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This thesis is intended as a contribution to the literature referred 
to as the "optimum currency area literature". The purpose of the 
analysis developed in the thesis is to gain an understanding of the 
monetary and financial implications of the actual currency area 
structure of the international economy. The analysis can then be used 
for the purpose of assessing whether changes in this currency area 
structure might be desirable. 
The theoretical material falls into three parts. Cross-country data 
are used in the theoretical chapters to assess the explanatory value 
of the ideas. The theoretical analysis is then applied to the 
historical experience of an individual country, Argentina. Time series 
data are offered for the application to the Argentine case. 
The first theoretical section of the thesis is concerned with the 
structure of the money supply in an economy as between its imported and 
domestic components. A central tenet of the thesis is that there are 
cross-country differences in the size of the imported share of the 
money supply which is required for monetary and exchange rate 
stability, and that these cross-country differences can be related to 
structural characteristics of an economy. It is shown that the 
structure of incremental money demand has important balance of 
payments implications. 
A theoretical framework for the analysis of the structure of the 
money supply is developed. This framework is then used to argue that 
an economy which makes more extensive use of external financial 
intermediation will require a larger share of foreign exchange reserves 
in the monetary base. 
The second part of the theoretical analysis studies some 
relationships between the currency area structure of the international 
economy and patterns of international financial intermediation. It is 
argued that we can identify certain structural features of a currency 
area which would give rise to a tendency for residents to make use of 
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foreign financial centres. The theoretical considerations lead to an 
explanation, in terms of currency area structure, of certain cross- 
country differences in financial development. 
In the third theoretical section, the analytical framework which was 
developed in previous chapters is used to address three specific 
questions. These questions serve to bring out some answers to the more 
general question of what are the implications for an economy of using 
an imported money supply. The analysis yields some new perspectives on 
the monetary and financial implications of import substitution 
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This thesis is intended as a contribution to the literature referred to 
as the "optimum currency area literature". It does not, however, 
directly address the question "what is the optimum currency area? ", but 
instead approaches issues concerning currency area structure from a 
slightly different direction. Instead of attempting to identify the 
"optimum currency area", the purpose of the analysis developed in this 
thesis is to gain an understanding of some of the monetary and 
financial implications of the actual currency area structure of the 
international economy. The analysis can then be used for the purpose 
of assessing whether changes in this currency area structure might be 
desirable for particular countries or groups of countries. Governments 
of certain types of economy, for instance, might conclude that national 
priorities could be more successfully pursued by joining with other 
economies in a larger currency area, while in other cases the policy 
conclusions drawn from the analysis would point to a need for greater 
regional monetary independence. The intention of this thesis is to 
improve our understanding of the implications of the actual currency 
area structure of the international economy. 
The theoretical material offered in this thesis falls into three 
parts, and is covered in Chapters II-IV. The theoretical analysis 
developed in these three chapters is then applied to the specific case 
of Argentina, in Chapter V, with the help of statistical material on 
the variables identified by the previous analysis. 
The concept of "external financial intermediation", referred to as 
"EFI", is defined in Chapter II and has an important role throughout 
the thesis. Briefly, EFI refers to the use by residents of one 
currency area of financial instruments denominated in a foreign 
currency, or issued by non-resident financial intermediaries, or both. 
"External financial intermediation", or EFI, is distinguished from 
"domestic financial intermediation", which is defined analogously, and 
which is referred to as "DFI". 
The central theoretical core of the thesis is concerned with the 
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structure of the money supply in an economy as between its imported and 
domestic components, and is developed in Chapter II. It will be 
recalled that the literature on optimum currency areas had originally 
emerged in the context of the debate on the relative merits of fixed 
versus flexible exchange rates, prior to the breakdown of the "Bretton 
Woods" system of fixed exchange rates. Here some of the same key 
issues are approached from a different direction. Instead of asking 
whether fixed exchange rates may be desirable for a particular type of 
currency area, we ask the following questions: if a currency area is 
to be successful in maintaining a fixed exchange rate, what share of 
the domestic money supply must be comprised of, or backed by, the 
imported component of the money supply? What structural 
characteristics of a currency area can we identify that would enable it 
to successfully maintain a fixed exchange rate, over an indefinite 
period, with a lower ratio of foreign exchange reserves to the total 
money supply than would be required for another currency area to be 
successful in maintaining a fixed exchange rate? We then go on to 
analyze some of the implications for an economy of using an imported 
money supply, and of changes in the share of the imported component of 
the money supply which is compatible with the maintenance of exchange 
rate stability. The analysis developed in this thesis thus addresses 
issues raised by exchange rate policy by means of first analyzing the 
implications of currency area structure for the structure of the money 
supply, and then analyzing the implications for the economy of a 
particular structure of the money supply. 
Determination of the relative shares of the domestic credit and 
imported components of the monetary base is a subject which has been 
treated in a variety of open economy monetary models, from quite a 
different perspective. In standard textbook models the composition of 
the monetary base, as between the domestic credit and imported 
components, is commonly treated as a sort of residual, to which no 
particular importance is attached, except that the danger of exhausting 
foreign exchange reserves is usually pointed out. It is also regularly 
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acknowledged that increasing the domestic credit component of the 
monetary base by "sterilizing" foreign exchange reserve losses can not 
continue ad infinitum, but at some stage will precipitate a crisis, 
when the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate becomes impossible. It 
is also regularly acknowledged that there are very great cross country 
differences in the level of foreign exchange reserves at which reserves 
begin to be perceived as inadequate, and a crisis may be precipitated. 
One way of looking at the theory developed in Chapter II of this thesis 
is that it provides an approach to analysis of cross-country and 
historical differences in the relative share of the imported component 
of the money supply which is perceived as "adequate" by wealth-holders. 
The view taken here is that over the long run wealth-holders will 
impose on an economy their view of what constitutes an adequate share 
of the imported component of the money supply, via the mechanism of 
exchange rate changes. If a government persists in attempting to 
maintain in circulation a stock of money in which the share of the 
imported component is lower than that which is considered "adequate" by 
wealth-holders, the result will be repeated devaluations (or persistent 
depreciation) of the currency in question. The question of whether 
there can be national independence in monetary policy thus will be seen 
from a new perspective through the analysis offered in this thesis. 
A key argument developed in Chapter II is that the relative 
predominance of external financial intermediation (EFI), in relation to 
domestic financial intermediation (DFI), is one of the important 
factors influencing the structure of the money supply. The arguments 
developed in Chapter II lead to the conclusion that currency areas in 
which EFI is relatively important will require the share of the 
imported component of the monetary base to be larger, relative to the 
domestic component, than would be required for the maintenance of a 
fixed exchange rate in a currency area where DFI predominates more 
strongly. 
Policy measures which influence the relative shares of EFI and DFI in 
the total financial intermediation activity of a currency area 
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therefore also influence the structure of the money supply which is 
compatible with exchange rate stability. Disagreeable consequences of 
using an imported monetary base can thus be successfully combatted by 
policies which lead to a strengthening of the relative share of DFI in 
the financial structure. Policies which are devised for the purpose of 
strengthening domestic financial development therefore also have 
implications for the structure of the money supply. 
It follows from this analysis that characteristics of currency area 
structure which have an influence on patterns of international 
financial intermediation will also have a bearing on the required 
structure of the money supply. In particular, characteristics of 
currency area structure which tend to lead residents in certain types 
of currency area to make relatively strong use of EFI, such that the 
DFI share in the domestic financial structure is relatively weak, will 
tend to cause this type of currency area to require a relatively large 
imported component in its monetary base for the maintenance of monetary 
stability and a fixed exchange rate regime. In Chapter III the 
implications of certain characteristics of currency area structure for 
patterns of international financial intermediation are examined. 
The analysis developed in Chapters II and III have a direct bearing 
on exchange rate policy. This is because the manner in which exchange 
rate policy is conducted is one of the factors identified as 
influencing the relative shares of EFI and DFI, and therefore also the 
required structure of the money supply. Policies which lead to 
repeated devaluations, or persistent depreciation, of a currency, are 
seen to cause EFI to increase relative to DFI, which in turn leads to 
an increase in the share of the imported component of the monetary base 
which would be required for the successful maintenance of a fixed 
exchange rate. Policies of exchange controls and restrictions on 
international transactions, implemented for the purpose of holding the 
exchange rate at levels which are perceived by the public as 
overvalued, are seen to cause similar tendencies. The phenomenon 




In Chapter II the theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
structure of the money supply is developed. Three types of base money 
are distinguished for use in the analysis. Four types of monetary 
system are then identified analytically by the types of money used in 
each system. An algebraic formulation of the structure of the money 
supply is used in an identity which enables us to characterise the four 
types of monetary system by the range of values taken by various terms 
in the identity. This identity is then used to develop the analysis of 
the factors determining the relative share of the imported component of 
the money supply which would be required for the successful maintenance 
of monetary and exchange rate stability. The identity serves to draw 
together various concepts of reserve adequacy which have appeared in 
different contexts in the economics and economic history literatures. 
The distinctions between the three types of base money are in part 
taken from the distinctions between "inside" money and "outside" money 
developed by Gurley and Shaw [1960]. The definition of "inside" money 
used in this thesis is taken directly from Gurley and Shaw. However, 
their term "outside" money is not used here, because the term as they 
use it includes both of the other two types of money distinguished 
here, "imported" money, and paper money issued without any asset 
backing, referred to in this thesis as "fiat" money. The precise 
meaning attached to these three terms in this thesis is explained in 
detail in Chapter II. 
The distinction which is of primary interest in this thesis is that 
between the imported and the domestic components of the money supply, 
where the domestic components may be either "fiat" or "inside" money. 
Therefore the distinction between "imported" money and the other two 
types of base money is vital to the analysis. 
Historically and geographically, the number of economies in which two 
distinguishable types of money, or two currencies, are used for the 
performance of the functions of money far outnumber the cases of 
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economies in which a single currency has been used for all monetary 
functions. Historical problems of monetary chaos, when a great many 
different currencies or forms of money were in simultaneous use, to the 
detriment of the efficient performance of monetized markets, do not 
concern us particularly here, nor do the supposed advantages of 
multiple competing monies. With multiple competing monies the concept 
of a currency area would in any case seem to lose its meaning. There 
has been however, a persistent pattern, which can be observed in many 
of the world's economies, for much of modern economic history, in the 
use of two monies, which is captured in the analytical framework 
developed in this thesis. One of the two monies is a "hard" money, in 
the sense that stocks of it are' used as reserves, and it is usually 
imported; the other money is of domestic origin, is the standard medium 
of exchange for the currency area, and may be quite "soft". The use of 
two monies, one hard and one soft, is standard practice in many of the 
world's countries at present; dollarization is one form of this 
practice. 
The case of economies in which a single currency is used for all 
monetary functions by private residents, and stocks of the imported 
money are held only by official monetary institutions, is portrayed in 
the analytical framework used here as a special case, within a broader 
picture. 
The analytical formulation of the structure of the money supply which 
is used here thus enables us to analyze a diverse range of monetary 
structure, along a spectrum in which the imported component of the 
money supply has a relatively smaller or larger share. At one extreme 
the entire money stock may be imported, as for instance in an economy 
in which the sole form of money is imported silver or gold coin. At 
another extreme, an economy might hold only a very small stock of the 
imported money, as reserves in the official monetary institutions, with 
domestic forms of money serving all monetary functions for the private 
sector, including reserves for private sector banks. The formulation 
of the structure of the money supply which is normally used in 
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textbooks on money and banking, or on basic international monetary 
economics, for instance, portrays an economy of this latter type, which 
is here identified as a special case. 
The analytical framework developed in Chapter II can be applied to a 
wide range of policy issues and problems. For instance, it will enable 
us to analyze the proposal that countries with soft currencies and 
intractable inflation problems should change to using an imported 
monetary base, as in the currency board system. Many of the world's 
poorer countries have experienced intractable problems of monetary 
instability and capital flight in the post-WWII period, in association 
with unsuccessful attempts to manage a monetary system based on a 
larger domestic credit component of the monetary base than had been 
maintained during gold standard or currency board days. It is often 
argued that such economies should adopt, or return to, a currency board 
type of monetary system. Eastern European countries are confronting 
similar questions of monetary system. Western banks which some of 
these economies might like to attract may prefer to deal in hard 
currencies, and may perceive a system which uses an exclusively hard 
currency base as in everyone's best interest. The analytical framework 
developed in this thesis can be used to address all of these policy 
questions. 
The analysis offered in this thesis is also pertinent to economies 
which have undergone significant changes in any of the factors which 
have been identified by the theoretical arguments developed here as 
contributing to the determination of the required structure of the 
money supply. For instance, this analysis can be used to identify 
implications for an economy of changes in the relative share of the 
domestic financial system which is conducted through the use of 
financial instruments denominated in a foreign currency, or in the 
tendency for residents to use EFI. 




The question addressed in Chapter III of the thesis concerns the 
implications of the currency area structure of the international 
economy for patterns of international financial intermediation. What 
features of a currency area might we be able to identify as giving rise 
to a tendency for residents of that currency area to make use of 
external financial intermediation rather than domestic financial 
intermediation? That is, are there identifiable structural features'of 
a currency area which would tend to cause resident savers to prefer to 
hold their saving abroad, or in foreign denominated financial 
instruments, or both? 
If we can identify structural characteristics of a currency area 
which would give rise to this tendency, then we can gain some 
understanding of ways in which the present currency area structure of 
the international economy is contributing to the determination of the 
observed patterns of international financial intermediation. We can 
then identify certain types of currency area as being confronted, 
because of the influence of these structural characteristics, with 
particular problems in the development of a domestic financial 
structure which would not tend to arise in other types of currency 
area. Policy measures can then be directed either towards changing the 
structure of such currency areas, or towards overcoming these 
particular problems in the domestic economy while remaining within the 
existing currency area structure. 
Analysis of the influence of currency area structure on patterns of 
international financial intermediation thus has an important 
application to the formulation of national policies concerning the 
development of the domestic financial structure. If an economy is 
characterised by structural features which give rise to a tendency for 
residents to use financial instruments issued in foreign financial 
centres, or denominated in a foreign currency, the implementation of 
policies which have been successful in other types of currency areas 
may have quite disappointing results if the influence of these 
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structural features on the financial structure is not taken into 
account. The achievement of successful domestic financial development 
in economies characterised by these features may require policy 
measures which were not needed in the financial development of other 
types of currency area. Analysis of the financial implications of 
currency area structure thus has important applications to the 
formulation of national policy on financial development. 
The structural features identified in Chapter III as giving rise to 
this tendency for residents of a currency area to use foreign, or 
foreign denominated, financial instruments, are features which are 
characteristic of many of the world's poorer countries, i. e. those 
commonly referred to as "less developed", or "LDCs". The analysis 
developed here thus has particular pertinence to the formulation of 
policies attempting to foster financial development in these countries. 
It also offers a means of explaining some of the observed patterns of 
cross-country differences in the type of financial structure which has 
developed. Some of the cross-country data on financial structure given 
by Raymond Goldsmith in his books on financial structure and 
development will be used in Chapter III in assessing the influence of 
the currency area structure of the international economy on the 
observed pattern of cross-country differences in financial structure. 
In Chapter IV the theoretical analysis developed in the preceding 
chapters will be used to address three specific questions. These 
questions have been chosen for their pertinence to policy issues of 
current interest. The third of these questions was chosen with 
specific reference to the case of Argentina, and the theoretical 
analysis developed in Chapter IV serves as the basis for the 
statistical study presented in Chapter V. Application of the analysis 
to these three specific questions serves to bring out the main points 
of the answers offered in the thesis to the more general question of 




The following three questions are addressed: 
(1) What are the implications of using a completely imported monetary 
base, as in a currency board type system, as is sometimes advocated for 
"soft currency" countries? 
(2) What are the implications for an economy of significant increase in 
the required share of the imported component of the money supply? 
(3) What are the implications for an economy of a fall in the traded 
share of national output unaccompanied by a fall in the required share 
of the imported component of the money supply? 
The implications of using a completely imported monetary base are also 
discussed to some extent in Chapter II, since two of the four types of 
monetary system identified in that context are characterised by the use 
of a completely imported monetary base. 
The first of these three questions was chosen for analysis because it 
is pertinent to policy issues facing a great many countries at present. 
It also serves to bring out some new perspectives on certain historical 
phenomena which emerge through the theoretical approach developed in 
this thesis. 
The second of these questions may be pertinent to the case of Post- 
WWII Britain. The analysis offers some new perspectives on Britain's 
post-WWII balance of payments difficulties and struggles with 
unemployment and inflation. 
The third question I believe to be pertinent to the case of 
Argentina. I believe this question to be also more generally pertinent 
to many countries which have been pursuing import substitution 
industrialization policies associated with substantial restrictions on 
trade and capital flows. The pertinence to the Argentine case of the 
analysis developed in Chapter IV will be tested against statistical 
material in Chapter V. 
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The application of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II to 
the questions analyzed in Chapter IV required some assumptions to be 
made about the real structure of the economy being analyzed. A basic 
structure of perfect competition is used, in a fairly standard 
"dependent economy", i. e. two sector, model, with "traded" and "non- 
traded" goods and services. The new perspectives which emerge from the 
analysis result from two alterations to the basic dependent economy 
model with perfect competition. The first of these two alterations is 
that imported money is distinguished from domestic types of money, and 
imported money is a traded good. It is a traded good because it is, by 
definition, imported. Changes in the structure of incremental money 
demand as between the imported and the domestic components of the money 
supply, therefore alters the aggregate structure of demand for traded 
as opposed to non-traded goods. Incremental money demand can be large 
relative to total export earnings, so that the relative share of this 
incremental money demand which is for the imported money can have a 
large influence on the aggregate structure of demand as between traded 
and non-traded goods. The structure of the money supply therefore is 
shown through this analysis to have important implications for the 
structure of relative prices between traded and non-traded goods. 
The second alteration to the basic dependent economy model concerns 
the structure of the production function. The alteration to the 
production function is that it includes a liquidity term as well as the 
standard factor inputs. The inclusion of the liquidity term follows 
the analysis given by Gurley and Shaw [1960], in which liquidity for 
firms is seen as making some real contribution to the efficiency with 
which factor inputs can be transformed into output. This formulation 
of the production function also gives expression to some of the main 
lines of argument developed in the economic history literature in 
explaining the historical development of banking and financial 
intermediation. Real money, or liquidity, thus enters into the 
production function and has a real marginal product, as do other factor 
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inputs. The marginal product of liquidity is assumed to be diminishing 
in relevant ranges, as are marginal products of other factors; the 
marginal product of liquidity is assumed to fall to zero quite rapidly 
at some level of liquidity, to avoid the implausible implication that 
an increase in the real money supply could by itself generate increases 
of output beyond some level of liquidity. The basic analysis of 
perfect competition theory of distribution is then used to derive 
conclusions concerning the implications for the two sectors of changes 
in the structure of incremental money demand. Implications of such 
changes for trends in relative prices of traded and non-traded goods, 
and in returns to fixed factors within the currency area are given 
particular attention. 
The combination of these two alterations to the standard dependent 
economy model with perfect competition yields some very interesting new 




EFI and the relative shares of the 
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imported and domestic credit based 
components 
of the money supply 
1 Introduction 
This section of the thesis develops the idea that the relative shares 
of the imported and domestic components of the money supply which are 
compatible with monetary and exchange rate stability depend upon the 
relative predominance of External Financial Intermediation (EFI) in the 
financial structure of an economy. It is argued that in a currency 
area in which EFI is relatively predominant a larger share for the 
imported component of the monetary base will be required for monetary 
and exchange rate stability. By contrast, in a currency area in which 
Domestic Financial Intermediation (DFI) predominates strongly over EFI 
monetary and exchange rate stability will be compatible with a much 
smaller share for the imported component of the monetary base. The 
concept of External Financial Intermediation is explained in detail 
below. 
The concept of "the relative shares of the imported and domestic 
components of the money supply which are compatible with monetary and 
exchange rate stability" requires some clarification. A central tenet 
of this section of the thesis is that there are cross country 
differences in the relative shares of the imported and domestic 
components of the money supply which are compatible with monetary and 
exchange rate stability. In this section of the thesis I first provide 
a framework for the analysis of these cross-country differences; I then 
go on to make use of this framework in order to analyze the 
contribution of various factors to the determination of these cross 
country differences. I will explain what is meant by "compatible with 
monetary and exchange rate stability" more fully below. 
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As a first step in developing this analytical framework, three types 
of base money are distinguished. The use of combinations of these 
types of money in different monetary systems is then discussed. Four 
types of monetary system are discussed, these being identified 
analytically by the types of money used. Particular attention is given 
to the implications of the composition of the money supply for the 
nature of the lender of last resort function in the different regimes. 
Costs of the various systems are also given attention. 
The distinctions between the three types of money are in part based 
on the distinctions between "inside" and "outside" money developed by 
Gurley and Shaw [1960]. Their definition of "inside" money is 
retained. However, their term "outside" money includes both of the 
other two types of money distinguished here: "imported" money is one 
of these two types; domestic paper fiat money is the third type used 
here, and it is referred to as "fiat" money. 
This section makes use of an algebraic identity which enables us to 
characterise the four types of monetary system in terms of the range of 
values taken by various terms in the identity. Some of the claim that 
an EFI economy must have a larger share of imported money in the money 
supply is revealed through the use of this identity to be true by 
definition, and the identity is thus serving the useful, if modest, 
role of clarification. The algebraic formulation is then used to draw 
together various concepts of what constitutes "adequacy" of foreign 
exchange reserves, and to develop the argument that a smaller share of 
imported money can be compatible with monetary and exchange rate 
stability when DFI is stronger relative to EFI. 
Historically, the relative shares of the imported and domestic 
components of the money supply have been very different in different 
countries. Within individual countries, these relative shares have 
also differed over time. At one extreme are economies which use an 
entirely imported circulating medium, such as silver and gold coins, or 
an imported paper money such as US$ (in countries outside the USA). 
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For instance, in 1803,94.7% of the circulating medium in France was 
specie, which, since France had no gold or silver mines, was entirely 
imported. ' For England and Wales, in 1800, the equivalent figure was 
40%; in 1913 it was only 11.5%. 2 In France, the share of specie in the 
circulating medium also fell during the 19th century, but not as far; 
in 1910 this share was still 32.9%. 
Not only are there sharp historical and national contrasts in the 
imported share in the circulating medium, but there are equally sharp 
contrasts in the proportion of the paper monetary instruments which are 
"covered" by specie or foreign exchange reserves. At one extreme, for 
example, we have the currency board economies, in which the local paper 
note issue was "covered" 100% (or sometimes even more) by foreign 
exchange reserves. Similarly, in Argentina, between 1893 and 1930, 
paper note issue was solely against gold. However, commercial banks in 
these economies also made a contribution to the circulating medium, by 
deposit creation; a very much smaller share of this component of the 
circulating medium was usually "covered" by reserves of notes or 
foreign exchange, so that even if the coverage of the notes themselves 
was 100%, the gold (or foreign exchange) coverage of the total 
circulating medium was substantially less than 100%. In Argentina, for 
instance, the share of the total money supply which was "covered" by 
gold was 35.6% in 1913. The figure for France, in 1910, was nearly 
identical to that for Argentina, at 35.9%, whereas the figure for 
France had been 97.4% in 1803. An extreme case at the opposite end of 
the spectrum may be offered by the case of Scotland, towards the end of 
the 19th century, when "... it is unusual for specie reserves [of the 
big banks of note issue] to exceed 5% of total liabilities to the 
public; more often they are less than 1%... "3 
The analysis of these cross-country and historical differences in the 
structure of the money supply, in terms of the relative shares of the 
imported and domestic components, is the subject of this section of the 
thesis. 
The following contrasting quotations may serve to clarify the nature 
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of the questions being addressed. The first quotation is from A. G. 
Ford : 
"Throughout the nineteenth century the history of the Argentine 
currency had been a melancholy tale of the over-issue of paper money 
usually to provide funds for national or provincial governments, 
interspersed with temporary attempts at stabilization, the printing 
press being the favourite source of revenue for bankrupt, and at times 
corrupt, administrations. w4 
This quote from Ford expresses a very well known perspective, in 
which the use of the inflation tax is portrayed in a strongly negative 
manner. Note however that Ford makes no mention of the richness or 
poverty of the inflation tax base, i. e., of the success (or otherwise) 
of the government in profitably putting this paper money into 
circulation. Emilio Hansen, on the other hand, writes about the same 
epoch in Argentine monetary history from a strikingly different 
perspective: 
"... In whatever [budgetary] emergency arose, there was the Bank of 
the Province of Buenos Aires... with credit always growing, and power 
to issue a paper circulating medium which was accepted and circulated 
without resistance in commerce and among the people... The people did 
not concern themselves particularly with knowing whether this paper 
money appreciated or depreciated, but were satisfied with the knowledge 
that this money was a standard of value and could be used to cancel 
debts... "5 
Hansen goes on to contrast the position of the Buenos Aires 
government, which has just been described, with that of less fortunate 
neighbouring governments: 
"... Buenos Aires [province and city] was able to maintain a long and 
costly war without putting burdensome pressure on its financial 
contributors, while their adversary could barely manage to scrape puny 
sums from lenders at usurious rates... While Buenos Aires flourished 
with a circulating medium of 14 or 15 million pesos of absolutely 
inconvertible paper money, [their adversary] the Parana government 
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could not manage to keep in circulation even a single million pesos, 
despite covering them with all sorts of promises and guarantees... i6 
The city and province of Buenos Aires made habitual use of paper 
money as the circulating medium, whereas the neighbouring nations, 
including that under the Parana government, used a metallic circulating 
medium, largely silver, which was imported. 
Whereas Ford has expressed the familiar negative view concerning the 
use, and governmental abuse, of the inflation tax, Hansen draws 
attention to the great advantages for a government, and for its 
populace, in being able to make use of the inflation tax in financial 
"emergencies" instead of being forced to such extremities as borrowing 
at usurious rates of interest and to giving up their best sources of 
revenue to pay foreign creditors. Hansen stresses differences between 
the Buenos Aires government and surrounding (independent) governments 
in this respect, and draws attention to the question of what factors 
may determine these differences in the richness of the inflation tax 
base. 
Hansen asks a question which is very close to that which I am 
addressing in this section of the thesis, since the alternative form of 
money in question was imported (metallic money): 
"... What are the circumstances or situations which enable a paper 
money to take root and prosper, and what factors oppose this success? " 
The central point in Hansen's answer is as follows: 
"... paper money.. . can not exist except 
in the context of 
commerce... it is the invention of commerce, for the purpose of giving 
wings to credit, the life and power of commerce... "7 
This is not so very far from the argument which I will develop here, 
that a larger domestic share in the money supply can be compatible with 
monetary and exchange rate stability when this domestic money is used 
extensively in the process of financial intermediation. Hansen, 
however, formulated his questions in terms of the use of paper money as 
opposed to metallic money, whereas in this thesis the focus is on the 
distinction between imported money and money of domestic creation. 
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Hansen's perspectives are pertinent because of the circumstance that 
the two types of money he discusses correspond to my categories: the 
paper money was of domestic creation, whereas the metallic money was 
imported. His questions can therefore be re-interpreted in terms of 
the distinction which concerns us here. 
Determination of the relative shares of the domestic credit and 
imported components of the monetary base is a subject which has been 
treated in a variety of open economy monetary models, from quite a 
different perspective. In these models the composition of the monetary 
base, as between the domestic credit and imported components, is 
commonly treated as a sort of residual, to which no particular 
importance is attached, except that the danger of exhausting foreign 
exchange reserves is usually pointed out. It is, however, regularly 
acknowledged that increasing the domestic credit component of the 
monetary base by "sterilizing" foreign exchange reserve losses can not 
continue ad infinitum, but at some stage will precipitate a crisis, 
when the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate becomes impossible. It 
is also regularly acknowledged that there are very great cross country 
differences in the level of foreign exchange reserves at which reserves 
begin to be perceived as inadequate, and a crisis may be precipitated. 
The theory developed in this section of the thesis provides an approach 
to analysis of cross-country and historical differences in the relative 
share of the imported component of the money supply which is perceived 
as "adequate" by wealth-holders. The concept of the relative share of 
the imported component of the money supply being "compatible with 
monetary and exchange rate stability" thus means that the share of this 
imported component is perceived as "adequate" by wealth-holders. The 
view taken here is that over the long run wealth-holders will impose on 
an economy their view of what constitutes an adequate share of the 
imported component of the money supply, via the mechanism of exchange 
rate changes. If a government persists in attempting to maintain in 
circulation a stock of money in which the share of the imported 
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component is lower than that which is considered "adequate" by wealth- 
holders, the result will be repeated devaluations (or persistent 
depreciation) of the currency in question and the erosion of the 
inflation tax base. 
The question of whether there can be national independence in 
monetary policy thus is seen from a new perspective through this 
analysis. The total stock of money which can be maintained 
successfully in circulation depends upon the relative shares of the 
imported and domestic components of the money supply which are 
perceived as adequate by wealth holders, as well as on the level of 
foreign exchange reserves. Sterilization of fluctuations in foreign 
exchange reserves for the purpose of maintaining some desired level of 
the money stock can therefore be a successful policy only when it does 
not involve persistence in reducing the ratio of foreign exchange 
reserves to the total money supply below that "adequate" level. 
National monetary policy independence is therefore a reality only 
within the range which may be permitted by these reserve fluctuations. 
There is, however, the possibility of a stronger form of national 
monetary independence which emerges from the analysis: Governments can 
operate on some of the factors which determine the cross-country 
differences in these "adequate" relative shares of the imported and 
domestic components in the money supply. 
Indeed, if governments ignore the factors which determine these cross- 
country differences, and attempt to maintain some desired level of the 
money stock simply by expanding the domestic credit component of the 
money supply, they run the risk of reducing their inflation tax base 
and making matters worse, as will be seen. 
The questions addressed in this section of the thesis are particularly 
pertinent to the many economies in the world in which there has been a 
problem of currency "softening". In response to this problem, the 
suggestion has sometimes been made that a currency board type of 
monetary system might be more successful. Eastern European economies 
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are facing these same issues as they are being opened up to market 
activity. The analytical framework developed in this section enables 
us to identify some of the factors which determine cross-country 
differences in the structure of the money supply, and thereby gives us 
a means of analyzing these issues. 
From the argument that the imported share of the money supply will need 
to be larger in an economy dominated by EFI, the conclusion will be 
derived that there is a role for government in economies of this type 
in actively fostering the development of DFI. This might include the 
establishment and development of financial intermediary institutions 
for the purpose of building up DFI business. 
This conclusion supports, and extends, the view expressed by R. S. 
Sayers8 that central banks in underdeveloped countries should cultivate 
active banking business. It also offers support, from a new 
perspective, to the view that development of the financial structure 
has an important contribution to make to real economic development. On 
the other hand, this conclusion opposes the view that the best way to 
monetary stability and financial development in an economy suffering 
the destructive effects of persistent inflations is simply to abandon 
the domestic currency altogether and use an imported "hard" currency 
instead. It also opposes the extreme view that everything should be 
left to the private sector in financial development. 
I will begin the analysis of this chapter of the thesis by explaining 
the concept of External Financial Intermediation. 
2 Clarification of concepts 
External Financial intermediation 
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I use the term "external financial intermediation" (EFI) to refer to 
the use, by residents of a given currency area, either of foreign 
denominated financial instruments or of non-resident financial 
intermediary institutions. This is distinguished from "domestic 
financial intermediation" (DFI), in which the process of financial 
intermediation is carried out by domestic financial intermediaries 
using financial instruments denominated in the domestic currency. 
Two types of "external financial intermediation" are distinguished: 
(1) "currency type EFI", which refers to financial intermediation using 
instruments denominated in a foreign currency; and (2) "geographical 
EFI", which refers to financial intermediation carried out through non- 
resident financial institutions. Geographical EFI usually also 
involves currency type EFI, but not invariably. The pure currency type 
EFI does not involve geographical EFI, but is financial intermediation 
carried out by domestic resident financial institutions. Pure currency 
type EFI involves the channelling of domestic savings to domestic 
borrowers, through the financial intermediation services of domestic 
resident intermediaries; the only "external" element is that the 
financial instruments involved are denominated in a foreign currency. 
These concepts may be clarified with the help of some examples. A 
case of pure currency type EFI occurs, for instance, when a London bank 
accepts dollar denominated deposits from one group of UK residents, and 
extends dollar denominated loans to other UK residents; in the 
geographical sense, since UK residents are using a UK resident 
financial institution, this constitutes domestic financial 
intermediation, or "geographical DFI". When the Argentine government 
sells US$ denominated bonds through local Argentine financial 
intermediaries to Argentine residents, we have another case of pure 
currency type EFI (and geographical DFI); domestic savers are lending 
to a domestic borrower through the intermediation of domestic resident 
financial intermediaries. On the other hand, when residents of 
Venezuela hold dollar assets in New York, and the Venezuelan government 
(or any other Venezuelan resident) simultaneously borrows dollars in 
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New York, we have EFI in both the geographical and currency sense. 
Here again, we have domestic savers lending to a domestic borrower, but 
the financial intermediary services employed to achieve this effect are 
in this case provided by non-resident institutions. If the Venezuelan 
government is borrowing in New York more than Venezuelan residents have 
invested in New York, we have a case of net capital movements from New 
York to Venezuela as well as a case of EFI. The distinction between 
net capital movements and geographical EFI is a very important one, and 
will be clarified further below. 
In this terminology, a branch of a foreign bank operating within a 
given currency area is engaging in "domestic financial intermediation" 
(DFI) to the extent that it performs financial intermediation between 
domestic resident savers and borrowers using financial instruments 
denominated in the domestic currency. For other purposes of study, the 
"domestic" and "foreign" elements of a country's financial structure 
have often been distinguished in different categories. For instance, 
the study of financial development has had reason to be concerned with 
differences between the roles played by branches and subsidiaries of 
foreign financial institutions and the role of domestic banks. For 
this reason, among others, information about an economy's banking 
structure sometimes distinguishes between "domestic banks" and "foreign 
banks"; this distinction is usually given by residence of head office, 
but it is also sometimes given by source of capital. Information about 
the currency denomination of the banking activity, rather than about 
residence of head office, is what the distinction between currency type 
EFI and ordinary DFI requires. 
It might turn out to be generally the case, as I discovered it to be 
in Argentina, that "domestic" banks lead in DFI, while "foreign" banks 
tend to use the currency type EFI to a much larger extent. In the 
Argentine case, prior to WWI, banking data sometimes enables us to 
distinguish between banks with gold denominated capital and banks with 
domestic paper denominated capital; this is not exactly the same as 
what is usually meant by "foreign" and "domestic" banks, but the 
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categorizations do overlap substantially. Banks with gold denominated 
capital had 31.6% of their loans, by value, denominated in gold 
(currency type EFI) in 1900, whereas the figure for banks with paper 
denominated capital was only 7.72%. By 1910 these figures had fallen 
to 13.04% and 1.74% respectively (See tables in Chapter V for further 
details. ) The role of foreign banks in the economic development of a 
country may be quite different from that of domestic banks if foreign 
banks do tend to use EFI substantially more than domestic banks do. 
The currency type EFI is the focus of interest in this study. As 
indicated above, the general concept "currency type EFI" includes all 
foreign denominated financial instruments used by resident savers and 
investors, whether the financial intermediary institution is resident 
or non-resident. That is, it includes both the pure currency type EFI 
and the cases of currency type EFI which are also EFI in the 
geographical sense. Analytically, I would treat financial instruments 
which are indexed to the exchange rate as foreign currency denominated, 
and these are therefore to be included in currency type EFI. The 
measurement of the relative importance of currency type EFI thus 
involves looking at the currency denomination of domestic resident 
financial intermediation, as well as at foreign assets and liabilities 
held by residents. Data on the currency denomination of the banking 
system for the case of Argentina is offered in Chapter V, for the 
period 1900-1931. 
The balance of payments implications of the pure currency type EFI 
differ from those of geographical EFI, as follows: In the case of pure 
currency type EFI, we have domestic resident savers and borrowers being 
served by domestic resident financial intermediaries. The pure 
currency type EFI therefore involves no transactions with non- 
residents, and does not show up in the external balance of payments; 
the financial intermediation services being performed are part of 
domestic GDP. Geographical EFI, on the other hand, involves the use by 
resident savers and borrowers of non-resident financial intermediary 
institutions; it therefore involves the import of foreign financial 
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services. Geographical EFI thus does involve flows of payments which 
figure in the balance of external payments, in contrast with pure 
currency type EFI. 
The balance of payments implications of geographical EFI may be 
clarified with an example. Consider the case of an economy which has 
zero net external debt, but which makes use of geographical EFI, using 
the standard formulation of the balance of payments, as follows: X-M 
-S+K= dG, where dG is the change in official reserves, X, M, and*K 
are exports, imports, and net capital movements, respectively, and S is 
net debt service. By assumption K=0, and net foreign debt is also 
zero. The use of geographical EFI involves resident savers in holding 
assets in non-resident financial institutions; there will therefore be 
a flow of interest and dividends to the holders of these assets, which 
figures as a credit item within S. Resident borrowers from abroad, on 
the other hand, have to pay out interest and dividends on their foreign 
loans. The net debt service item, S, thus represents the difference 
between the average borrowing and lending rates charged by the non- 
resident financial institutions involved, multiplied by the value of 
the stock of financial instruments involved. 
In other words, S is in this case the flow of payments made for the 
use of foreign financial services. If the use of non-resident 
financial intermediaries involves large volumes of savings and 
borrowing, the value for net debt service could be quite large, even 
though we have assumed net debt to be zero. In this case the large net 
debt service item represents extensive use of non-resident financial 
services; this case may be contrasted with a case in which net debt 
service represents interest and amortization on net foreign borrowing. 
To put it another way, geographical EFI involves "consumption" of 
financial services performed by non-resident intermediaries, in the 
same way that the use of non-resident shipping companies or the 
services of any other non-resident company does. If the consumption of 
services performed by non-residents is on a substantial scale, the 
payment for these services can give rise to a substantial figure for S 
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even when net capital movements are not involved. 
It should be also be noted that an economy which uses geographical 
EFI extensively will have a substantial GROSS external debt, without 
necessarily being a NET foreign debtor. As is well known, the external 
debt side of geographical EFI is usually visible (and legal) while the 
asset side of the process is often hidden. It can therefore be quite 
impossible to distinguish properly between external debt which is part 
of a process of geographical EFI, and external debt which represents 
net international capital movements. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between external debt which represents 
net capital movements and external debt which is part of a process of 
geographical EFI is a very important one, and needs to be clear 
analytically whatever the difficulties besetting empirical distinction. 
The reason the analytical distinction is so important is that the 
factors which determine net international capital movements are by no 
means identical with factors which determine the use of geographical 
EFI. Kindleberger [1987] has stressed this distinction with particular 
force, and has expressed the view that there has been excessive focus 
on explaining capital movements as if they were net capital movements, 
and inadequate attention to explaining the gross flows which 
characterize international financial intermediation. 
In this thesis the focus is on EFI, and not on net capital movements. 
The arguments presented in this section of the thesis provide a line of 
explanation for the use of EFI, but are not concerned with explaining 
net capital movements. 
The term "cross-border" financial intermediation is used by Bryant 
[1987]; his use of this term appears to be synonymous with what I have 
here termed "geographical EFI". Bryant also makes reference, in the 
same book, to the distinction between "domestic-currency and external- 
currency assets and liabilities". ' The terms "external financial 
intermediation" and "domestic financial intermediation" as I have used 
them here evolved in my own thought over a period of time, but clearly 
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owe a significant debt to Bryant's formulation of questions concerning 
international financial intermediation in the book cited. 
Currency area structure of the international economy 
The term "currency area" may be defined in various ways for various 
purposes. Here, for the purpose of looking at patterns of 
international financial intermediation, I am using a definition in 
terms of national boundaries: A "currency area" is here defined as the 
geographical domain within which a particular currency has legal (or 
customary) tender status. In general it may be taken as the 
monopolized domain of the currency in question (even though the use of 
foreign currencies may not be outlawed), and for the most part this is 
taken as coinciding with national boundaries. A "currency" is here 
understood as a denomination, such as sterling, dollars, pesos, etc., 
so that I will refer to a broad range of financial instruments issued 
in a particular currency which will include notes and coins but also 
other instruments such as treasury bills, bonds, etc. This usage 
coincides with standard journalistic practice and is more suited 
conceptually to my purposes than the narrower definition of currency as 
notes and coin. 
The term "currency area" is commonly used to refer to a group of 
countries which maintain fixed exchange rates. For the purpose of 
distinguishing between currency type EFI and DFI, however, it is 
necessary to use the narrower definition which has just been explained. 
The phrase "the currency area structure of the international economy" 
refers to the pattern in which the international economy is divided up 
into currency areas. Characteristics of this pattern which are 
pertinent to this section of the thesis include, for example, the size 
distribution of the world's currency areas, and the distribution among 
currency areas of other structural characteristics which might give 
rise to EFI. This phrase could sensibly be used with either the 
broader or the narrower meaning of the term "currency area". Since the 
focus of this section of the thesis is on the currency type EFI, 
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however, the narrower meaning will generally be intended. 
The "Two money strategy" 
The term "two money strategy", or, synonymously, "dual currency 
strategy", refers to the practice within a currency area of using two 
currencies (in the sense of the word "currency" just defined) to fulfil 
the functions of money rather than one. It refers in particular to the 
practice of using a foreign currency to fulfil the store of value 
function, while using the domestic currency as the medium of exchange. 
The types of financial instruments used to fulfil the "store of value 
function of money", as the phrase is used here, includes financial 
instruments normally classed as "non-monetary" as well as "monetary" 
financial instruments in the narrower sense of the word "monetary". 
I use the word "strategy" in the sense of a practice which is 
continued through a period of time, as for instance the practice, or 
habit, of using some usual combination of bank deposits and cash tends 
to be continued through time, as opposed to the sort of decision which 
might be made afresh every day. The notion of "strategy" will receive 
more precise explanation in Chapter III; in this section it may be 
understood as meaning customary practice. 
The practice of using two currencies to fulfil the functions of money 
requires further explanation. We may begin by recalling that I have 
been defining "currency" as a denomination, which includes a wide range 
of financial instruments. A currency performs the functions of money 
through the medium of the range of financial instruments denominated in 
that currency. Thus the dollar, for instance, performs the medium of 
exchange function through bills and cheques denominated in dollars: It 
performs the standard of deferred payment function through contracts 
denominated in dollars; it performs the store of value function through 
financial instruments denominated in dollars which are held in wealth 
portfolios; and it performs the unit of account function when values of 
goods or wealth are measured in terms of dollars. The dollar is an 







The USA is an example of a currency area in which the functions of 
money are nearly always all carried out in the same currency, the US$. 
This is the simplest case, and the one which is commonly assumed in US 
(or UK) textbook portrayals of money and banking. However, very few of 
the currency areas comprising the international economy are actually in 
this position, nor have been in this position in modern economic 
history. Far more numerous are the countries in which the domestic 
currency has legal tender status (or customary status), and is used as 
the normal medium of exchange, but in which the other functions of 
money are shared with some other currency (or currencies). Moreover, 
the expansion of "Euro-markets" has been extending the use of multiple 
currencies in some monetary functions, in some countries, while the 
increase of "dollarization" has been extending it in others. The use 
of both a "soft" domestic money and a "hard" foreign money is a 
familiar phenomenon in much of the world, and it is this practice in 
particular to which I refer with the term the "two money strategy". 
In the case of a currency area in which two currencies are being 
used, the exercise of the functions of money is carried out through 
financial instruments denominated in a variety of ways. It will be 
recalled that I have been defining "currency area" as the geographical 
domain within which a particular currency has legal tender (or 
customary tender) status. The legal (or customary) tender status of 
the domestic currency supports its use as a medium of exchange, and 
this function is normally carried out through notes and coins and 
cheques denominated in the domestic currency. On the other hand when 
longer term financial instruments, such as bonds, are issued, these may 
be denominated in the foreign, "hard", currency, although payable in 
the domestic currency. We then have a mixed case, in which the foreign 
currency is serving as a unit of account, standard of deferred payment, 
and store of value, but the domestic currency remains the medium of 
exchange. 
The range of financial instruments denominated in the domestic 
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currency reflects the range of monetary functions performed by that 
currency. 
In the "two money strategy" we have the domestic currency serving as 
the medium of exchange, and a "hard" foreign currency serving the store 
of value function. Sometimes the foreign currency is used in the form 
of hoards of imported cash, and sometimes, as in the case of the bond 
issue described above, it serves as the denomination for financial 
instruments issued through local financial intermediaries. In the 
latter case we have the pure currency type EFI. In a strict, or 
pedantic, sense, the holding of hoards of imported cash would 
constitute geographical (as well as currency type) EFI in cases when 
the foreign cash is a paper money which was issued by a foreign 
government through a process of financial intermediation, as opposed, 
for example, to hoards of gold coins. The two money strategy thus, 
these days, normally involves the use of currency type EFI in some form 
or other. It could, however, take the form of the use of a metallic 
money as the "hard" money, as indeed was the common practice in earlier 
times, in which case EFI would not be involved. 
Textbooks stress the interdependence of the functions of money, and 
the advantages of versatility, as explanations for the use of a single 
currency, and with good reason. For example, for a currency to 
function as a medium of exchange it must also serve as a store of value 
for at least long enough to take the holder from one transaction to 
another. It will serve better as a medium of exchange if it serves 
longer for a store of value, since it thereby gives the holder a wider 
range of choice for his next purchases. If the holder of a purse full 
of notes knows that prices denominated in these notes are rising daily, 
he has little time in which to choose what to buy before the rise in 
prices has removed his opportunity to buy anything at all. 
"Dollarization" usually refers to inroads made by the dollar against 
the domestic currency in the medium of exchange function which have 
occurred for precisely this reason. 
In economies where dollarization is important, dollars have usually 
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been sharing the functions of money with the local currency for some 
time, in the manner described above as the "two money strategy"; they 
have been serving as the unit of account and standard of deferred 
payment in a variety of contracts and financial instruments, and as a 
store of value for holders of dollar bills or financial assets 
denominated in dollars and held at home or abroad. Acceleration of 
inflation has then eroded the ability of the domestic currency to 
perform the store of value function even to the extent required by the 
medium of exchange function. 
In view of the interdependence of monetary functions, and the 
advantages of versatility, why is it that the use of two (or more) 
monies has been the much more common phenomenon, both historically and 
among the currency areas of the present time? Since the "two money 
strategy" is in fact much more common than the single money case, we 
are confronted with the question of whether there are advantages to 
this practice which offset the better known advantages of using the 
same currency for all monetary functions. This question is another way 
of looking at the question which is addressed in Chapter III of this 
thesis. The structural characteristics of certain types of currency 
area which give rise to currency type EFI also imply advantages to the 
"two money strategy" in the broader sense, as will be seen. 
3 Analytical Framework 
Types of money 
Three types of base money are distinguished. The distinctions are in 
part based on the distinctions between "inside" and "outside" money 
developed by Gurley and Shaw, 10 and their definition of "inside" money 
is retained. However, their term "outside" money includes both of the 
other two types of base money distinguished here: "Imported" money is 
one of these two types; domestic paper fiat money is the third type 
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used here, and it is referred to as "fiat" money. 
Inside money 
The term and concept of "inside" money are taken from Gurley and Shaw, 
as noted above. The concept will be reviewed briefly, and then set in 
the context of our distinction between EFI and DFI. In this section of 
the thesis it is the currency type EFI and DFI which are the focus of 
interest. Unless otherwise indicated in a particular context, the 
terms EFI and DFI should be understood throughout this section as 
referring to the currency types. In most instances the reference will 
be to the pure currency type EFI and DFI, moreover, and this should be 
assumed unless it is made clear in a particular case that the joint 
geographical and currency form is intended. 
"Inside" money is money created in a process of financial 
intermediation, as described by Gurley and Shaw. The financial 
intermediary purchases assets from those to whom it lends, and issues 
liabilities of its own which it sells to those from whom it borrows. 
When these liabilities are such as fall into any of the categories 
called money, such as sight deposits or paper bank notes, the money 
thus created is "inside" money. 
In common usage, the term "inside money" is often understood as 
referring only to "low-powered" money created by commercial banks, and 
not to the "high-powered" forms of monetary liabilities issued by 
central banks. Here however, the term refers to monetary liabilities 
issued by any bank (or any financial intermediary acting in this 
respect as a bank), regardless of whether the bank has official status 
or not. Thus the term "inside" money will be used here also to refer 
to notes issued (or deposits created) by a central bank in the process 
of acquiring any interest bearing financial assets, whether these be 
government bonds or private commercial bills. The defining 
characteristic of "inside" money, as I am using the term, is that the 
quantity of outstanding monetary liabilities corresponds on the balance 
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sheet of the issuer to an equal value of earning assets; in other 
words, that it is money issued in a process of financial 
intermediation. 
The definition of "inside" money offered by Karl Brunner in "The New 
Palgrave: Money" differs only slightly from the definition used here: 
"... 'Inside money' matches in a consolidated balance sheet of 'money- 
producers' a corresponding amount of private debt... "11 The difference 
between the two definitions is in the qualification "private" applied 
to the debt. As I am using the term here, "inside" money includes 
money issued against government debt as well as against private debt. 
The definition used here will enable us to relate the concept of money 
created in a process of financial intermediation to a wide range of 
banks in a variety of geographical and historical contexts, and is 
therefore more suitable to the theoretical framework to be developed 
here. 
As a matter of historical fact, banks of issue with official status 
have frequently issued monetary liabilities against private debt or 
commercial bills, as well as against government debt, while banks of 
commercial type, whose liabilities are of the "low-powered" type, have 
created monetary deposits in the process of lending to governments (and 
thereby acquiring some form of government debt). Analytically, the 
element to be distinguished by the term "inside" money in the 
theoretical framework developed here is the creation of money in the 
process of financial intermediation; a more restricted definition of 
inside money which excludes either certain types of financial earning 
assets or certain types of institutions, is therefore not suitable in 
this context. The category "inside" money will thus include notes (as 
well as deposits) issued by commercial banks, private banks, banks with 
semi-official status, and official central banks, etc., regardless of 
whether the earning assets thus acquired are private or government or 
some mixture of the two. 
A feature of inside money is that it can be "high-powered" base money 
or "low-powered" money, depending on the nature of the issuer and the 
35 
Chapter II 
context. This feature turns out to be of considerable interest: the 
question of the context in which inside money acquires the 
characteristics of high-powered base money instead of just low-powered 
money will be explored more fully later on. When a Central Bank buys 
government securities or rediscounts commercial paper for another bank, 
issuing its own liabilities or notes in exchange, the "inside" money 
which is created is referred to as "high-powered", and is part of the 
monetary base. "Low-powered" inside money is that which is created by 
the rest of the banking system. 
The liabilities of the Central Bank normally have this "high-powered" 
status because of legal restrictions governing the composition of 
reserves held by the rest of the banking system. However, the 
phenomenon of multiple expansion of monetary liabilities on the basis 
of some asset which is thereby in fact "high-powered", serving the 
function of a monetary base, is a also a market phenomenon, and as such 
has a much longer history than that of central banking as we now know 
it. As part of a market phenomenon, this "high-powered" status is 
conferred upon a particular asset by a combination of factors, among 
which are various legal factors. Characteristics of currency area 
structure which may contribute to market forces influencing the quality 
of this "high-powered" status are the particular focus of interest in 
this thesis. 
The concept of "inside" money is developed by Gurley and Shaw in a 
closed economy context; the financial intermediation process described 
is thus necessarily one of domestic financial intermediation in the 
geographical sense. Implicitly, since no mention is made of currency 
denomination, it is also DFI in the currency sense. However, in the 
present context of distinguishing between EFI and DFI the currency 
denomination of what is termed "inside" money must be specified. By 
"inside" base money, i. e. inside money issued by a central bank or 
other issuer of high-powered inside money, we will be referring to 
money created in the process of DFI only (i. e. the denomination of the 
financial assets acquired is that of the domestic currency being 
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issued), unless otherwise indicated in a specific instance. When a 
banking system conducts its business in more than one currency 
simultaneously, "low-powered" inside money will actually be a mixture 
of EFI and DFI inside money, and will accordingly be identified as such 
in that context. 
Imported money (or foreign money) 
The concept of "imported" money used here includes both foreign 
exchange and precious metals. The term "foreign" money will be used 
interchangeably with "imported" money. For analytical purposes the 
assumption is made that the currency area does not have domestic mines 
of monetary metals. 12 Imported money is denoted G, as indicated in the 
discussion of (G/F)* above. 
The characteristic of interest is that "imported" money has to be 
imported, and consequently requires the export of something - goods, 
services, or assets, real or financial - in exchange. (The 
theoretically possible case of a currency area receiving its imported 
monetary base as a gift from another currency area is ignored. ) 
Whether the imported money in question is foreign exchange in a form 
which pays interest, or is gold or some other commodity money, or cash, 
which does not pay interest, does of course impinge seriously on the 
balance of payments, but analytically that distinction is not the focus 
of our present interest. 
Changes in the currency area's stock of "imported" money thus show up 
in the balance of payments, and interact in that context with other 
sources of demand and supply of foreign exchange. This element in the 
balance of payments is now commonly treated as an "accommodating" item, 
changes in official reserves being seen as the passive consequence of 
decisions giving rise to demands and supplies of foreign exchange in 
other categories. In other contexts, changes in official reserves are 
viewed as reflecting attempts by residents to adjust the total 
aggregate quantity of real money to that which they desire to hold. 
Neither of these treatments will serve our present purpose. 
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In the present context, "imported" money will instead be treated as 
an item in the balance of payments which is subject to its own specific 
demand influences. These influences are not identical with general 
influences on the aggregate demand for money, except in the special 
cases in which all money is of the imported type, or in which the 
various types of money are perfect substitutes. When the different 
types of money distinguished here are reliably convertible into one 
another at permanently fixed rates of exchange, they may become perfect 
substitutes, and private specific demand for imported money balances 
may effectively cease to exist. Under these circumstances the 
aggregate net imports of foreign money may be correctly viewed, as in 
simple monetary models, as reflecting general influences on the 
aggregate demand for money in the currency area. However, since we 
want to analyze the relationships between the different types of money, 
the assumption of convertibility at permanently fixed rates of exchange 
will not be made here. 
The total stock of imported money, G, is the sum of the stocks held 
by three categories of holder: 
(2.1) G= Gp + Gb + Go 
where Gp is the stock of imported money held by private individuals, Gb 
is the stock of imported money held by commercial (deposit) banks, and 
Go is the stock held by the official monetary authorities or central 
bank. The term "central bank" will henceforth be used interchangeably 
with "monetary authorities", to refer to any institution which issues 
legal tender money; it would thus include such institutions as 
conversion offices which issue notes in exchange for gold or foreign 
exchange, currency boards, etc., as well as any private or semi-private 
bank whose note issue is accepted as legal tender, or even as well 
established customary tender accepted by government in cancellation of 
debts. 
The following treatment of the balance of payments categories will be 
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used here: 
(2.2) X-M+K-S- (dGb+dGp) = dGo 
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where (dGp + dGb + dGo) = dG; and dG is total net imports of foreign 
money into the currency area. X-M includes both the trade account 
and the factor services account except for net debt service. S is net 
debt service, K is net capital imports. dGp is net increases in 
private individuals' stocks of imported money, dGb is net increases in 
commercial banks' stocks of imported money, and dGo is net changes in 
official reserves of foreign money. If there were no net imports or 
exports of foreign money by private individuals, this formulation would 
be identical with the standard simple form, dG in that case being the 
change in official reserves: X-M-S+K= dGo = dG. The private 
(both individuals and commercial banks) holding of imported money 
implies the possibility that changes in official reserves are 
reflecting purely domestic movements of imported money between the 
official reserves and private holdings. 13 
The reason for using this formulation is that it is easily related to 
a broad range of historical contexts, among which we can identify the 
cases when dGp = 0, or dGp = dGb = 0, as special cases. As noted 
above, this could be the case when private demand for imported money 
has faded out because imported and domestic types of money have become 
perfect substitutes. In earlier periods, when both gold and domestic 
paper money were in private use in many countries, private imports of 
gold, "imported" money, figured as an item in analyses of the behaviour 
of balances of payments and exchange rate movements, and those analyses 
are more clearly portrayed in this formulation. For example, this 
specific demand for imported money was one of the factors discussed by 
Alfred Marshall in relation to the case of the Indian balance of 
payments. '` Now that private demand for balances of imported money has 
been regaining importance even in countries where it had almost faded 
out, an analytical formulation which makes it easier to draw on the 
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understanding offered by the these earlier analyses seems useful. 
Historically, the private demand for stocks of imported forms of 
money, gold and silver for instance, had been an important factor 
influencing the balance of payments in most countries. In the days of 
the operation of the international gold standard, for instance, 
domestic private demand for gold was an important factor to reckon with 
in defending convertibility of the note issue. This factor had faded 
in importance in some countries, notably in countries with strong 
financial centres. However, in the form of "dollarization", it is 
currently a major factor influencing the exchange rates and balances of 
payments of a great many countries, as the private holding of dollars 
is very widespread. 
in the major developed countries with sophisticated financial centres 
the private holding of imported monies is now again also a factor on a 
significant scale; in these countries the practice of holding stocks of 
foreign currencies is (as yet) not very widespread among the 
population, but since the magnitude of the money portfolios involved is 
large, the practice does have quantitative importance. As may be 
observed in Table 11.2, below, Gb assets and liabilities are in the 
case of many countries very much larger than the corresponding figures 
for Go, so that net changes in Gb can be large relative to those in Go. 
The diversity of literatures in which the subject of some form of 
"imported" money is treated reflects the antiquity of the phenomenon 
and the variety of its forms. The literature on the operation of the 
international gold standard, for example, has as its subject the use of 
a monetary base which is at least partly imported, in a regime in which 
convertibility between the imported and domestic types of money at a 
fixed rate of exchange is maintained. The use of imported money is 
also the subject of the literature on the currency board system. 
Described as "currency portfolio diversification", the holding of 
imported money (as well as of domestic types of money) is the subject 
of the currency substitution literature. The "dollarization" 
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literature is concerned with currency areas in which the imported money 
is tending to displace domestic types of money. The phenomenon of 
dollarization will be discussed further below. 
Fiat money 
The third type of money is domestic paper note issue, "fiat" money. As 
the term is used here, the defining characteristic of "fiat" money is 
that there are no assets held against this type of money, either in the 
form of income earning assets, such as held in the "inside" money case, 
or of gold or other commodity or any other asset. In this respect this 
type of money corresponds to the description given by Gurley and Shaw 
of the creation of what they call "outside" money. However, in 
subsequent discussion Gurley and Shaw refer also to gold and foreign 
exchange with the same term "outside" money, whereas gold and foreign 
exchange are here termed "imported money". 
What may be yet more confusing to the reader is that the term "fiat 
money", is actually used, in the literature on monetary and financial 
history, for both what I am calling fiat money and what I am calling 
high-powered inside money. This occurs because both are paper forms of 
money, as opposed to metallic money, and both have been given legal 
tender status by government decree (or by government "fiat", hence the 
use of the term) in historical instances. Nevertheless, the 
distinction must absolutely be made, because it is a distinction which 
has immense practical importance, as will become apparent below. 
The crucial difference between these two types of money may be 
further clarified as follows: Fiat money is here treated as being 
issued in exchange for current goods and services, as for instance in 
financing current government expenditure, if issued on behalf of the 
government. High-powered inside money, on the other hand, is issued in 
exchange for financial assets of some sort, which then form part of the 
asset portfolio of the issuing institution, and are expected to yield a 
stream of income. The analytical distinction of interest here is that 
between the issue of money in payment for current goods and services, 
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and the issue of money in acquisition of a financial asset. If it 
happens that the assets acquired by the issuing institution 
subsequently fall in value below the nominal value of the monetary 
liabilities issued in their acquisition, the difference between the 
actual value of the earning assets and that of the outstanding monetary 
liabilities constitutes "fiat" money in the terminology used here. It 
frequently did happen, in historical cases, that commercial banks would 
issue their own bank notes in the course of extending loans, and that 
the earning assets thus acquired "went bad", so that the nominal value 
of the outstanding notes was greater than the value of these assets; 
the difference between these two values would here be termed "fiat 
money". 
Paper note issues which become established in use by custom rather 
than by any government decree are here also treated as fiat money if 
they are issued in payment for current goods and services as opposed to 
being issued in the purchase of financial earning assets. Thus, for 
example, notes issued by a manufacturer in payment of wages to his 
workers, which then may enter into circulation, would be here 
considered fiat money even if their use was entirely customary, and 
never given government support as legal tender. 
It has sometimes happened, historically, that primary securities have 
been sold by the borrower (usually the government) to the public as 
earning assets, but have subsequently served as a form of paper money, 
circulating like bank notes. This occurred, for instance, in 19th 
century Argentina. 15 These would here be treated as a form of interest 
bearing fiat money, since they were issued in exchange for current 
goods and services, like the manufacturer's notes mentioned above, 
instead of in the acquisition of financial assets. 
Analytically, the provision of payments services, which is described 
by Gurley and Shaw in their portrayal of "outside" money, constitutes 
the provision of a range of financial services which could be performed 
by various types of institution. At a minimum, the issuer of the 
"fiat" money is providing the service of the issue of notes; only to 
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this very limited is the term fiat money as used here necessarily 
associated with the provision of any payments services. Other payments 
services, such as running a clearing house, may also be provided by the 
institution issuing fiat money, but the identification of the money as 
of the fiat type is independent of the range of services provided. 
Payments services of all sorts may also be (and commonly are) provided 
by institutions which create "inside money". 
In the discussion that follows, these notes are not assumed to be 
guaranteed to be convertible at any particular rate into either of the 
other two types of money, unless specifically indicated in a particular 
context. They are simply paper notes, providing a medium of exchange; 
to what extent they serve other functions of money will differ in 
different circumstances. Fiat money is assumed to be legal tender 
within the currency area only. Moreover, within the currency area 
contracts may be denominated in one of the other two types of money, 
and in such cases the legal tender status of the note issue does not 
extend to fixing a rate of exchange. 
Historically, the conditions under which paper money has been accepted 
as money are closely related to those under which inside money has been 
high-powered instead of just low-powered money. The legal provision 
that notes are legal tender, the legal basis of what is normally 
referred to as a fiat regime, is only one factor. The best known case 
of paper money serving as money, and indeed even as high-powered money, 
the basis for credit expansion by other banks, while being neither 
convertible into gold nor given legal tender status, must be the case 
of Bank of England notes during the Napoleonic Wars. Hawtrey's point 
that ".... convention took the place of law, and the Bank of England 
note became a customary standard... n16 brings out the well-known social 
custom factor, which gives externalities to private holdings of any 
particular type of money. People are willing to accept paper money in 
discharge of a debt when they know that their creditors, actual or 
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potential, will accept the paper money in turn. Each person's 
willingness to hold the paper money contributes to the usefulness of 
everyone else's holdings of the money, or vice versa. 
In some historical cases of successful paper money circulation, an 
important factor in gaining public acceptance of the paper money has 
been the willingness of a large creditor to accept the paper money at a 
fixed nominal value in cancellation of debts. For this to be 
successful, the creditor concerned must, of course, be able to control 
the quantity of the paper money issue; the commitment gives the 
creditor a motive to maintain the value of the paper money by 
restricting the quantity issued. Governments as creditors in the 
collection of tax debts, may be large enough creditors to use this 
technique for gaining the acceptance of a government note issue. For 
example, in the case of 19th century Buenos Aires, the successful 
establishment of a paper note circulation was assisted by the 
government commitment to the acceptance of the paper notes at their 
nominal value in payment of customs duties. '' The same technique has 
sometimes been used, successfully, by large issuers of other types of 
financial instruments, for the same purpose of improving the liquidity 
and market acceptance of their liabilities. 18 
A feature of fiat money is that its acceptance may be voluntary or 
forced. A government with good powers to collect taxes may be able to 
gain voluntary acceptance for a government note issue by accepting its 
own notes in tax payments. At another extreme, governments have very 
often faced stronger pressures to spend than their powers to tax can 
accommodate by other means, and have attempted to make up the 
difference by forcing acceptance of their notes (or other liabilities) 
and imposing the "inflation tax". This feature of fiat money is a 
crucial factor affecting the relationships between fiat money and the 
other types of money. 
Notes on high-powered money 
As concerns high-powered money, I am treating as "imported money" any 
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asset held by the monetary institution which is denominated in a 
foreign currency. Thus, in this framework, there is no category for 
EFI high-powered inside money. If, for example, the government issues 
bonds which are denominated in a foreign currency and sells them to the 
central bank, the assets thus acquired by the central bank are here 
treated as part of its holdings of foreign denominated assets, in the 
same category as gold and foreign exchange held in other forms. 
However, any discrepancy between the foreign exchange market value of 
these assets and the purchase price imposed upon the bank by the 
government is treated either as a form of government levy on the bank 
or as a fiat issue, depending upon whether or not the creation of money 
is involved. If paper money or deposits are created by the central 
bank on the government's account in the purchase of these bonds, the 
difference between the real foreign exchange market value of the assets 
thus acquired and the quantity of money created in exchange for them, 
would constitute the creation of fiat money in the terms of the 
framework used here. It has frequently happened, in actual historical 
circumstances (and continues to happen) that the foreign exchange 
market value of such assets is well under the nominal price the bank is 
required to pay, so that money creation which takes the nominal form of 
an asset purchase by the central bank in reality has a substantial 
"fiat" issue component, as the term is defined here. 
Structure of the money supply, algebraic formulation 
The following identity will be used for the purpose of analyzing the 
structure of the money supply in the various monetary systems: 
(2.3) F= kY = Gp + [(Go / W) + Gb] / g, or: 
(2.3a) F= kY = Gp + [H + Gb] /g 
where: 
(i) F is the total money supply, cash in the hands of the public (Hp), 
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plus commercial bank deposits, (D), plus private individuals stocks of 
imported money, Gp. Thus we have another expression for F as follows: 
(2.3b) F= Gp + Hp +D 
This formulation (2.3b) corresponds to standard definitions of the 
money supply except for the inclusion of Gp; i. e., if Gp=O, we are back 
to the standard definition. 
(ii) Y is nominal income, and k is therefore defined as k= F/Y. 
(iii) Go is monetary gold and foreign exchange reserves held by the 
central bank or other official monetary institution; Gb is gold and 
foreign exchange reserves held by the commercial banks. Gp is any of 
these forms of imported money held privately, such as dollars under the 
mattress or gold coins. 
(iv) The monetary base is comprised of H+ Gb +Gp. If private 
individuals and the commercial banks hold no gold or foreign exchange 
reserves (i. e., if Gp = Gb=O), then H forms the whole of the monetary 
base. 
(v) W is the ratio of Go to the sight liabilities of the central bank, 
e. g. cash, and deposits at the central bank belonging to the commercial 
banks, which are here jointly denoted H. W is thus the proportion of 
central bank sight liabilities "covered" by gold and foreign exchange. '' 
Fluctuations in the domestic currency value of the central banks' 
stocks of gold and foreign exchange which may be occasioned by 
fluctuations in exchange rates or in the foreign exchange market value 
of foreign denominated assets held, can cause W to change without any 
change in H. For instance, suppose the central bank has issued 100 
units of domestic currency, i. e. 100H, half of which was a purely fiat 
issue of paper notes, and half of which was issued against the purchase 
of gold at the current exchange rate. If this 100H constituted the 
total note issue, H, we would have W=1/2. Suppose then that the 
domestic currency H depreciated against gold, so that the gold stock Go 
held by the central bank doubled its value in terms of H, from 50H to 
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100H. W would have risen to W=1, without any change in H. 
Similarly, if our central bank had issued its 100H against the purchase 
of, say, US$ denominated foreign exchange assets, so that we had W=1, 
but the US$ then depreciated , we would have W<1, assuming H 
constant; if the value of the US$ in terms of H had halved, we would 
again have W= 1/2, the remaining 50H having been transformed into a 
mere fiat issue. 
This treatment of H differs from that of the standard international 
monetary economics textbook treatment of the central bank's 
contribution to the monetary base, H, as follows: In the standard 
textbook treatment, the central bank's contribution to the monetary 
base, H, is treated as identically equal to the sum of the central 
bank's foreign exchange reserves, Go, and a domestic credit component, 
C. This formulation implies either that there are no fluctuations in 
the value of the assets held in either of the categories, Go or C, or 
that any fluctuations which might occur are simply being defined as 
causing alterations in C (or in H). For instance, if the central bank 
had issued 100H as above, 50H against gold and 50H in the purchase of 
domestic currency (H) denominated government bonds, and the value of 
gold in terms of H doubled, the central bank would be holding 100 H 
worth of gold, and 50H worth of bonds; the outstanding note issue H 
remains fixed at 100H. In the formulation used here, W would have 
risen to W=1, and the bank has made foreign exchange gains. Or, to 
look at another case, it may be that some event, such as for instance 
the loss of a source of tax revenues, caused the value of the domestic 
government bonds to halve, so that the central bank is holding gold, 
Go, still worth 50H by assumption, and domestic government bonds worth 
now only 25H; the outstanding note issue remains fixed at 100H. In the 
formulation used here, W remains unchanged at W= 1/2, while the 
original 50H of high-powered inside money has fallen to 25H, and we now 
also have a fiat issue of 25 H. In such cases as these, definitions 
can be stretched, or assumptions made, which would enable the standard 
textbook formulation of H as identically equal to Go+C. However, such 
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methods of fitting an identity to reality would obscure precisely those 
changes which will be important in the analysis to be developed here; 
it therefore will not suit present purposes. 
(vi) g is defined by the above identity (2.3a), as follows: 
(2.3c) g= (H + Gb) / (F - Gp). 
It therefore reflects both the average reserve ratio held by commercial 
banks and the share of official monetary liabilities held by the banks 
(Hb), as opposed to those held as cash in the hands of the public (Hp). 
g falls as the public entrusts a larger share of H to the banks, and as 
the average reserve ratios of banks falls. 
It may be seen from (2.3a) and (2.3b) above that g is the inverse of 
the standard "money multiplier". The standard version of the monetary 
base, as noted above, is a special case of the version given here, as 
follows: The standard version of the monetary base has Gp = Gb = 0, so 
that H is the whole of the monetary base, which would leave us with F= 
(1/g) H. In this form (1/g) is clearly recognizable as the standard 
money multiplier; as such, it depends, as has just been indicated 
above, on the commercial banks' cash/deposit ratio (which would be 
Hb/D, with Gb = 0), and on the public's cash/deposit ratio (which is 
Hp/D, with Gp = 0). 
The ratio, k, of the total (nominal) money supply, F, to nominal 
income, Y, will be treated as a constant for much of the discussion, 
and unless otherwise specifically indicated, in this section of the 
thesis. 
Monetary Systems 
Except in the Type I system, where there are no banks, none of the 
systems make any assumptions about the relative size of Go and Gb. If 






money), Gb = 0, but in Types II-IV this is not assumed. 
Type I: Imported money only 
This monetary system uses only imported money, supported by no banks at 
all. In terms of the above identity, W=1, and g=1, such that the total 
money supply F= kY = Go + Gp. 
A monetary system which uses only imported money would be like a 
currency board system without the support of any banks at all. This is 
also the position of individual households and of any small towns or 
regions within larger currency areas which lack local banks. The 
entire local stock of money has to be bought in or borrowed from 
outside, and paid for by the sale of goods and services to non- 
residents. Fluctuations in the total stock of money caused by the 
vicissitudes of export earnings or capital inflows can not be 
compensated for by offsetting increases in other types of money, since 
we have assumed these not to be in use. Individuals can defend 
themselves from the full harshness of these fluctuations by holding 
precautionary stocks of money, or a central institution can perform a 
similar function for the community as a whole, in precisely the same 
manner that individuals and households within large currency areas 
normally hold precautionary balances. However, there can be no 
multiple expansion of credit based on any of these stocks of imported 
money, because that would constitute the creation of inside money which 
has been ruled out by assumption. 
Two important features of this type of monetary system are (1) its 
costs, and (2) its dependence upon export earnings. The costs may be 
substantially reduced if the form of imported money used pays interest, 
as has often been pointed out in connection with the trend towards 
holding interest bearing forms of foreign exchange instead of stocks of 
gold. 
It is instructive to consider the relationship between the costs of 
holding money balances and the share of export earnings in total 
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income. Since income and exports are flows, while the supply of money 
is a stock, once the desired money stock is achieved no further flows 
of money imports (or exports) would be required. If income is growing 
however, and the desired money stock is in some constant ratio to 
income, as in the formulation above (F = kY), then this desired stock 
will also be growing. If all income derives from exports, then the 
maintenance of some desired ratio of money to income will accordingly 
require a proportionate share of export earnings to be set aside each 
period for increases in this stock of money as income rises. However, 
as exports (X) become a smaller and smaller share of total income (Y), 
i. e. as (X/Y) falls, the share of export earnings which must be set 
aside to maintain this same ratio (k) of money stock to income, as 
income increases, must rise. The share of export earnings required to 
satisfy incremental money demand as income grows is as follows: 
(2.4) (dF/X) = (kdY) / xY 
where dF is the incremental money demand, dY is the change in income, 
and x is the ratio (X/Y). [Hence X= xY. ] The following rearrangement 
of (3.4) may make the relation clearer: 
(2.4a) (dF/X) = (k/x) (dY/Y). 
It is evident from (2.4a) that when the ratio, x, of exports to 
income falls, a larger share of export earnings must be set aside for 
the purpose of meeting incremental money demand. The extreme case may 
be imagined in which the currency area imports no goods from outside at 
all, but only imports its money supply, and provides for all other 
needs locally. Historically, during periods of rapid growth in 
countries where imported money had an important share in the total 
money supply, increments to the money stock were often an important 
part of capital imports. The case of Sweden during the 30 or so years 
before WWI provides one example of this which has received recent 
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study. 20 On the other hand, the well known tendency of India, prior to 
WWI, to import vast quantities of silver, is probably better explained 
by to an inclination to increase the ratio of silver stocks to income 
as a store of value, in preference to other forms of wealth holding, 
rather than by incremental demand for imported money. 
In Mercantilist England, the preoccupation with running a trade 
account surplus in order to ensure the sufficiency of the country's 
stock of gold, was a reflection of the importance of this imported 
component in the total money supply during that period. The various 
trade restrictions which were imposed were partly for this purpose, 
attempting to foster domestic production and exports, and to restrict 
imports, in order to increase the domestic stock of gold. In the 
English case the development of financial institutions and domestic 
forms of money must have contributed to the fading of these 
Mercantilist anxieties, and to the rising influence of free trade 
doctrines which stressed instead the gains to be made through 
increasing international specialization and exchange. 
Thus a feature of using an entirely imported money supply is that it 
has balance of payments implications which can give rise to motivations 
for the imposition of restrictive trade practices. These balance of 
payments implications are worth looking at in more detail. 
In this type of monetary system an increase in the demand for money 
balances would tend to lead to a deficit on the official settlements 
definition of the balance of payments, unless the increased demand for 
money is entirely at the expense of imported (or exportable) goods and 
services: X-M- dGp < 0; dGb =0 (by assumption) . This contrasts 
with simple monetary models in which imported money is not 
distinguished from domestic types, and in which an increase in the 
demand for money balances at the expense of goods and services leads to 
a surplus on balance of payments, the total money stock being increased 
by this means. If all money is imported and all goods and services are 
also traded, then the desired increase in money balances would be 
matched by an increase in the current account surplus (X-M = dGp), by 
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the same mechanism of foregone consumption as in those models. 
However, if all money is imported, but some of the foregone goods and 
services are non-traded items, then the desired increase in money 
balances would not be matched by an increased current account surplus, 
and a deficit on balance of payments (official settlements definition) 
would result (X -M- dGp < 0), if starting from equilibrium. This 
point comes out clearly using our above formulation for the balance of 
payments, and assuming net capital imports K=S= dGb = 0: X-M- 
dGp = dGo. An increased private demand for imported money can be met 
by drawing down official reserves, or by decreasing imports M, or by 
increasing exports X, or by any combination of these three means. 
In various areas of current literature, an increase in the private 
demand for foreign money is treated as an increased capital outflow. 
The above case when this incremental money demand gave rise to a 
deficit would thus be portrayed: X-M+K= Go < 0. The resulting 
prediction as concerns the balance of payments is the same, but the 
difference in conceptual approach tends to lead one to focus on 
different things. In particular, the demand for money is normally 
understood as being related to income in some important way. On the 
other hand, the main focus in analysis of capital flows tends to be on 
differences in expected returns among alternative investments, although 
income may be also a factor. Here we need a conceptual approach which 
puts the focus of attention on factors influencing the demand for 
money, and the present formulation has therefore been preferred. 
Incremental money demand associated with income growth is large; it 
can be very large in relation to the size of exports, in particular. 
If the currency area imports its money supply, incremental money demand 
can be large relative to export earnings and other imports, as can be 
seen from (3.4a), above. Incremental money demand can therefore put 
considerable pressure on the balance of payments when the money supply 
is imported. For this reason the analysis of the structure of the 
money supply, as between its imported and domestic components, has 
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Further analysis of the implications of using an imported money 
supply will be developed in Chapter IV. In this Type I monetary 
system, we have had F=G, such that (G/F) = 1, where (G/F) may be 
assumed equal to (G/F)*. In Chapter IV we will be looking at cases 
when (G/F)* < 1; therefore in that context incremental money demand 
will not be identical with incremental demand for imported money. 
There is, however, a direct relationship, which is determined by 
(G/F)*. This relationship is easily seen: 
(2.5) G= (G/F) kY 
from the identities (2.3) or (2.3a) above. We can thus identify the 
incremental money demand, required to satisfy (G/F)*, as follows: 
(2.6) dG = (G/F)*kdY 
From (2.6) and (2.4a), we see that (G/F)* is a factor determining the 
relation between incremental demand for imported money and export 
earnings, as follows: 
(2.7) (dG/X)= (G/F)* kdY / xY 
It is clear in (2.7) that incremental money demand puts greater 
pressure on the balance of payments as (G/F)* is higher. This is the 
reason the analysis of the determination of (G/F)* has such practical 
importance; these practical implications of (G/F)* will be analyzed 
more fully in Chapter IV. 
There is no role for a lender of last resort in a monetary system which 
uses imported money only, since there is no multiple expansion of 
credit in this system. The features of main interest have been the 
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Type II: Imported money plus low-powered inside money 
The currency board system is of this type when there are banks 
operating in the economy. An economy which uses nothing but gold (or 
silver) as its monetary base and reserves, instead of notes issued 
against foreign exchange reserves as in the currency board system, 
would also be of this type, provided there are banks in operation. 
In terms of the above identity, W=1, and g<1. The total money 
supply (F) is therefore: F= kY = Gp + [Go+Gb] / g. 
Note also that in the Type II system the liabilities H of a currency 
board or other monetary institution cannot exceed Go. However, in 
historical currency board cases it did happen sometimes that the 
foreign assets held against the note issue exceeded the note issue in 
value. 21 
The money supply in the Type II system, unlike that in the Type I 
system, can vary without any change in Go + Gb, through changes in g. 
This feature has been stressed as providing a source of monetary 
"flexibility" in currency board systems. 
This type of monetary system uses an entirely imported monetary base 
but also has a banking system which creates inside money. The banks 
create inside money through the mechanism of multiple credit expansion 
based on its reserves of the imported money. This type of monetary 
system is that which was normally in operation in the countries using 
the currency board system. The inside money created by the banks in 
this context is low-powered money. 
Lender of last resort 
In this type of monetary system, the use of multiple credit expansion 
by banks does give rise to the possibility of bank runs, and therefore 
implies a need for a lender of last resort. Who, however, could 
fulfil such a role? The lender of last resort function requires the 
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ability to create the supplies of base money which may be required in a 
crisis. But imported money can not be created locally. The nearest 
thing to a lender of last resort which is possible in this system would 
be a large bank which holds its own large stocks of the imported money, 
and which is willing to rediscount bills for other banks in a crisis, 
drawing on its own stocks of imported money for the purpose. In order 
to perform this service, the bank in question would necessarily be 
foregoing the pursuit of its own profits to some extent, since the 
holding of large idle reserves is costly; some compensation for this 
cost could be achieved by charging penalty rates of interest for its 
rediscounting service. Should the pressures of the crisis prove too 
much for the reserves of this bank, there might be the possibility of 
borrowing abroad. 
Since base money can not in this system be created locally, the true 
lender of last resort function can not be performed, and the 
possibility of banks being forced into suspension of payments remains. 
The quasi-lender of last resort function just described is similar to 
the role played by the Bank of England in much of the 19th century. 
The severity of the pressures on the Bank to "bend" the restrictions on 
note issue and create more base money locally has often been stressed. 
Argentine monetary history provides another example of this quasi- 
lender of last resort function being performed by a large local bank, 
using its own reserves, in the context of a system using an imported 
monetary base. From the early 1890's until 1931, increments to the 
money supply were entirely imported, notes being issued only for gold. 
The Banco de la Nacion Argentina held a very large stock of gold of its 
own, and did some rediscounting for other local banks. However, since 
it possessed no power to "bend" the restrictions on note issue (it had 
no power of note issue), it could not create new base money whatever 
pressures there might be to do so, and its performance of the lender of 
last resort function was accordingly rather limited. 
In the historical experience of countries using the currency board 
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system, the banks operating within the area tended to be branches of 
large foreign banks. For these banks the existence of a local lender 
of last resort was not of such great importance, since they could 
borrow from the parent bank. Under this system, local banks without 
access to the emergency support of a foreign "parent" would be at a 
distinct disadvantage in a crisis vis a vis these foreign branch banks; 
depositors' confidence in local banks would accordingly be likely to be 
more "delicate", and the banks more vulnerable to panics. The 
incompatibility of this type of monetary system with the performance of 
the true lender of last resort function might have been a factor 
inhibiting local financial development in these areas. 
Flexibility of the money supply, and income growth 
By contrast with the first monetary system examined, in this system the 
currency area does have the power to increase or decrease its total 
supply of money without necessarily impinging on the balance of 
payments. The total quantity of base money is entirely dependent upon 
the balance of payments, as in the first monetary system. However, the 
creation of inside money by the banking system through the mechanism of 
multiple credit expansion gives rise to the possibility of varying the 
total supply of money by varying the multiple of credit expansion. 
That is to say, variations in the reserve/deposit ratios maintained by 
the banking system are possible, and by this means the total quantity 
of money may be subjected to local influence without any direct impact 
on the balance of payments. There may, of course, be indirect effects 
on the balance of payments, if the expansion (or contraction) of credit 
leads to an increase (or decrease) in demand for imports or in local 
consumption of exportables. 
In this second monetary system, an increase in domestic income which 
gives rise to an increase in the desired monetary stock need not 
immediately or necessarily impinge on the balance of payments. Instead 
of importing the desired increment to the money stock, there now exists 
the possibility of meeting this increased demand for money by raising 
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the money multiplier, i. e. lowering g. As noted above, this can be 
done, without any change in the public's cash/deposit ratio, by 
lowering the aggregate reserve/deposit ratio of the banking system. 
Although this second monetary system does give local influence over 
the total quantity of money, independently of movements in the balance 
of payments which determine the monetary base, the actual use of this 
flexibility brings with it severe hazards of balance of payments 
crises. For instance, consider the case of a domestic credit 
expansion, accommodating an increased demand for money occasioned by 
domestic income growth, holding the imported monetary base constant. 
The lowering of the aggregate ratio of imported money to domestic bank 
money increases the vulnerability of the banking system to the 
possibility that panic or loss of confidence could cause the public to 
suddenly attempt to shift out of domestic inside money into imported 
money. Moreover, there are also the indirect effects of the expansion 
on the trade balance, as home consumption of traded goods tends to rise 
with income. Under such circumstances, a whiff of bad news concerning 
expected export receipts, with the implication of an impending threat 
of reduction in the monetary base, could easily touch off a panic which 
would take banks into unavoidable suspension of payments. 
The flexibility of the local money supply which the banking system 
brought into the currency board system has often been commented upon by 
proponents of the system. However, the potential scope for exercising 
this flexibility in support of domestic income growth is distinctly 
limited by the hazards just described. It is evident, moreover, that 
these hazards are much greater if the growth in production being 
financed by the credit expansion is in non-traded goods, since this 
type of growth generates both demand for money and demand for traded 
goods, without contributing to the supplies of either (except for the 
supplies of low-powered domestic inside money). 
That these features of currency board systems might be one reason why 
so much non-traded goods production in some colonial economies remained 
non-monetized is a possibility that will be discussed further in 
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Chapter IV. Foreign banks operating in those areas have often been 
criticized for their tendency to concentrate their lending on the 
foreign trade sectors at the expense of sectors serving the domestic 
economy; the above discussion shows that these policies would be the 
necessary response of caution in this type of monetary system. The 
root of the problem is that the impossibility of creating base money 
locally deprives the system of a true lender of last resort. 
As concerns the cost of the money supply in this second system, the 
creation of domestic inside money has reduced these costs very 
substantially. The reduction in cost of the total money supply is 
approximately in proportion to the multiple of credit expansion in use, 
except that the development of the banking system does require 
investment of capital in its institutional structures, e. g. buildings 
and information systems, etc., not to mention the employment of bank 
staff, with associated infrastructure requirements. The scale of fixed 
capital outlay underlying the development of a banking system can force 
a very small, or very poor, currency area into using the much more 
expensive system of importing its total money supply. 
Type III: Imported money plus fiat money plus low-powered inside money 
The Type III system is distinguished from the Type II system by W<1, 
such that H< Go. Thus the total money supply is: F= kY = Gp + [H + 
Gb] / g, where H= Go / W. 
This type of monetary system has as its monetary base a fiat paper note 
issue as well as imported money. The fiat issue is assumed to be 
issued by the government, and to be legal (or customary) tender within 
the currency area, as indicated above in the discussion of fiat money. 
The introduction of fiat money into the system as a component of the 
monetary base gives rise to the possibility of changes in the rate of 
exchange between one component and the other of the monetary base. It 
accordingly affords a motive for the creation of two types of low- 
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powered inside money: EFI inside money, and DFI inside money. EFI 
inside money results when banks make loans and create deposits 
denominated in terms of the imported component of the monetary base, 
while DFI inside money is created if the deposits are denominated in 
the domestic paper money, H. In this type of monetary system, the 
banking system may confine its money creation to DFI inside money, or 
it may create both types. Banks operating in this system also face a 
range of options in the currency composition of their loan portfolios, 
of their reserves, (Hb+Gb), and of their capital. 
Historically, this type of monetary system finds many examples. The 
absence of a high-powered inside money component of the monetary base 
is the feature that distinguishes this system from the system presently 
in most common use. In the case of 19th century England, the note 
issue had both fiat and foreign based components, as in this system. 
However, the rediscounting done by the Bank of England involved the 
creation of deposits which were closer to being high-powered inside 
money than is really compatible with this model. Also, since the fiat 
issue had been fixed in 1844, increments to the monetary base after 
that time were either imported (gold) or inside money created by the 
Bank of England. The Argentine case, prior to 1931, serves as a closer 
example, although in Argentina also the fiat issue was fixed (after 
1892). 22 
This third monetary system has three or four types of money, 
depending on whether the banking system creates both EFI and DFI inside 
money, or only DFI inside money. Accordingly, there exist various 
possibilities of convertibility combinations. Two or more types of 
money may be convertible at a fixed rate of exchange, or the rates of 
exchange may fluctuate among all types. An illustrative example of the 
latter position, taken from US monetary history, is provided by 
Hawtrey: "... It was a noteworthy feature of the crisis of 1873 that 
there were 3 different media of payment. Inconvertible paper was still 
the principal form of legal tender money; gold, which was used in 
foreign trade transactions, was at a premium over paper; and paper was 
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at a premium over bank credit... "Z' 
The creation of EFI inside money as well as DFI inside money 
complicates matters further. A particularly interesting feature of the 
Argentine case is that throughout its early financial history, prior to 
1930, the banking system conducted its business in both gold and paper 
money, creating thereby both EFI inside money and DFI inside money. 
The creation of EFI inside money is currently practised in all major 
financial centres in the form of the creation of "euro-money" deposits. 
Lender of last resort 
The introduction of a domestic fiat component in the monetary base 
creates the possibility of the true lender of last resort function 
being performed in this monetary system. In the case of a crisis, the 
government can issue new fiat money in order to enable banks to meet 
crisis demands for cash from depositors. If banks must also meet 
demands for converting EFI deposits into the imported money, they can 
use the new notes to buy the required imported money in the market, at 
a premium if necessary. 
However, the performance of the lender of last resort function in 
this system necessarily depends on the possibility of suspending 
convertibility between the fiat and the imported components of the 
monetary base. Since the local lender of last resort can not create 
increments to the imported component of the monetary base, exercise of 
the lender of last resort function involves increasing the fiat share 
in the monetary base. But if the note issue becomes "too large" 
relative to the total monetary base, the system is likely to face a 
speculative flight out of domestic paper into the imported money which 
would bankrupt anyone willing to go on supplying the imported money at 
a fixed exchange rate. An official institution performing this role, 
for instance, would soon lose all of the imported component of the 
monetary base to private stocks. On the other hand, suspension of 
convertibility between the imported and fiat components of the monetary 
base permits the local lender of last resort to defend the banking 
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system without subjecting the monetary authorities to loss of the 
imported component of the monetary base. 
Argentine monetary history, during the "Baring" crisis of 1890, 
provides an interesting illustrative example of a government attempting 
to exercise the lender of last resort function in this form. A fiat 
issue had been authorized for the purpose of assisting the three major 
banks which had some official status, in an attempt to control 
depositors' losses and prevent the crisis from spreading. However, 
before the notes had been delivered to the banks, word arrived from 
Barings that that bank was also in serious trouble, with an urgent 
request for remittance of some funds. Upon receipt of this request, 
the majority of the note issue was diverted from its original 
destinations, and used instead to buy gold in the market which was then 
sent to Barings. One of the three local banks (the National Mortgage 
Bank, not a commercial bank) received the remainder of the issue, and 
the other two banks were left to fail, with the usual consequences for 
the spread of the crisis. 
The introduction of the fiat component into the monetary base permits 
the strengthening of the banking system by enabling a lender of last 
resort to create base money locally in a crisis. In this capacity, the 
power of the domestic government to issue fiat money contributes 
positively to creating conditions which foster the development of the 
domestic financial structure, and DFI in particular. 
This positive aspect of the government's power to issue notes is 
worth stressing, since it has the potential to make a big difference to 
the structure of credit creation which can be undertaken by banks. In 
the previous system, in particular, it was noted that caution would 
require banks to restrict lending for projects in non-traded sectors, 
and to concentrate their services on traded sectors. This was because 
all base money was imported. In the present system no such limitation 
on the extension of credit to purely domestic production is required: 
DFI inside money can be used in the extension of credit in such cases, 
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and in the event of a crisis depositors can be paid with fiat money 
issued by the local lender of last resort. Convertibility into the 
foreign money may be suspended, but the banks need not thereby be 
adversely affected. 
The implications just discussed of the existence of a domestic 
component in the monetary base are of immense importance. The 
structure of the money supply seems likely to have been a factor of 
much more importance in historical patterns of economic development 
than has been recognized. 
The potentially positive role of the government power to issue fiat 
money has certainly been thoroughly overwhelmed historically by 
instances of its destructive potential. For instance, the 
deterioration of the Argentine financial structure since the 1930's has 
been commonly attributed to the detrimental effects on the system of 
excessive government creation of fiat money. 
The destructive effects on a financial system of excessive government 
note issue or forced borrowing from the banking system are worth 
looking at more carefully, distinguishing between two cases by the type 
of money being created. 
If the government is meeting excess expenditures by creating fiat 
money, this money may or may not be convertible at a fixed rate of 
exchange into other components of the money supply; Hawtrey provided us 
(see above) with an example of a case when the rates of exchange were 
not fixed. But if the rates of exchange are not fixed, the banking 
system may well respond to excessive note creation on the part of the 
government by holding their reserves in the form of more imported money 
(Gb) and fewer notes (Hb); private holders of money balances may choose 
the same option. These responses serves to defend these banks and 
private money holders against the imposition of the "inflation tax" via 
the excessive note issue. However, in so doing, they simultaneously 
reduces the "inflation tax" base, since the size of this base depends 
on the size of private sector holdings of the fiat money being created. 
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If no one will hold the notes, the government can not impose the 
inflation tax by note issue. 
The government can force the banking system to hold the notes by 
imposing regulations concerning the structure of reserve requirements. 
In so doing, the government is forcing the banks to submit to the 
imposition of the inflation tax. Banks forced to hold their reserves 
in the form of a fiat money that is depreciating against the imported 
money would rapidly go bankrupt if they did not also denominate their 
liabilities in the fiat money. But this means that the (DFI) inside 
money created by the banks is depreciating at the same rate as the fiat 
notes, and therefore that holders of this inside money are being 
subjected to the inflation tax just as if they were holding notes. The 
banking system is then faced with the tendency of the public to reduce 
their holding of bank deposits in favour of increasing their private 
stocks of imported money, i. e., Gp would tend to rise relative to D. 
The banking system must pay higher interest rates to try to hold on to 
its depositors' funds, and borrowers must be charged higher rates 
accordingly. 
Government borrowing from the banking system which forces banks into 
creating excessive quantities of DFI inside money so that the DFI 
inside money depreciates against the imported money has the same 
effects just described, as in both cases note issue and the DFI inside 
money are linked at a fixed rate of exchange. It is the necessity of 
creating DFI deposits (as opposed to EFI deposits), imposed by the 
structure of reserves, which prevents the banking system from defending 
itself from the destructive effects of excessive government money 
creation, as Hawtrey's example from US monetary history reminds us. If 
the banking system were free to shift its reserves into the imported 
money and conduct its operations in EFI inside money, it could 
extricate itself from these destructive effects and continue to attract 
its depositors by creating a higher quality of money, the EFI type of 
inside money instead of the DFI type. As noted, this would reduce the 
government's access to an inflation tax base. 
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If the banking system does not support the government fiat issue to a 
sufficient extent to keep the fiat money acceptable to the public, then 
the use of a fiat issue in the performance of the lender of last resort 
function is undermined. There is thus a delicate and ambiguous element 
in the existence of government power to create fiat money as concerns 
its influence on the financial structure. Without the fiat component 
of the monetary base, we are back in the Type II system, with the 
attendant implications for the banking system and the structure of 
credit indicated in that context; with the fiat component the banking 
system faces the threat of its abuse just noted. 
Type IV: Imported money plus DFI high-powered inside money plus low- 
powered inside money 
This system cannot be distinguished from the Type III system by the use 
of this identity as given above. This is because the distinction 
between the two systems is in the asset structure of the official 
monetary institution, which is not portrayed in this identity. The 
distinction is made as follows: In the Type IV system this institution 
is functioning as a bank, creating money in the process of acquiring a 
portfolio of financial assets. The monetary liabilities it issues, H, 
are thus identically equal to the sum of domestic credit extended (C) 
and imported money, G (foreign exchange, etc. ), acquired, as in the 
standard textbook portrayal of the monetary base: H= Go + C. Thus in 
the Type IV system the asset portfolio of the monetary institution is 
comprised of both foreign denominated assets (which may pay interest or 
may not), and domestic currency denominated assets, on which there is a 
positive expected rate of return. If Go were held entirely in the form 
of gold or other non-interest bearing assets, then the domestic 
portfolio would still provide a positive expected income. In the Type 
III system, on the other hand, the official monetary institution 




In the Type IV system, therefore: H= Go/W = Go + C; In the Type 
III system, on the other hand, H= (Go/W) > Go. 
Thus in the Type III system, it is possible for the monetary 
institution to derive an expected income of zero from the assets held 
against its monetary liabilities. This would be the case when Go is 
held entirely in non-interest bearing form, such as gold. (That the 
expected income on its Go assets would in this case actually be 
negative due to storage and security costs is ignored here. ) 
The difference between a Type III monetary system and a Type IV 
system is that in the Type IV system H liabilities are issued against 
both Go and C, such that H= Go + C, whereas in the Type III system C= 
O and H> Go, but the excess of H over Go in the Type III system is a 
fiat issue. 
When the expected return on the portfolio C falls below that which 
gives the portfolio a present value equal to the value of the 
liabilities H issued against it, i. e. below (H-Go), the difference 
between the actual value of the portfolio C and (H-Go) constitutes what 
is here termed a fiat issue, as indicated above in the discussion of 
the different types of money. The monetary system then becomes a 
mixture of Type III and Type IV. 
In this type of monetary system there is some form of a central bank 
which issues the liabilities with high-powered money status in exchange 
for some form of high quality primary security. This primary security 
must be denominated in a domestic currency, since in our terminology 
the money created would otherwise be EFI inside money. (As noted 
above, we are here treating EFI inside money created by a central bank 
as "imported". ) The monetary base has two components, a DFI inside 
money component and an imported component; the rate of exchange between 
the two components may be fixed or variable, as in the previous systems 
discussed. The rest of the banking system creates low-powered inside 




The important feature of the primary security used by the central 
bank in creation of this DFI base money is that it must be one which is 
held in high esteem by domestic wealth holders. In many cases, both 
current and historical, this feature has not been a characteristic of 
domestic government debt, although it is now customary to think in 
terms of government debt in the context of central bank inside money 
creation. 
In this monetary system the central bank can issue its own 
liabilities against its holdings of the two types of asset. Holders of 
these liabilities (which we refer to as "notes") might therefore 
approach the central bank requesting conversion of these notes into 
either of the two assets. This contrasts with the previous system in 
which notes were either issued against the imported money or were just 
fiat money, so that requests for conversion could only be into imported 
money. 
Lender of last resort: 
The central bank in this system can act as a lender of last resort by 
creating new high-powered inside money, buying securities of an 
appropriate type from the rest of the banking system. 
The vulnerability of the financial structure based on this monetary 
system to the hazards of excessive government borrowing described above 
depends upon the type of primary security used in the creation of 
central bank inside money. If government securities are used, there is 
the risk of excessive government borrowing eroding the quality of the 
securities, so that they are no longer held in high esteem by domestic 
wealth holders. The quality of the central bank liabilities would also 
be undermined, and the system could deteriorate in the manner described 
in the previous section. 
The financial structure is in a stronger position if the central bank 
does not hold government debt which is subject to threat of excessive 
issue, as it tends to be when other forms of government revenue are 
weak. High quality commercial bills were accordingly preferred for 
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this purpose in various historical cases, with legislation therefore 
sometimes imposing this restriction on the structure of central bank 
assets. The banking system then has the support of the lender of last 
resort function, while avoiding the vulnerability to the destructive 
effects of exposure to excessive government borrowing which were 
associated with the existence of the lender of last resort function 
under the fiat system. 
Dollarization 
The phenomenon referred to as dollarization, which has been a striking 
feature of monetary life in many economies recently, can be portrayed 
using the framework given above. Dollarization commonly refers to the 
holding of hoards of dollar bills by private citizens. In Buenos 
Aires, for instance, this is presently done on a large scale. Dollars 
are then changed into domestic currency in order to meet transactions 
needs. The dollar hoards tend to take the place, in the monetary lives 
of dollar holders, of a range of the bank balances to which residents 
of countries such as Britain or the USA are accustomed, deposit 
accounts as well as current accounts. In Buenos Aires one meets with 
the phenomenon of professional people holding no bank accounts at all, 
something scarcely imaginable in Britain or the USA. They hold dollar 
bills instead, and sometimes other saleable items serving as a store of 
value as well. 
Dollarization, in the sense of the word just explained, would be 
portrayed in the framework of the identity (2.3) in the size of Gp 
relative to the term [(Go/W) + Gb] / g. The process of dollarization 
is portrayed as a rise in Gp relative to [(Go/W) + Gb] / g. 
Equivalently, it can be portrayed using (2.3b) as a rise in Gp relative 
to Hp+D. 
This formulation reveals with stark clarity the reason dollarization 
is perceived as a "problem", and also a reason why some voices have 
argued that the way forward for such an economy is just to go over to 
the use of dollars entirely, abandoning the domestic currency. " What 
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this identity shows clearly is that in holding dollar bills instead of 
domestic cash or bank balances the cost to the economy of maintaining 
its circulating medium is increased. The increase in Gp at the expense 
of D increases the ratio (G/F), and presumably also (G/F)*; when W<l, 
the same is true of an increase in Gp at the expense of Hp. Moreover, 
the stock of Gp held is a stock of import purchasing power in a direct 
and visible way. The perception that the economy is suffering from a 
balance of payments constraint on growth, as well as from being poorer 
that it would like to be, gives force to the perception that the 
phenomenon of dollarization is a "problem". 
Another reason for dollarization being perceived as a problem also 
comes through clearly in this identity: Gp is not properly measurable, 
because the acquisitions of dollars are so often secret, and the stocks 
hidden. This means that the total money supply is not properly 
measurable, and that demand for the more readily measurable forms of 
money (i. e. domestic currency and deposits, [H + Gb] / g) is 
complicated by the choice of the relative share of Gp in total money 
balances held. Monetary management is thus more complicated than when 
Gp = 0. These issues are developed elsewhere, especially in the 
dollarization and currency substitution literatures. 
If a change to a purely imported monetary base were made (i. e. W=1), 
as in the proposed change to dollars, it may be that residents could be 
persuaded to reduce Gp and increase their holdings of low-powered 
inside money, D. 25 The achievement of reducing Gp from substantial size 
to zero, in favour of deposits, would release for other uses a 
substantial stock of capital. Moreover, it would release for other 
uses a stock of import purchasing power which could, for instance, be 
more productively put into the form of an increase in the stock of 
imported capital goods. 
When the economies suffering from dollarization are perceived as 
suffering from balance-of-payments constraints on growth, the release 
for other uses of a stock of import purchasing power may be seen as an 
important gain. In any case, the economy would unambiguously gain from 
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holding the stock of imported money, Gp, in some form of productive 
asset instead; gains would be realised whether the productive assets 
held were interest bearing foreign financial assets (the gains achieved 
by central banks from holding foreign exchange reserves in the form of 
interest bearing assets instead of in the form of gold or cash), or 
were instead held as an increment to the real imported capital stock. 
In the latter case, domestic labour would be expected to benefit 
directly from the increase in the real capital stock, whereas the 
increase in aggregate income from the change of Gp into an interest 
bearing foreign financial asset may or may not "trickle down" to 
benefit domestic workers. 
These lines of argument in favour of changing entirely to dollars, 
i. e. to a wholly imported monetary base, thus come through clearly in 
the framework of the above identity. Other arguments, such as benefits 
of monetary stability which might thereby be achieved, and benefits of 
financial development which might be facilitated, etc., are also put 
forward for making such a change. I will return to these later, as 
they are pertinent to the argument about the relative shares of DFI and 
EFI and the composition of the monetary base. 
The reduction of Gp to zero was largely achieved in some developed 
countries, at least for a time, when gold ceased to be held privately 
and foreign bills or balances were not held on a significant scale. 
4 The Concept of (GIF)*, and the mechanism by which it is imposed 
The ratio of the stock of imported money to the total money supply 
which, for a particular economy in some particular historical period, 
is compatible with monetary and exchange rate stability, is here 
denoted (G/F)*. The reader will recall that the term G refers to the 
total stock of the imported money (monetary gold or silver, or foreign 
exchange) in the economy, while the term F refers to the nominal money 
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supply. The ratio (G/F)*, which may also be referred to as the 
"required foreign exchange ratio", is treated as a sort of structural 
parameter for an economy, the determination of which is to be analyzed 
below. The ratio (G/F), on the other hand, is merely the actual ratio 
of these two stocks, whatever it may be at any given moment. Thus we 
can refer to an economy as maintaining an actual foreign exchange 
ratio, (G/F), which is higher or lower than the "required" ratio, 
(G/F)*. For example, a government might impose legal restrictions on 
note issue and deposit creation such that the actual ratio (G/F) is 
consistently held above the required ratio, (G/F)*. 
The view has sometimes been expressed that under the currency board 
system a higher level of foreign exchange reserve coverage was 
maintained than was necessary for monetary and exchange rate stability. 
In the terms used here, this would be saying that the actual ratio 
(G/F) was being maintained at a higher level than the required ratio 
(G/F)* by means of the legal restrictions governing money creation. 
The mechanism by which (G/F)* is imposed on an economy is treated as 
operating in an asymmetrical way, as is normal in discussions of 
foreign exchange reserve adequacy: The sorts of pressures which may 
tend to bring the actual ratio (G/F) down to (G/F)* when (G/F) > (G/F)* 
differ from those which operate in the reverse direction, and will not 
be dwelt upon here. The view taken here is that economies can maintain 
(G/F) > (G/F)* for indefinite periods, but that the response of wealth- 
holders will tend to thwart a policy of attempting to maintain (G/F) < 
(G/F)*; that is, wealth holders will respond to a perception that (G/F) 
< (G/F)* by shifting out of the currency and re-imposing (G/F)* by 
means of an exchange rate change. 
In other words, if the domestic components of the money supply are 
perceived by wealth holders as excessive relative to the foreign 
component, a scramble for the foreign money will force up its price. 
The value of existing stocks of foreign money is thereby increased 
relative to the value of the total money stock expressed in terms of 
the domestic currency. On the other hand, foreign exchange reserves 
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can be accumulated by monetary authorities without such adjustment 
being imposed (such stocks are thus assumed to be small relative to the 
total world supply). 
If an attempt is made to hold the share of the domestic components of 
the money supply above the share indicated by (G/F)*, the price of 
foreign exchange will be repeatedly forced up. A government may, for 
instance, be persisting in such a policy in an attempt to maintain a 
given level of the money stock, because of the unpleasant employment 
consequences of allowing the money stock to settle at a lower level. 
Political pressures to maintain the level of the money stock at some 
level which is higher than that which is consistent with (G/F)* may be 
very strong because of the unpleasant employment consequences of 
monetary deflation. Persistence in such a policy would result in 
repeated foreign exchange crises or persistent depreciation of the 
currency (or both! ). 
Moreover, persistence in such a policy would result in an 
increasingly intractable problem of currency "softening". The reason 
the problem will become increasingly intractable is that persistence in 
such a policy would tend to erode the inflation tax base, or in the 
terms used here, it would tend to raise (G/F)*. The maintenance of the 
level of the money stock which may be seen as desirable for employment 
reasons then becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with monetary 
and exchange rate stability, while political pressures to alleviate 
unemployment by maintaining the level of the money supply may continue 
unabated. In Chapter IV the implications for an economy of a rise in 
(G/F)* will be analyzed. 
The response of wealth holders to persistence in a policy of 
overexpansion of the domestic components of the money supply requires 
further explanation, as it is this response which will tend to cause 
the rise in (G/F)*. The essence of the idea is that this change is 
caused by changes over time in the average currency composition of 
wealth holders' financial portfolios, this change being associated with 




Analytically, wealth holders are treated as pursuing either a "single 
currency strategy" or a "diversification strategy. " The "two money 
strategy" which was discussed above is a specific version of the 
"diversification strategy". The currency structure of portfolio demand 
for the class of wealth holders which pursue the "diversification 
strategy" is assumed to be fluid, changing rapidly in response to a 
high quality information set. These groups of financial sophisticates 
will be referred to as "diversifiers". Wealth holders who pursue the 
"single currency strategy", on the other hand, do not alter the 
currency composition of their financial portfolios in response to news, 
but instead persist in holding all their financial wealth in 
instruments denominated in the domestic currency only. Like the 
population of the province of Buenos Aires described by Hansen above, 
this group does not trouble itself about currency appreciation or 
depreciation. 
The word "strategy" is used here, as before, to indicate that the 
policy is continued over a period of time, as the customary or habitual 
practice of the individuals concerned. This type of habitual 
behaviour, as opposed to behaviour which results from repeatedly making 
fresh decisions, is seen as caused by information and transactions 
costs. The making of decisions in itself is also costly, in that it 
requires labour, time and thought, i. e. energies which could be used in 
other ways. 
Financial information and transactions, like all information and 
transactions, are costly. A fluid portfolio response to high quality 
information necessarily rests on a foundation of a substantial 
investment of capital in the institutional structures through which 
information is obtained and transactions services provided. Access to 
information and transactions has some "lump sum" costs so that wealth 
holders will stick to a simple single currency strategy unless the 
costs of the single currency strategy are expected to more than offset 




The potential costs of the single currency strategy are increased by 
the size of financial wealth holdings; the potential costs of the 
single currency strategy are also increased by the magnitude of the 
exchange rate devaluations involved. A small wealth holder facing the 
possibility of a small exchange rate change could do better with a 
simple single currency strategy. In particular, working classes, for 
whom the share of financial wealth holdings in their total assets is by 
definition small, would be likely to be able to obtain a much higher 
return to investment of resources (time and energy, for example) in 
trade union activity towards defending the real value of their primary 
assets (wage rates and contracts), than they would be able to obtain 
from investment of resources in access to financial portfolio 
diversification information and transactions. 26 
With successive devaluations, information about the effects of 
exchange rate devaluations is spread. This effect tends to increase 
the range of wealth holders who decide that the single currency 
strategy is unwise, overly costly. The inflation tax base is thus 
eroded, as the use of currency type EFI thus increases relative to DFI. 
According to the arguments developed below this will push up (G/F)*. 
This aspect of the spread of information is related to what 
Kindleberger calls "collective memory", and it can be lumpy: People 
receive information about the costs and benefits of the single currency 
strategy through their own and others' observed experience; a really 
major shock, like a large and unexpected loss, can have traumatic and 
enduring effects on currency strategy preference, or on "monetary and 
banking habits". This aspect of information spread and its effects on 
currency strategy is in the nature of cultural change, and as such can 
carry a considerable weight of inertia. Kindleberger [1978] and 
[1984], for example, has repeatedly stressed this weight of inertia in 
the response of financial habits, and the enduring nature of 




With successive devaluations, the range of wealth holders who find 
the single currency strategy overly costly would tend to increase also 
if the information and transactions costs of financial diversification 
are falling, or if the size of their financial wealth has increased, or 
if the magnitude of the devaluations increases. Over time, with 
successive devaluations, the information and transactions costs of 
access to financial diversification do indeed tend to fall, as the 
institutional structures supporting financial diversification become 
more developed; the development of institutional structures is also 
subject to forces of social inertia, as well as involving substantial 
fixed capital investment. 
That an increasingly intractable problem of currency "softening" is 
very likely to be caused by persistence in a policy of maintaining a 
given ratio of domestic to foreign components of the money supply, thus 
follows from the tendency for a wider range of wealth holders to change 
from a single currency strategy to a diversification strategy as time 
goes on. This is because the magnitude of the exchange rate change 
required to restore (G/F) to (G/F)* is greater as the ratio of desired 
to actual value of foreign exchange stocks is greater. As the group of 
single currency strategy wealth holders becomes smaller, the desired 
ratio of domestic to foreign components of the money supply is reduced; 
i. e., (G/F)* rises. The magnitude of exchange rate change required to 
achieve portfolio balance for a given actual ratio (G/F) is thus 
increased. But the increase in the magnitude of exchange rate change 
will decrease still further the range of wealth holders for whom the 
costs of diversification outweigh the expected losses from the single 
currency strategy. ' Moreover, for the reasons indicated above, the 
costs of diversification are likely to be falling, which will 
contribute further to the same effect. " 
The distribution of gains and losses from exchange rate devaluation, 
which is in favour of diversifiers at the expense of the single 
currency strategy group, will also contribute directly to enlarging the 
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relative share of financial wealth held by the diversifying group. 
This factor also will contribute to increasing the share of EFI 
relative to DFI, and thereby also to raising (G/F)*. 
The combination of all of these tendencies is to alter the structure 
of the aggregate wealth holders' portfolio demand, reducing the DFI 
share in financial portfolios in favour of EFI, and thereby raising 
(G/F)*. A policy of continuously expanding the domestic components of 
the money supply in an attempt to maintain the level of the money stock 
above that which is given by (G/F)* times the level of actual foreign 
exchange reserves will thus tend to result, by the operation of these 
tendencies, in the accelerating deterioration of the currency in 
question. The consequences of persisting in such a policy will be 
analyzed further in Chapter IV. 
5 EFIIDFI and the structure of the money supply 
now much of the claim that an EFI economy must have a 
larger share of imported money in the money supply is 
revealed through the use of this identity to be true by 
definition? 
High-powered money, the monetary base 
The contribution of DFI to the monetary base is reflected in the 
above identity by W. Where the domestic credit share of the monetary 
base is larger, W is necessarily smaller, by definition. However, W 
can also be reduced by the issue of fiat money, as is described above, 
without the issuing institution thereby acquiring any increase in its 
asset portfolio of primary securities. In a pure EFI economy, i. e. one 
in which DFI is zero, the issue of fiat money is the only means of 
reducing the share of the imported money in the monetary base . 
21 
The identity [2.3, or 2.3a] makes clear the fact that the way the 
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imported component of the monetary base is reduced is by reducing W. 
This much is true by definition. However, the distinction made here 
between high-powered inside money and fiat money serves to direct our 
attention to the quality of the asset portfolio held by the monetary 
institution. In the case of inside money, the monetary institution 
increases its portfolio of primary securities, whereas in the case of 
fiat money there is no such increase. The portfolio of primary 
securities acquired through the issue of inside money thus provides the 
issuing institution with a stream of income which is not provided by 
the issue of fiat money. This distinction is important, because the 
strength of a financial institution, and the attractiveness of its 
liabilities, are dependent upon the quality of its asset portfolio. 
Thus while it is identically true that reducing W reduces the 
imported component of the monetary base, the distinction between the 
two methods of doing so reveals a range of very different possibilities 
concerning the asset structure and strength of the issuing institution. 
To these I will return later; at present it should be noted that the 
contribution of DFI to the monetary base is reflected in W, which will 
be less than one if this contribution is positive, but that W can also 
be less than one if DFI is zero but there is a fiat issue. 
Low-powered money 
The contribution of low-powered inside money to the total money 
supply is reflected in g. The lower the average reserve ratio, the 
greater is the contribution of low-powered inside money to the total 
money supply; this also is true by definition. However, low-powered 
inside money creation may be EFI or DFI: If banks allow customers to 
hold deposits denominated in a foreign currency, it is EFI, whereas if 
the deposits are denominated in the domestic currency it is DFI. In 
either case, however, the money created constitutes a contribution to 
the total money supply which is not imported, but which is instead the 
creation of the domestic financial sector; it is part of the 




We can now see how much of the claim that an EFI economy must have a 
larger share of imported money in the money supply is revealed by 
definition. 
High-powered money 
As concerns the monetary base, we have seen that the share . of 
imported money can be reduced by reducing W, either by fiat issue or by 
the creation of (DFI) inside money, and that the difference between the 
two methods is in the asset structure of the issuing institution. 
Thus, these definitions do not tell us that the EFI share has 
necessarily to be larger where DFI is zero, but they do tell us that 
the asset structure of the issuing institution will be different, for a 
given W<1, depending on whether the reduction of W was due to DFI 
inside money or whether it was due to fiat issue. And moreover they 
also tell us that the asset structure is weaker, for the same W<1, in 
the fiat issue case, other things equal. 
Low-powered money 
As concerns low-powered money, the identities (2.3) and (2.3a) show 
us that the lower the average reserve ratio, g, the lower the share of 
the imported money (Go+Gb) in the total money supply F. But this 
average reserve ratio can be lowered by creating either DFI low-powered 
inside money, or by creating foreign denominated deposits, which are 
EFI inside money. In either case, as noted above, money is being 
created domestically rather than imported. 
As has been noted above, g would also be lowered by an increase in 
the share of H held by the banks as opposed to that held as cash in the 
hands of the public. Historically, this has been associated with an 
increase in public confidence in banks, and is therefore also a 
contribution of domestic banking to the provision of the money supply. 
The contribution of the domestic financial structure to reduction of 
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the imported component of the money supply is in reducing g, whether by 
lowering reserve ratios or by increasing the banks' share of H. This 
reduction of g can be achieved whether the banks are conducting EFI 
business or DFI business. Therefore, while the identity does make 
clear the importance of the banks' contribution in reducing the 
imported share in the money supply, it does not reveal any particular 
special direct contribution of DFI. The gains to the economy 
attainable through increasing the share in the total money supply of 
domestically created low-powered inside money are attainable whether 
this low-powered inside money is EFI or DFI. 
Thus far, examination of this identity has provided some support for 
the arguments in favour of attempting to cure the ills of a weak 
currency by changing to a Type II monetary system, using an entirely 
imported monetary base, and entirely free use of EFI deposit creation. 
The gains to the economy attainable by reducing g, as well as gains 
attainable by reducing the share of Gp in favour of domestic bank 
money, could be achieved by this means if the change in monetary system 
sufficiently increased public confidence in the domestic banking 
system. 
However, this view does ignore the well known role of government 
support for the banking system, in the provision of deposit insurance 
and the lender of last resort function, in achieving a high level of 
public confidence which permits a low g and Gp. And we have seen 
above, in the discussion of the Type II monetary system, that the 
provision of the lender of last resort function in this system is 
problematic, and expensive in the maintenance of adequate central 
reserves. Nevertheless, there are gains to be made in pooling 
reserves, such that reduction of the total G= Gp + Gb + Go may be 
attainable, as well as reduction in g. Therefore, in my view, the 
weakness of the lender of last resort function in the Type II system 
does not entirely undermine the soundness of these arguments in favour 
of changing to a Type II system where the domestic currency has become 
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The influence of the relative shares of EFI and DFI 
low-powered money on the composition of the 
monetary base. 
We can now make use of our identity to see what effect the relative 
shares of EFI and DFI in low-powered money may have on the composition 
of the monetary base, (H + Gp + Gb). This addresses only a small part 
of the question concerning the influence of the relative shares of EFI 
and DFI on the monetary base because the financial instruments 
discussed here include only the monetary (or most liquid) end of the 
full spectrum of financial instruments included in the terms EFI and 
DFI. 
For the present, Gp will be assumed constant, unless indicated 
otherwise in a particular context, since the focus of interest here is 
on the composition of commercial banks' reserves, (Gb+Hb). 
The influence of the relative shares of EFI and DFI in total 
deposits, on the composition of the monetary base, depends upon the 
nature of the reserve ratios held by banks against the two types of 
deposits. At one extreme, if banks hold the same ratio and composition 
of reserves regardless of the structure of deposits, then the relative 
shares of EFI and DFI in total deposits would not influence the share 
of imported money in the total money supply. For instance, Gb might be 
zero, the banks holding reserves only in the form of Hb, and relying on 
the central bank to supply G from its reserves (Go) whenever required. 
However, more generally, Gb is likely to be positive when there are EFI 
deposits, and the composition of reserves held by commercial banks 
(Hb+Gb) is likely to depend on the share of EFI in total deposits. 
It is a theoretical possibility that reserve ratios could be the same 
for both types of deposits, with Gb held as reserves against EFI 
deposits, and H held against DFI deposits. However, this need by no 
means be the case, and in historical cases the position has certainly 
been very different indeed. In the Argentine case, for example, during 
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the gold standard era, banks held very much higher reserve ratios 
against EFI deposits than against DFI deposits, as will be seen. This 
policy can of course emerge as a response to expectations that the 
domestic currency may depreciate against G. While many other factors 
(notably the structure of legal reserve requirements) can influence the 
policies of banks concerning the composition of reserves held against 
the two types of deposits, one would certainly expect perceptions about 
the relative strengths of the two monies to be an important factor. 
Consider, for example, the perspectives offered by this framework on 
the case of an increase in the share of foreign denominated deposits. 
Assume, to begin with, that the total volume of deposits remains 
unchanged. Suppose also that banks hold foreign exchange reserves 
against these EFI liabilities in the same ratio as their average 
reserve deposit ratio. An increase in EFI relative to DFI would then 
result in an increase in Gb relative to banks' holdings of H. Consider 
now what the identity (2.3) shows: 
(2.3) F= kY = Gp +H Go / W) + Gb] /g 
Assume no change in Gp. Then for the total money supply to remain 
constant, while Gb rises, either g has to rise or (Go/W) has to fall. 
Banks are holding a smaller quantity of the central bank's liabilities, 
H; if the public happened to want to increase their holdings of H at 
the same time as banks are reducing theirs, the excess supply of H 
might be absorbed by the public, such that a fall in g would result. I 
see no particular reason why an increase in the quantity of cash in the 
hands of the public would be expected to accompany an increase in the 
EFI share of bank deposits. (An increase in desired Gp and a reduction 
in desired Hp would seem a more plausible accompaniment to an increase 
in the EFI share of bank deposits than the reverse. However, I am 
assuming Gp constant here. ) 
If, on the other hand, banks simply pile up excess reserves of H, 
raising g by this means, the total money supply could again be kept 
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constant. However, since this policy would tend to reduce banks' 
profitability, it is hardly a plausible voluntary response to an 
increase in the EFI share of their business. This policy could, of 
course, be imposed by law; such a law would effectively be a sort of 
tax on the banking system, and could become intolerably crippling if 
the EFI share became large. 
The identity shows that if g is to remain constant when Gb rises, 
then H has to fall to maintain an unchanged total money supply. If W< 
1 then a fall in H offsetting an increase in Gb results in an increase 
in the imported share in the monetary base, G/ (H + Gb + Gp). 
Another possibility resulting from the increase in Gb would be that H 
is held constant, such that the total money supply rises. If real 
income is constant, and k does not rise, this increase in the nominal 
money supply would only be absorbed by inflation of prices such that 
nominal income Y rises. This could then result in a depreciation of 
the exchange rate which would serve the function of increasing the 
value of G against H, thereby achieving the reduction in the real size 
of the stocks of H relative to those of G which was desired by the 
banks in the first place. In this case also the increase in the share 
of EFI bank deposits would result in an increase in the share of the 
imported component of the monetary base. 
These conclusions are of course closely analogous to those reached by 
McKinnon [1982) in his analysis of the world reserve portfolio shift 
out of US$ which occurred in the 1970s. 30 In that context the US was in 
the role of the above central banker supplying H, while other 
countries' central banks were in the position of our bankers above, 
confronting a public which was wanting to hold fewer dollar denominated 
assets. Central banks' purchases of the unwanted excess dollars were 
not entirely offset by sales of other assets, such that an the world 
money supply was increased. (The analogy here is with the last case 
considered above, when banks increase Gb but do not offset this 
increase by reducing their holdings of H, nor by raising reserve 
ratios, such that total deposits increase. ) Depreciation of the dollar 
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subsequently reduced the real value of the dollar share in these asset 
portfolios, as in the above case, altering the real size of the 
outstanding stock of dollars relative to the stocks of appreciating 
currencies. 
Thus it seems clear that by one route or another an increase in the 
EFI share of low-powered inside money must lead to an increase in the 
imported share of the monetary base which is compatible with both 
profitable banking and exchange rate stability. If the rate of H 
creation is maintained constant, other things equal, in the face of a 
trend change in the relative shares of EFI and DFI low-powered inside 
money, according to the arguments developed here, we can expect to see 
a "softening" (or "hardening", if the DFI share is rising) of the 
currency in question. 
In practical application, of course, differences in characteristics 
between EFI and DFI bank deposits which are not captured by the above 
identity must be taken into consideration when assessing the probable 
effects of a change in the relative shares of EFI and DFI in total 
deposits. For instance, it may be that EFI deposits do not serve the 
purpose of domestic current means of payment, while DFI deposits do 
serve this purpose. Velocity of the two types of money could be quite 
different, and the inflationary impact of a given increase in the total 
money supply could in consequence differ sharply according to the 
currency composition of the increase. If, for example, savings hoards 
of money are tending to be held in EFI deposits (or, worse, in Gp), 
while DFI deposits are pared down for transactions needs, DFI money 
velocity might very well increase, such that the inflationary impact of 
a given rate of H expansion could be intensified. 
Conclusion 
In this section I have made use of our conceptual framework to 
examine the influence of the relative shares of EFI and DFI monetary 
instruments on the relative shares of H and Gb in the monetary base. 
The conclusion that a change in the shares of H and Gb in the monetary 
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base would also involve a change in the imported share of the monetary 
base rested on the assumption that the central bank's contribution to 
the monetary base was greater than its holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves, i. e. that H> Go, or W<1. It ignored the possibility that 
the increase in banks' holdings of imported money might simply be 
offset by a reduction in the central bank's holding of foreign exchange 
reserves, such that the total share of imported money in the monetary 
base would remain unchanged despite the fall in the central bank's 
share. That is, in the terms of our identity, it ignored the 
possibility of a fall in W sufficient to keep (Go + Gb) constant in the 
face of a fall in H relative to Gb. We can now make use of the concept 
of adequacy of the proportion W of official reserves to central bank 
liabilities in order to examine this possibility. 
The concept of W* 
The question addressed in this section concerns the proportion (W) of 
total central bank monetary liabilities (H) which is "covered" by 
foreign exchange reserves. As noted above, this proportion has been 
very different, historically, in different countries, and within 
individual countries it has differed over time. Convertibility of 
central bank liabilities into foreign exchange or gold at a fixed rate 
has been achieved, in different times and places, with very different 
values for W. I will make use of the concept of there being at any 
given time, for a particular central bank, some value for this 
proportion which is perceived as "adequate" by wealth holders, in the 
sense of being adequate for the maintenance of convertibility at a 
fixed rate of exchange. This value for WI denote W*; it is directly 
analogous to the concept discussed above denoted (G/F)*, except that W* 
pertains to the central bank's liabilities, H, as opposed to the total 
money supply, F. The purpose of this concept of W*, is to capture the 
enormous historical and geographical differences in the average W which 
has been successfully combined with convertibility at a fixed rate of 
exchange. As has been described above concerning the imposition of 
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(G/F)*, the idea I am using is that wealth holders will re-impose W* 
via the mechanism of portfolio shifts and exchange rate changes if W 
falls below W*. 
The possibility that a shift in the composition of commercial banks' 
reserves in favour of Gb might be offset by a fall in the proportion W 
sufficient to avoid an increase in the imported share of the monetary 
base can now be assessed by using the concept of W*. If indeed the 
central bank had been holding foreign exchange reserves in excess of 
those which would give W= W*, then it is plausible that the increase 
in Gb might be at least partially offset by a fall in Go, such that a 
rise in the EFI share of deposits need not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the imported share in the monetary base [G/ (Gb +H+ Gp) 
1. This is a possibility. However, when the increased share of EFI 
deposits, and/or of Gb relative to banks' holdings of H has been 
occurring as a response to a perception on the part of banks and wealth 
holders that the rate of issue of H has been excessive (i. e., that W 
has been tending to be less than W*), an offsetting reduction in W 
would not be a tenable prospect. 
6 Concepts of reserve adequacy 
In this section I will approach the question of what factors might be 
determining W*, and (G/F)*, by drawing on two concepts of reserve 
adequacy which have been in common use in quite different contexts. 
The framework of the algebraic identity which I have been using above 
will be used now to relate these different concepts of reserve adequacy 
to the proportion, W, and to G/F, and thereby gain some insight into 
factors influencing W* and (G/F)*. 
The concept of reserve adequacy as derived from 
foreign trade considerations 
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The first of these two concepts is the concept of adequacy of foreign 
exchange reserves which has been in common use in recent years in 
discussions of trends in international reserves. 31 This concept of 
reserve adequacy relates the average stock of foreign exchange reserves 
(Go) in a given year to the flow of imports (M) in that year, or to the 
flow of imports and net foreign debt service jointly (M+S). This gives 
the ratio R= Go/(M) or Rs = Go/(M+S), as the actual ratio for any 
year, from which I will use the concept Rs* as the ratio which is 
considered "adequate". The 1985 UNCTAD publication cited in (30) 
above, for example, makes use of this approach, while stressing its 
insufficiency: "The degree of reserve ease can never be fully captured 
by statistics, and no single measure of reserve adequacy is entirely 
suitable. Using as a criterion a reserves-to-imports ratio of 25% 
.... which 
has generally been regarded as a bare minimum, reserves have 
been inadequate since 1980 for the world as a whole and for the non-oil 
exporting developing countries in particular... Perhaps a more 
meaningful measure for the countries is the ratio of non-gold reserves 
to annual payments for goods and services plus loan repayments: in 
1981-1982 this ratio stood at 16-17%, down from 24-25% in 1977-79 and 
30% in 1973... "32 
In attempting to explain differences among countries in reserve 
adequacy, i. e. cross-country differences in Rs*, variability of the 
trade balance has been recognized as an important factor, as for 
instance in the following quote from Scammell [1987): "... First, trade 
volume is not the sole determinant of the need for reserves; rather it 
is instability of the balance of payments at any trade volume that is 
important ..... 
33 
There is a considerable literature on demand for reserves which makes 
use of the reserves-to-imports (and debt service) ratio, and it is not 
my intention to survey it or assess it here. Instead I will simply 
take from the usage in that literature the concept Rs* (as I have just 
defined it) and put it in the conceptual framework which I have been 
using here; this will enable us to see what are the implications of 
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that concept of reserve adequacy for the structure of the monetary 
base. 
The identity I have been using is repeated here: 
(2.3) F= kY = Gp + [(Go/W) + Gb] /g 
where (Go/W) = H, or W= Go/H. 
The concept Rs* can be used to give a value Go* which incorporates 
the concept of reserve adequacy as derived from trade considerations: 
Go* = Rs* (M+S). If we treat the other terms in the identity as fixed 
parameters given by the institutional structure of the financial system 
at any particular stage in the development of an economy, we obtain a 
portrayal of the structure of the money supply which relates this 
structure to trade considerations. The terms g, Gp, and Gb reflect the 
habits and practices of the public in holding domestic currency cash 
(Hp) and foreign money (Gp), and the banks average reserve ratios and 
composition of reserves (Gb + Hb) held against different types of 
deposits. All of these are features of the structure of the financial 
system in an economy at any given time, and can therefore be treated as 
fixed parameters when the focus of our attention is, as here, on a 
concept of reserve adequacy deriving from trade considerations. The 
concept of reserve adequacy derived from trade considerations focuses 
on cross-country differences in balance of payments current account 
flows, and not on cross country differences in parameters of the 
financial structure. 
It should however be noted that Rs*, as opposed to R*, does have in 
it the net external debt service term, S, and that cross country 
differences in this value may be reflecting differences in financial 
structure and not merely differences in net debt positions (as was 
explained earlier), as follows: Consider an economy which has zero net 
external debt, foreign assets exactly matched by foreign liabilities, 
but which uses EFI in the geographical sense of the term. S will be 
positive, (that is, there will be a debit item on current account, S) 
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reflecting the difference between the borrowing and lending rates of 
interest. This flow is the cost of using non-resident financial 
services, and is larger the larger the stocks of assets and liabilities 
involved, i. e., the greater the use of the non-resident financial 
services. Countries which function as financial centres receive these 
flows as earnings on invisibles, while for periphery countries which 
make use of the geographical financial centres this is a debit item on 
current account. On the other hand, EFI in the currency denomination 
sense, conducted by resident financial institutions, does not give rise 
to this item in the balance of payments; economies which use EFI in the 
currency denomination sense only are using the financial services of 
residents instead of importing financial services as in the 
geographical EFI. 
The value of [ Rs* (M + S) ] is thus not directly affected by the use 
of EFI in the pure currency sense, but it is increased by the use of 
EFI in the geographical sense. 
It will therefore be seen that the concept Rs* does yield the 
implication that the imported share in the money supply must be higher 
for an economy in which EFI, in the geographical sense, is larger 
relative to DFI, because, as we have just seen, Go* as derived from 
Rs*, (i. e., Go* = Rs* [M + S] ), is made larger by the higher value for 
S which is implied. However, this implication does not follow for EFI 
in the pure currency sense, when the financial services being paid for 
by this flow S are performed by domestic residents. 
The following expression is derived, by substituting for Go in the 
identity we have been using: 
(2.3rs) F= kY = Gp + ((Rs (M + S) / W] + Gb) /g 
since Rs = Go / (M + S), so Rs(M + S) = Go. 
(2.3rs*) F* = kY = Gp + {[Rs* (M + S) / W] + Gb) /g 
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where [Rs* (M + S)] = Go*. 
The expression (2.3rs*) makes use of the concept of reserve adequacy 
derived from trade considerations, and yields a portrayal of the 
structure of the money supply based on that concept of reserve 
adequacy. The total imported share of the money supply is: 
(2.8) G/F = (Gp + Gb + Go) /F 
(2.8a) (G/F)* = (Gp + Gb + Go)* /F 
The concept of reserve adequacy Rs* thus yields, by implication, a 
concept of an adequate imported share in the money supply, (G/F)*: 
(2.8rs*) (G/F)* = {[Rs* (M + S) + Gb + Gp} / F} 
Using this concept of an adequate imported share in the money supply, 
(i. e., focusing on Rs* (M+S) and ignoring cross country differences in 
g, Gb and Gp) cross-country differences what constitutes an adequate 
structure of the money supply are attributed to differences in three 
things: (a) Rs*, which has been seen as positively related to trade 
balance variability; (b) the level of imports in relation to income 
M/Y; and (c) the level of net debt service, also in relation to income, 
S/Y. 
The imported share in the money supply is, in (2.8rs*), seen to be 
positively related to both imports and net debt service. 
Treating the average velocity of the total money supply as constant, 
so that k is constant, the expression (2.3rs*) shows that the concept 
Rs* also implies a W*: Since W= Go / H, and Go = Rs (M + S), Go* = 
Rs* (M + S), and W* accordingly emerges as W* = Rs* (M + S) / H. With 
the financial structure given, such that Gb and Gp and g are fixed, and 
if nominal income Y is also fixed, then H is also fixed. If reserves 
Go are at the level given by this concept of reserve adequacy, Go*, 
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then W can not be reduced without increasing the total money supply in 
an inflationary way, that is, raising F. (If real income and velocity 
are constant, this implies a rise in the price level. ) The concept Rs* 
thus also implies a W*, when the other parameters of the financial 
structure are treated as given. 
Conclusions 
The concept of reserve adequacy derived from trade considerations 
thus gives one approach to explaining cross country differences in W 
and in the total imported share in the money supply which have been 
successfully compatible with convertibility at a fixed rate of 
exchange. The conclusions which emerge from this approach are as 
follows: 
The proportion W* of central bank monetary liabilities H which are 
"covered" by foreign exchange reserves which is compatible with the 
maintenance of monetary and exchange rate stability is influenced by 
(a) the variability of the trade balance (which is the trade-based 
explanation of cross-country differences in Rs*); (b) the openness of 
the economy, as measured by the ratio of imports to income; and (c) the 
level of net debt service (S) in relation to income. A larger 
proportion of central bank monetary liabilities must be covered by 
foreign exchange reserves in order to maintain monetary stability as 
(a) the trade balance is more variable, as (b) imports form a larger 
share in total expenditure, and (c) as net debt service is higher in 
relation to income. 
As noted above, EFI in the geographical sense, i. e. the use of the 
financial services of a foreign financial centre, yields a higher value 
for net debt service, S, for any given level of net debt; the share of 
the imported component of the monetary base [(Go* + Gb + Gp) / (H + Gb 
+ Gp)] which is compatible with monetary stability at a fixed exchange 
rate is thus higher, ceterus paribus, for economies using geographical 
EFI than for economies functioning as geographical financial centres. 
The idea that the level of net debt service is an important factor 
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influencing cross-country differences in the share of foreign exchange 
reserves in the monetary base is in accordance with the conclusions 
reached by Lindert (1969]. Lindert wrote as follows: "... None of the 
chief creditor nations' governments or central banks was among the top 
foreign currency holders. In fact, among the Western European net 
creditor nations.... there appears to have been an inverse correlation 
between their rank as net creditors and their rank as official holders 
of foreign exchange.... Conversely, the greatest amounts of foreign 
currency balances were amassed by some of the world's largest 
accumulators of total reserves and the world's largest debtors... " 
"... Perhaps the most noteworthy determinant of the degree of official 
exchange holding was the extent of the country's dependence on credit 
from the financial centre... " "... The irony of the rise of a key 
currency regime before WWI is underscored by another quantitative 
implication of the data presented above: The accumulation of liquid 
claims on major financial centres loomed much larger in relation to the 
total reserves held by the centre countries than in relation to the 
total reserves of the countries holding these claims... 11" 
Lindert is stressing the importance in these patterns of net debt and 
net creditor positions, as opposed to the use of EFI by itself. The 
periphery countries which he studied were in general both net capital 
importers and users of EFI, in both the geographical and currency EFI 
forms. In the terms of the present framework, this combination of net 
capital import and the use of geographical EFI yielded high values for 
S, which were associated with high values for Go*. 
The idea that the openness of the economy, as measured by the import 
ratio, influences cross-country differences in the structure of the 
monetary base is in harmony with the idea developed by McKinnon 
[1963], 35 that the currency composition of savings instruments would 
reflect the "representative bundle of goods" consumed by the savers in 
question. In this case, it is the consumption pattern of the economy 
as a whole, as captured in the ratio of imports to total expenditure, 
which is being reflected in the currency composition of central bank 
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(or other official institution) financial assets, a larger share of 
foreign assets being associated with a larger share of imports in the 
"representative bundle of goods" consumed by the economy. 
The conclusions just derived give some support for the claim which 
has been often made that the currency board system was better suited to 
many former colonies than is the more "modern" system adopted since 
independence, as follows: Some of these economies do feature 
relatively high values for all three of the characteristics identified 
above (variability of trade balance, openness, and high values for net 
debt service). However, it should be remembered that these conclusions 
were derived from trade considerations only, while treating the 
structure of the financial system as given, and that it was the purpose 
of these former colonies to make major changes in the structure of the 
financial system. This is therefore not the best conceptual approach 
for achieving an understanding of the failures associated with those 
changes. 
The concept of reserve adequacy as derived from 
banking considerations 
The second concept of official reserve adequacy which I will use is 
one which derives from consideration of the central bank (or other 
monetary institution) in its role as a financial institution. This 
approach yields a concept of W* which derives from examining the nature 
of the financial services performed by this institution and the quality 
of its asset portfolio. In this approach wealth-holders (and 
commercial banks) are seen as assessing the quality of the central 
bank's liabilities by forming a view of the quality of its asset 
portfolio and of the payments services it offers. A concept of W* is 
thus derived from assessing performance of the central bank as a bank. 
Using this approach, W* is seen as being determined by the quality of 
the financial services performed by the institution itself: W* would, 
on this view, be lowered by the development of a profitable portfolio 
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of domestic assets, or by increasing the attractiveness of the payments 
services offered by the bank. It would be raised by deterioration in 
the quality of the bank's domestic asset portfolio, or by deterioration 
in the attractiveness of the bank's liabilities for any other reason, 
such as decline in the quality of payments services offered. 
In the previous section, when a concept of W* was derived from trade 
considerations, we had been treating the parameters of the financial 
structure as given, such that g, Gp, and Gb, and hence also H, were 
fixed. The trade considerations which yielded the concept of reserve 
adequacy Go* therefore determined the proportion W* which was 
compatible with monetary and exchange rate stability. Now, however, we 
are looking at W* as deriving from the quality of the central bank's 
performance as a financial institution, and it is therefore not 
appropriate to treat Gp and Gb as fixed. Instead, the liabilities of 
the central bank, H, are treated as competing with Gp and Gb; the share 
of H in the monetary base is thus treated as depending on the relative 
attractiveness of H to banks and private wealth holders. On the other 
hand, since g reflects the banks' average reserve ratios and the share 
of H held by banks as opposed to the public, and is thus not so 
directly related to the central bank's performance in competition with 
Gp and Gb, g can be treated as fixed for the present. 
i will retain, from the previous section, the concept of reserve 
adequacy Rs* derived from trade considerations. This will now be 
treated as a fixed structural parameter for the economy, the value of 
Rs* being treated as depending on the variability of the trade balance 
and the openness of the economy. These are structural feature of an 
economy which are fixed in the medium to long term, and not related to 
the central bank's conduct of its banking business in any direct way. 
Therefore it is appropriate to treat Rs* as a fixed feature of the 
economy in the present context. 
Looking again at the expression (2.3rs), from this new perspective, 
we reach a different view as to what determines the total share of 
imported money in the money supply: 
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(2.3rs**) F** = kY = Gp +{[Rs* (M+S) / W*] + Gb) /g 
(2.8rs**) [Rs*(M + S) + Gb + Gp] / F** = (G/F)** 
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Given Rs* and g, the total share of imported money in the money 
supply now depends on the success of the central bank in competing with 
Gb and Gp. If the central bank conducts an immensely profitable DFI 
banking business, its liabilities H may be made sufficiently attractive 
to banks and private wealth holders as to enable it to compete 
successfully with Gb and Gp and thereby expand H without increasing the 
total money supply, i. e. in a non-inflationary way. W* may thereby be 
lowered even without any reduction in Go* = Rs* (M+S). This 
possibility did not emerge in the previous section because we had been 
treating the financial structure as fixed, focusing instead on trade 
considerations. 
From this new perspective, the share of the imported money in the 
money supply depends on the success of the central bank in its banking 
operations as well as on the factors identified earlier as determining 
Go*. If the central bank is sufficiently successful in developing a 
profitable banking business and in offering attractive payments 
services, the share of its liabilities in the monetary base may be 
enlarged, and the cost to the economy of maintaining a part of its 
capital stock in the form of foreign exchange reserves in the hands of 
commercial banks and private citizens, (Gb+Gp), would accordingly be 
reduced. This perspective thus supports the view (expressed by Sayers, 
for example, as I have mentioned above) that central banks established 
in former currency board economies should indeed develop their banking 
business. 
Consider the following historical data offered by Cameron (1967) for 
England and Wales, on the composition of the total stock of money: In 
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1688 specie is estimated to have constituted 83.3% of the money stock. 
By 1913, specie had fallen to 11.5% of the money stock. In terms of 
the framework used here, in 1688 Gp/F was 83.3%; in 1913 it was 11.5% 
(See Table III-1). The difference was achieved in England by the 
development of the financial structure, such that bank deposits came to 
dominate the money supply. In terms of our framework, the main source 
of change was reduction in g and in Gp, specie coming to be 
concentrated in the banks where it "went further" towards providing the 
country's money supply. The liabilities of the Bank of England, H in 
our framework, gained against (Gb + Gp). 36 
With specie such a very high share in the total money supply in the 
early part of that period it is easy to understand the mercantilist 
preoccupation with the idea of running a balance of payments surplus in 
order to gain gold and ensure sufficiency of the money supply. Sudden 
changes in the money stock in a downward direction have never been 
popular; when specie so strongly dominated the money supply it was 
hardly irrational to want to maintain substantial specie hoards against 
adverse shocks; poor harvests, for example, would require sudden large 
increases in grain imports which had to be paid for in gold because 
other exports could not be increased at the speed and on the scale with 
which bad weather can destroy a season's crops. The flexibility given 
to the money supply through the development of the financial structure 
must have contributed significantly to the weakening of the 
mercantilist attitudes. 
In the Scottish case, as I mentioned earlier, the imported component 
in the money supply was brought to an even lower level. Writing about 
the Scottish banks of issue during the 18th and 19th centuries, Cameron 
tells us that the ratio of specie reserves to liabilities to the public 
was rarely above 0.05 and more often below 0.01. In terms of our 
framework these banks of issue are both commercial banks and official 
(but not government) monetary institution, so their specie reserves 
combine Go and Gb. If we lump them together and treat their 
liabilities as H we have a proportion W which contrasts very strikingly 
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with that of currency board economies. Since these banks of issue were 
also commercial banks, comparison of the ratio G/F, in which commercial 
bank money creation is also reflected, would give a more accurate 
picture. A currency board Type II monetary system, with W=1, would 
need to have its banks functioning with average reserve ratios 
implausibly low, even if (Gb+Gp) =0 such that all of the economy's 
stock of gold and foreign exchange is concentrated in the currency 
board, to achieve a ratio of G/F as low as the ratios which were 
successfully maintained by the Scottish banks of issue. In the English 
case, Goodhart writes that "... total gold holdings of all the banks in 
England and Wales in 1913-14 - including the Bank of England - 
represented about 7-8% of deposits. This was slightly in excess of 
estimates made earlier... 01 Goodhart gives the value of W, the 
Proportion, for 1913 as ranging from 30% in January to 59% in September 
(pp. 589-590). Gb was not zero at this time, and had been rising 
because of banks' perceptions that G/F was too low, as Goodhart 
explains. 
Since these G/F ratios were maintained in a context of fixed exchange 
rates between G and F, in the context of the present framework the 
actual ratios have to be treated as at least as great as (G/F) * and W*. 
Cameron's explanation of the lowness of the ratios in the Scottish 
case is from the perspective of the banking approach to thinking about 
reserve adequacy, as follows: "... More fundamentally, the fact that 
the Scottish Banks could function with such slender real reserves was 
due to widespread acceptance of their notes, along with fractional 
coinage, as the most desirable if not the only legal form of money. 
Given this public attitude, it was quite reasonable for the banker to 
regard his own unissued notes as a reserve with which to meet sudden 
public demands for cash... n3e In the terms of our framework, the notes 
of these banks of issue can be treated as H; these liabilities were 
very successful in meeting monetary needs at the expense of (Gb+Gp). 
In the next section we look in more detail at what factors might enable 
H to achieve this success. 
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Looking at W* from the perspective of banking considerations, we have 
seen that successful competition of H with Gb and Gp can achieve a 
reduction in W* even when we treat Go* as fixed by the foreign trade 
considerations we looked at earlier. The share of the imported 
component (Go* + Gb + Gp) in the total money supply F* is thereby 
reduced, i. e. (G/F)* is reduced. For a given level of nominal income Y 
and velocity k, a smaller stock of capital has to be held in the form 
of foreign financial assets (foreign exchange reserves) or monetary 
metal. A given increase in real income, with prices held fixed, thus 
requires a smaller increase in the stock of imported money to meet the 
monetary needs associated with the increase in Y. 
The next task is to look more closely at what the banking perspective 
tells us about the determination of W*. Since there are gains to be 
made in achieving reduction of W*, we want to know how this might be 
achieved. The argument of this section of the thesis is that W* is 
positively related to the relative predominance of EFI in the currency 
denomination sense, as well as in the geographic sense as we have 
already seen. W* can therefore be reduced by developing DFI relative 
to EFI. 
In particular, W* can be reduced by the development of a strong DFI 
asset portfolio on the part of the official monetary institution, or 
other state financial institution, in economies where private sector 
financial development tends to be EFI (in the currency sense only now, 
since we are discussing domestic financial development). 
The market for the Monetary Liabilities of the Central Bank (H) 
From a banking perspective, the success of H in competing with Gb and 
Gp depends on confidence, convenience, and rate of return, as well as 
on legal restrictions. Let us treat "confidence" as referring to 
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expectations concerning changes in the rate of exchange between H and 
G. To "have confidence in" H is then taken to mean that depreciation 
of H relative to G is not expected. 
Confidence and rate of return concern us particularly here. 
Convenience is treated as determined by the quality of the payments 
mechanisms offered through H and the breadth of the range of goods and 
services for which it is acceptable as money. The convenience of 
holding H can be increased by improving the quality of the payments 
services offered through it and by broadening the range and increasing 
the attractiveness of the goods and services for which it is acceptable 
as money. For the moment, however, I am treating these factors as 
fixed and focusing on confidence and rate of return. 
Before proceeding further, however, it should be noted that when H 
and F are denominated in the same units, such that it is not possible 
for H to depreciate against F or vice versa, as is the case when 
deposits are DFI rather than EFI, then contributions of the commercial 
banks to the monetary services offered in the economy can also enhance 
the convenience of the public in holding H. For instance, when 
commercial banks offer services in different regions all over the 
country, and will always accept H at par with their own deposit money, 
anywhere in the country, convenience to the public in holding H is 
enhanced without the bank of issue actually providing the improved 
payments services. Conversely, deterioration in the quality of 
services offered by commercial banks which accept H would adversely 
affect the convenience to the public in holding H. The fixed link 
between H and commercial bank DFI money means that they stand and fall 
together. However, at present I am treating the quality of the 
contribution of the commercial banks to the financial structure as 
given, and looking at the central bank, or other monetary institution, 
i. e. at the issuer of H. 
What we are looking at here, in order to consider the question of 
confidence and rate of return which H might offer, is the composition 
of the financial assets held by the central bank of issue. In the Type 
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II (currency board type) monetary system, we have H= Go. In the Type 
IV system we have H= Go + C, where C is a portfolio of financial 
assets denominated in terms of H, i. e. a portfolio of DFI assets with a 
positive expected rate of return, and is greater than zero. In the 
Type III system we have H> Go, but C=O. Why is it that some currency 
areas can successfully maintain confidence and monetary stability with 
a Type III or Type IV system, whereas other currency areas seem to need 
to stick much more closely to the Type II system to maintain 
confidence? 
In this section we are seeking answers to two questions: How can 
confidence be compatible with a lower W*? How can a central bank of 
issue profitably offer H at rates of return which enable it to compete 
successfully with Gb and Gp? 
How can confidence be compatible with a lower W*? 
Consider first the case of an economy in which DFI is well developed 
relative to EFI. It is the broad spectrum of non-monetary financial 
assets which concern us here, since we have already looked at the 
implications of differences in the shares of EFI and DFI low-powered 
money. If the bank of issue holds in its portfolio of assets C 
financial instruments which are readily marketable without loss of 
value in terms of G, then confidence in H can be compatible with a 
lower ratio Go/H than would be otherwise the case. For these assets C 
to be marketable in any quantity the bank might care to sell, the size 
of the portfolio C has to be "small" in relation to the market for 
these assets. A bank of issue which holds such marketable assets could 
surely reduce W to a very low level without causing any loss of 
confidence in H; in other words, W* must be very small indeed. 
But for DFI assets to find such a good market, the demand for DFI 
assets has to be very well developed. If wealth holders do not hold 
DFI non-monetary assets very much, the central bank can not hold a very 
large portfolio C of these assets before its holdings become large 
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relative to the market for them, and before they cease to be marketable 
without risk of pushing down their market price. 
One reason for cross-country differences in W* must therefore be the 
relative predominance of EFI among the range of non-monetary financial 
instruments: For a given stock of non-monetary financial assets held 
by residents of an economy, the market for the DFI assets held by the 
central bank of issue is smaller as the share of DFI assets in that 
stock is smaller. In an extreme case, if the private sector will not 
hold DFI assets at all, there is no private sector market for them. 
Note that this is not at all the same as saying that the stock of 
accumulated savings in an economy is too small to support a good market 
for these assets. This is a confusion that has often been made. For a 
given ratio of the stock held by residents of non-monetary financial 
assets to the stock of their monetary assets, the market for the DFI 
assets held by the central bank is smaller as the EFI share in private 
asset portfolios is larger. 
It must therefore be the case that W* would tend to be larger as the 
EFI share in the stock of non-monetary financial assets is larger. 
Historically, major banks of issue were often restricted in the range 
of DFI assets which could be held against the notes issued. These 
restrictions did often reflect concern with marketability of the assets 
held by banks of issue: High quality commercial bills of short 
maturity, such as normally found a good commercial market, were often 
specified. " 
However, it was not always the case historically that banks of issue 
were restricted to holding readily marketable short term bills. In 
some cases monetary institutions were issuing money in the process of 
purchasing primary assets which were not necessarily of a type which 
found a market among ultimate savers. For instance, the notes issued 
by the Scottish banks mentioned above were often issued as "cash 
credits" to borrowers in exchange for acquiring primary assets which 
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would not have been marketable to the general public. In these cases 
money was being created through a process of financial intermediation 
such as is portrayed in the model given us by Gurley and Shaw for 
inside money. Indeed, these cases perhaps more closely resemble the 
model given us by Gurley and Shaw for inside money than did the cases 
in which the monetary institution was just holding assets which found a 
large market. In any case, the role of the monetary institution in 
providing financial intermediation was significantly different in the 
two types of case. 
We turn now to investigate the case in which the DFI assets held by 
the institution issuing Ho are not readily marketable. The asset 
portfolio C held against the issue of H (i. e. the C in H= Go + C) is 
developed by issuing H against the purchase of DFI primary assets, in 
the case when these assets do not find a market among private wealth 
holders. If these assets C are not marketable, what determines W* from 
the perspective of banking considerations? 
A glance at whatever banking disasters spring to mind provides an 
immediate answer to this question: The holder of H has confidence in H 
when he has confidence in the soundness of that asset portfolio (Go+C), 
and loses confidence in H when he suspects that a significant share of 
the assets involved are "going bad". In this context "soundness" means 
that the loans, C, maintain their value relative to G. Since, by 
assumption, there is no market for them, their value depends entirely 
on the stream of income derived from them. If their value in this 
sense is maintained relative to G, then the institution will be able to 
meet demands for G by using the stream of income derived from its C 
portfolio to purchase, or borrow, G as required (except, of course, 
when international markets for G break down in some international 
crisis. ) When holders of H know this to be the case, confidence is 
preserved, in normal times. 
On the other hand if the issuing institution is known to have a large 
share of its portfolio in assets which are not yielding an adequate 
Chapter II 
100 
income stream, such that the value of the assets has fallen 
significantly below the original value of H (in terms of G) issued 
against them, then holders of H may have reason to lose confidence in 
the ability of that institution to continue to meet demands for G at a 
fixed rate of exchange. 
The failing of banks of issue, historically, because of fall in the 
value of their earning assets relative to the original value of the 
notes issued (in terms of gold or whatever the standard was) is a 
familiar story. Sometimes secrecy about the true state of affairs would 
successfully see a bank through, however. Similarly, the true value of 
Go+C may fluctuate with fluctuations in the expected earnings on C, and 
may temporarily fall below the value of H at the given rate of exchange 
between H and G, without causing loss of confidence. 
The banking perspective thus shows us that confidence in H depends on 
the behaviour of the value of the assets in the portfolio C relative to 
G, and that in the absence of a market for these assets this value 
depends on the expected value in terms of G of the income stream 
derived from them. The ratio (Go/H)* = W* which is compatible with 
confidence in H, thus depends on the value, in terms of G, of the 
income stream derived from the portfolio C. 
How can a bank of issue profitably offer H at rates of return which 
will enable it to compete successfully with Gb and Gp? 
It will be recalled that for H to increase without increasing the 
total money supply F*, it is necessary for (Gb+Gp) to fall, since we 
are assuming average commercial bank reserve ratios and the share of H 
held by banks both to be fixed (i. e. g is fixed). We have identified 
confidence, convenience, and rate of return as factors determining the 
success of H in displacing (Gb+Gp), and we are treating convenience 
factors as given. An increase in confidence in H may do something 
towards enabling H to displace (Gb+Gp) successfully, but it may also be 
necessary to offer a more attractive return on H. In any case, we have 
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also seen that the return on the portfolio, C, of DFI assets is a 
crucial factor in the maintenance of confidence. 
This brings us to the question posed above: "How can a bank of issue 
profitably offer H at rates of return which enable it to compete 
successfully with Gb and Gp? " 
This question brings us to the heart of the process of financial 
intermediation: why is it profitable? what is the source of the gains 
which underlie those profits? For the financial intermediary to 
function profitably, the rate of return received on earning assets must 
exceed that paid out on its own liabilities. How do borrowers succeed 
in paying interest and amortization on loans, and what gains motivate 
the willingness to do so? 
We also need to know why DFI business might be profitable for a State 
institution when the same business has not attracted profit-seeking 
private sector financial intermediaries, as in the case of the EFI 
dominated economy. 
Sources of gains underlying profits of financial intermediation 
The two or three basic sources of gains which underlie the profits of 
financial intermediation are well known, familiar both in micro- 
economic literature and in economic history literature. Consideration 
of these will lead us to distinguish "production loans" from 
"consumption loans" in our discussion of the central bank's DFI 
portfolio of assets. 
"Production loans" 
One source of gains is through a better allocation of productive 
resources, such that real output is increased. The condition for 
efficient use of factor inputs is the equation of marginal products in 
alternative uses; in the real world this has to be achieved through 
time and space, and is facilitated through the development of markets 
and channels of information. Financial intermediaries specialize in 
concentrating information about alternative borrowers, and provide 
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opportunity for alternative potential users of funds to compete for 
these funds. Borrowers with more productive projects can profitably 
offer the financial intermediary a higher return than can borrowers 
with less productive projects. There are many, and sometimes very 
amusing, historical cases of information failure in which banks turned 
away the borrower with the vastly more profitable, but new and unknown, 
project in favour of the better known but much less productive project; 
one must not claim too much. Nevertheless, financial intermediaries do 
make important contributions to the increase of real output through 
closer approximation to the efficient use of available factor inputs. 
These real output gains are one source of the profits of financial 
intermediation; where resources are underutilised, there are potential 
profits to be made in bringing resources into fuller productive use. 
Financial intermediaries contribute to this and reap some of the 
profits. 
One source of the income stream received from earning assets is thus 
the increase in real output made possible by the loan. The Scottish 
banks we have been mentioning made loans to manufacturers, for 
instance, and the increase in output thereby achieved served to keep 
these loans sound. Similarly, Cameron [1967] stresses the importance 
of credit extended by Lancashire banks of issue to the new textile 
manufacturers of the 18th and early 19th centuries as contributing to 
the growth of output during that period. These examples of money 
creation in a process of financial intermediation seem very close to 
the model offered by Gurley and Shaw [1960] for inside money; the banks 
in question remained sound and profitable while these loans remained 
sound, which in turn depended upon the real productivity of the 
borrowers' projects. 
Sometimes, as in the Lancashire textile case, economic growth has 
received the special boost of the dispersion of new technologies 
through this process; such cases have been among the most profitable 
for all concerned. Cameron chose to include as preface to his book 
"Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization" [1967] a quote from 
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Sch=peter which brings out this aspect of the function of credit 
creation: "... The essential function of credit... consists in enabling 
the entrepreneur to withdraw the producers' goods which he needs from 
their previous employments, by exercising a demand for them, and 
thereby to force the economic system into new channels. "" 
Loans for which the source of profit is real output gains are here 
referred to as "production loans". In macroeconomic terms, these loans 
finance what is usually referred to as "investment", i. e. contributions 
to the real capital stock. A credit boom of "production loans" (as I 
am here defining them) yields an increase in the productive capacity of 
the economy, i. e. a shift in the production functions underlying 
aggregate supply, as well as demand stimulus in the current period. 
"Consumption loans" 
A second well known source of profit to financial intermediaries is 
the gains to utility of consumers through the opportunity of exchanging 
consumption between different time periods. The consumer who derives 
greater utility from consumption now is enabled to persuade other 
potential consumers of current output to forego consumption to a later 
period by the mechanism of interest paid on a loan. Consumers achieve 
utility gains through the increased opportunities for intertemporal 
choice offered through financial intermediaries. These utility gains 
are also a source of profit to financial intermediaries. This source 
will be examined more closely below. Loans which derive their profit 
from this second source are here referred to as "consumption loans". 
In contrast to "production loans", these "consumption loans" do not 
finance additions to the real capital stock. In macroeconomic terms, a 
credit boom of this type would yield a demand stimulus, but would not 
alter the productive capacity of the economy (i. e. it would not alter 
the aggregate production function underlying aggregate supply). 
Increase of savings 
The third source of profit to financial intermediaries which is often 
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stressed is that in offering a more attractive range of savings 
instruments available to savers, the aggregate savings ratio may 
actually be increased; when an increased savings ratio is associated 
with an increased rate of productive real investment, the growth rate 
of real output may be increased. The links in the argument concerning 
this source of profits are subject to debates which are not pertinent 
here. This source of profit to financial intermediaries is not 
necessary to the present argument, and since it is the subject of subh 
disagreement it will be ignored here. 
Consumption Loans (profits derived from utility gains through 
reallocation of current output) 
The second source of profit to financial intermediaries, the profits 
deriving from gains to utility through intertemporal exchange in 
consumption, requires closer examination. Since this source of profit 
involves an increase in utility through better allocation of existing 
output rather than through better allocation of inputs yielding 
increased output, I will make the assumption, for the moment, that 
output is fixed. The differences between these two sources of profit 
are important, and it is necessary, therefore, to distinguish carefully 
between the two sources of gains analytically. 
Consumption loans have often tended to be seen as more risky, because 
of the fact that there can be difficulties for the borrower in 
suppressing consumption in subsequent periods in order to pay back the 
loan with interest. The price of a spending spree today is tedious 
frugality tomorrow; the consumer who overspent last period may be 
pressed into default. A bank with a portfolio of consumer loans is 
generally seen as weaker, for the same earnings on the loans, than a 
bank with a portfolio full of production loans, because of the fact 
that there is the difficulty of imposing frugality in the first case 
which (provided all goes well) does not arise in the second case. This 
difficulty of imposing frugality following the taking out of a 
consumption loan needs a closer look. 
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When the utility gains from increasing the scope for intertemporal 
choice in consumption are examined, it is commonly assumed that the 
consumer who borrows this period will be the consumer who bears the 
burden of subsequent frugality. However, when the borrower is in a 
position to exercise power over other consumers, his repayment of the 
consumption loan may not be at the expense of inflicting frugality upon 
himself; instead he may inflict the increased frugality on those 
consumers over whom he has power. In this case the interest rate he is 
willing to offer for the loan does not merely reflect his intertemporal 
rate of discount, but instead reflects his ability and willingness to 
increase his own present consumption at the expense of inflicting 
increased frugality in subsequent periods upon those other consumers 
over whom he has power. This is quite a different sort of choice from 
that which is normally portrayed in the modelling of consumer 
borrowing. 
The power-wielding borrower borrows to increase his consumption this 
period, and repays the loans by reducing the consumption levels of 
other consumers in subsequent periods. This may sometimes occur in 
families, but the most familiar case of this type of borrowing is by 
governments. The bank's assessment of the soundness of the loan in 
this type of case has to take into account the viability of the 
borrower's future repression of consumption among those over whom he 
has power. 
When a government borrows in one period, and spends the proceeds in 
such ways as (by assumption, as we are discussing consumption loans) do 
not increase real output during subsequent periods, the repayment of 
the loans has to come through the imposition of increased frugality in 
subsequent periods, normally achieved through increases in taxation. 
The beneficiaries of the spending of the proceeds of the loan have by 
no means always been the same people as endure the affliction of 
increased taxation. 
The power-wielding borrower model captures some important features of 
the historical realities of government borrowing which are not captured 
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by the standard model of the role of capital markets in enlarging scope 
for intertemporal choice. 
From a bank's perspective, the soundness of a loan to a government 
borrower depends upon the ability of the government in question to 
raise the requisite taxes, as is well known. In the case of the non- 
productive type of loan we have just been considering, there are two 
main, and very familiar, hazards which can cause the loans to go "bad": 
One of these is that the government's power to collect taxes may weaken 
as it becomes less popular or weaker militarily; the other possibility 
is that the tax-paying powers of the populace may be eroded. Imperial 
Russia in the late 19th century offers a familiar example of the second 
case: economic historians of that period have drawn attention to the 
fact that peasants were pressed so hard by taxation during that period 
that they were actually running down the productive capital stock in 
agriculture in order to pay taxes. The weakness of this basis for 
repayment of a loan is obvious, and has been portrayed in a rather 
vivid metaphor by Mao Zedong: "Another mistake is draining the pond to 
catch the fish. ""' (It is also known as killing the goose that laid the 
golden egg. ) 
The erosion of the capital stock may not directly threaten the bank 
whose loans are being repaid by this means, however. The bank may 
experience these loans to be sound provided the military strength of 
the government remains sufficient to successfully impose the taxation. 
This brings us to the second major hazard: The government may lose 
its power to impose the taxation necessary to repay the loans. In a 
democracy the government may be voted out; in other cases the military 
strength of the government may deteriorate relative to opposition 
forces. French loans (and others) to Imperial Russia all "went bad" 
with the Russian revolution. In an intermediate case it may turn out 
to be so expensive to maintain the military force needed to suppress 
discontent and impose the level of taxation required to repay a loan as 
to make the loan not viable. 
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Market failure in the power-wielder borrower case 
There is in the "power-wielder" borrower case the usual danger 
associated with situations in which the consumer of some good or 
service does not bear the full cost of his own consumption. The 
consumer who maximizes his own utility will consume such goods in 
quantities that exceed the socially optimum level, as is well known 
from elementary microeconomics. In the "power-wielder" borrower case 
this can lead to serious adverse effects on capital formation and 
economic growth which are very well-known among economic historians: 
The "power-wielder" borrower competes in capital markets with other 
borrowers, producers in particular. Since the "power-wielder" borrower 
does not bear the cost of his borrowing, he may offer such a high rate 
of interest as the producer-borrower could not match without going 
bankrupt. When this kind of "power-wielder" borrowing is for non- 
productive purposes and becomes large in the capital markets, would-be 
producer borrowers are forced back on their own resources, unable to 
compete for funds with the "power-wielders". There can be very serious 
adverse effects on capital formation. 
The following quotes, from Cameron, serve to illustrate the awareness 
among economic historians of the phenomenon just described; in the 
three cases referred to in these quotes, the "power-wielder" borrower 
is a government: ".... The late T. S. Ashton used to insist that 
capital formation in England in the 18th century was inhibited by the 
government's privileged position in the financial market, and yet the 
yield on consols rarely went above 5%. The size and inefficiency of 
the Austrian bureaucracy gobbled up much private saving at the same 
time that the attractive yields on government securities (as much as 8% 
on long-term issues, and even higher on short-term ones) - and the 
lucrative underwriting business - deflected both the capital and the 
attention of the bankers from riskier industrial investments.... " With 
reference to the economic stagnation in Italy between 1863-1893, 
Cameron writes: "... Given the financial instability of the government 
and its privileged competition with private enterprise in the capital 
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market, private domestic capital accumulation on any significant scale 
was virtually impossible.... " 42 
From the bank's perspective, this type of non-productive loan can be 
very attractive, as indicated in these quotes. But if the "power- 
wielder" borrower makes excessive use of his power and loses it, the 
bank holding this type of portfolio is in trouble, as in the earlier 
cases described above. 
Financial intermediation which serves the purpose of reallocating an 
existing level of output among alternative current consumers thus 
distinctly has its hazardous sides. This is not to deny the utility 
gains which may be achieved through intertemporal exchange; banks' 
portfolios are not normally perceived as weak for including a moderate 
share of consumption loans. However, when their portfolios include a 
large share of consumption loans to impoverished borrowers from whom 
collection of payment is difficult or involves the use of expensive 
methods (such as military force), then the soundness of the portfolio 
does elicit concern. 
suzmnary 
This discussion can be simply summarized: The value of the 
portfolio, C, of the financial institution issuing H, is more secure 
when the portfolio is stronger in production loans, i. e. loans 
associated with increases in real output. It is made weaker as the 
portfolio becomes more heavily weighted with loans which were extended 
for the purpose of reallocating consumption of an existing output 
without increasing the level of that output. Historically this 
principle shines through very clearly in the composition of DFI assets 
accepted by successful banks of issue: good quality commercial and 
manufacturing assets were favoured. Government borrowing for non- 
productive expenditure has a long tradition of being the ruin of 
lenders, banks included. However, it should be stressed that it is not 
the identity of the borrower that is the issue, but the difference 
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between productive investment and consumption uses of the loan. 
This discussion enables us to answer the question "How can a bank of 
issue profitably offer H at rates of return which enable it to compete 
successfully with Gb and Gp? " The answer is that it can do so by 
developing a strong portfolio of productive loans, choosing borrowers 
whose projects are sufficiently productive that they will be able to 
pay high enough rates of interest, without going bankrupt, to enable 
the bank to offer sufficiently attractive rates to compete with Gb and 
Gp. A share of consumption loans may successfully be included. 
However, if these latter are perceived by holders of Gb and Gp as 
increasing the riskiness the bank's portfolio, the inclusion of 
consumption loans may raise the rate of interest the bank has to offer 
on H in order to compete successfully with Gb and Gp. 
We have yet to address the question of why a state financial 
institution could make sufficient profit from such DFI business as to 
enable it to issue such attractive liabilities H, in cases when private 
sector financial intermediaries have not found it profitable to do so. 
Before addressing this question it is necessary to look at some 
characteristics of government borrowing. 
Government Debt 
In the above discussion, reference was made to government borrowing 
of the "consumption loan" type, i. e. borrowing to finance forms of 
expenditure which do not alter the aggregate production function of the 
economy or yield higher levels of real output in subsequent periods. 
This is to be contrasted with borrowing of what we have called the 
"production loan" type, which finances forms of expenditure which do 
alter the aggregate production function and lead to higher levels of 
real output in subsequent periods. 
Historically, however, government borrowing has not always been of 
the non-productive, consumption loan type. There is therefore no 
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historical justification for assuming government borrowing to 
necessarily be of this type, as is often done. In discussions about 
whether government bonds should be considered net wealth, for instance, 
the focus on whether or not residents fully take into account the 
future burden of taxation associated with a bond issue appears to imply 
this "consumption loan" assumption: The focus on repaying the loans 
through an increase in the burden of future taxation suggests the 
assumption that the government expenditure financed by the bond issue 
will not yield an upward change in the economy's aggregate production 
function which would instead enable the debt to be serviced out of 
increases in real output. 
There is however abundant theoretical literature concerning various 
forms of market failure and the provision of public goods from which 
there emerges a productive role for government in many forms. In the 
economic history literature, there has been considerable examination of 
the role which governments have played in economic growth, both 
favourable and unfavourable. In the historical cases when governments 
appear to have made an important positive contribution to economic 
growth, many of the types of contribution which have been identified in 
the theoretical literature can be recognized. These types of 
contribution by government are the substance of productive government 
expenditure; borrowing for such purposes falls into the "production 
loan" category, as defined here, since the expenditure thus financed 
yields increases in the productive capacity of the economy. 
For example, the theoretical literature informs us that the problem 
of underproduction of a good with positive externalities can sometimes 
be resolved by joining smaller units into bigger ones such that the 
gains which were external to the small unit become internal to the 
larger unit. Gains which are external to individual firms or 
households within an economy are internal to the economy as a whole, 
and hence to government; these gains can be tapped by government in the 
general form of tax on current income, so that the provision of such 
goods by government need not necessarily be at a loss. 
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Referring back to our "draining the pond to catch the fish" image, 
this type of productive government expenditure serves to increase the 
quantity of fish by improving the quality of the breeding pond; more 
fish can thereby be caught each season without reducing future 
production. The problem of destructive private sector overfishing, and 
under-maintenance of the capital stock of the pond, like over-grazing 
and under-maintenance of the commons, is well understood in the 
theoretical literature. Provision and maintenance of the 
transportation and communication infrastructure upon which private 
participants in markets rely, which has historically nearly always 
involved governments, constitutes expenditure of this type. The 
general increase in the productive capacity of the economy has then 
given rise to the possibility of some of the increased real output 
being channelled into government coffers via taxation. 
Government borrowing thus can be either of the "production loan" type 
or of the "consumption loan" type, as these two types have been 
distinguished here. The soundness of a bank's portfolio of government 
debt depends crucially on which type of borrowing has been predominant. 
The bad reputation with bankers and other lenders which has been 
achieved historically by governments has been associated with borrowing 
of the non-productive (or downright destructive, as when the waging of 
war wrecks destruction of the production structure) type rather than 
the "productive loan" type. It should be stressed, however, that the 
difference is in the type of expenditure, and not in the identity of 
the borrower. Many, and very important, forms of productive government 
expenditure have been identified in both the theoretical literature and 
in the study of historical cases. In consideration of the value of 
government debt the distinction between "production loans" and 
"consumption loans" is crucial. 
A government in financial difficulties which borrows to finance non- 
productive current expenditure can compound its budget difficulties in 
subsequent periods. A bank of issue which is known to be carrying a 
portfolio of this type of debt, and known to be under pressure to 
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continue increasing note issue against debt of this type, does not 
inspire confidence. On the other hand, if a government is borrowing to 
finance productive expenditure, leading to rising real output and 
rising government revenues through taxation of the increased output, a 
bank of issue which carries the government's debt is not exposed to the 
same reason for loss of confidence in its liabilities. 
The quality and value of the bank's portfolio of government debt thus 
depends on the type of borrowing involved. 
In assessing the quality of the portfolio, C, of DFI earning assets 
held by a bank of issue, therefore, the distinction between government 
debt and private sector debt is not adequate, not even necessarily very 
informative. What we do need to know is the composition of that 
portfolio between loans of the productive and non-productive types. 
Government borrowing can fall into either of the two categories. 
The special hazard posed to banks by governments is that they can 
force banks to accept their debt at nominal values above the real value 
of the earning asset thus gained, and thereby force issue of the bank's 
liabilities at such a rate that their value can not be maintained. 
Private borrowers have only rarely had power to ruin bankers in this 
fashion. 
why could a government bank of issue find DFI business profitable which 
had not been attractive to private sector financial intermediaries? 
By "government" bank of issue what I refer to here is the identity of 
the shareholders, and not the award by the government of particular 
privileges. The banks which have, historically, been referred to as 
"government banks", have often been identified as such because of 
special status granted to them by the government, even though the 
shareholders were private. I do not dispute the appropriateness of the 
appellation in such cases. However, the question addressed in the 
present section pertains to the identity of the shareholders: why 
might a government make a profit from developing banking business which 
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had not attracted private sector bankers? 
We are concerned now with the case of an economy in which the 
financial structure is dominated by EFI, particularly in the case of 
non-monetary financial instruments. We have seen that a central bank 
of issue, issuing H, can increase its share in the monetary base, and 
thereby reduce the imported share in the total money supply (G/F)* , 
without threatening monetary stability, if this bank can develop a 
sufficiently profitable portfolio of DFI earning assets. What we need 
to know now is how it could be profitable for this government bank to 
develop such a portfolio when, (we are dealing with an EFI dominated 
economy by assumption), private sector financial intermediaries have 
not perceived such business as profitable? 
Firstly, let us be clear about what is meant by "profitable". In 
this context the government as a whole is being treated as a business 
enterprise which operates a number of different projects; any 
individual project is treated as "profitable" if its net profit is 
greater than the sum of any decrease it may cause to net profits of 
other projects. A government bank which appears profitable merely 
because of subsidies contributed by other projects would not here be 
considered "profitable", unless the net profit achieved by the bank was 
greater than the sum of those subsidies. On the other hand, if the 
bank project records no net profit, yet its activities generate 
increases in profits achieved by other projects, then the bank project 
would be considered "profitable", in the sense used here. 
The development of DFI business which enables the economy to 
successfully reduce the imported share in the money supply offers gains 
to the economy as a whole, as we have seen earlier. In the final 
section of this thesis we will look more fully at the implications for 
an economy of successfully reducing the imported component in the 
monetary base. Some of the gains accruing to the economy as a whole as 
a consequence of successfully reducing the imported share in the money 




Some of the gains associated with successfully expanding the 
circulation of the note issue, the gains deriving specifically from 
seigneurage, could, however, be reaped by a privately owned bank which 
had a monopoly of the right of note issue. Indeed, historically, the 
profitability of the banking business appears to have often depended 
upon access to the right of note issue. 
Richard Sylla stressed this point about note issue and bank 
profitablility in a study which he made of regional distribution of 
banking services in the USA between 1863 and 1913. Sylla argues that 
"What restrictions on note circulation accomplished was the erection of 
barriers to national bank entry in places where high capital 
requirements and loan restrictions would otherwise not have proven 
prohibitive, and of further barriers in areas where these other 
restrictive provisions of the laws had already made entry difficult. 
Together, these barriers account for the extreme concentration of 
national banks in the northeastern part of the country in 1870 and the 
slow decline of this concentration between 1870 and 1900.... State 
banking was slow to provide a remedy for the deficiencies of national 
banking in the late 19th century largely because an. important part of 
its business, note issue, had been taken away. The habit of writing 
checks... was slow in coming to the rural districts ... in this period, 
and so, therefore, was pure deposit banking.. .. n°' 
Sylla found evidence of monopolistic practices among banks in these 
regions, and shows that there were large flows of capital out of these 
regions, which he attributes to these monopolistic practices. He shows 
that real rates of interest were higher in these regions, and that real 
rates of return on capital in banking were also higher, following the 
pattern of real interest rates. The under-provision of financial 
services to these areas (associated with these monopolistic practices) 
implied a relative under-utilization of factor resources in these 
areas, to which Sylla attributes considerable importance: "... With 
agriculture increasingly located outside of the Northeast, and yet 
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returning funds to the industrial sector through the operation of the 
banking system, the stage was set for a dramatic reversal of the 
relative positions of the two sectors. In just 15 years, between 1879 
and 1894, the agricultural share in commodity output shrank from 49% to 
32%, while that of manufacturing grew from 37% to 53%... "°6 
Sylla's arguments imply that banks with right of note issue would 
have found profitable financial intermediation business in these areas 
when such business was not profitable to existing banks; the erosion of 
the monopolistic position of the existing banks would also have yielded 
fuller utilization of factor resources in these areas and increased 
real production. 
Thus it may be that a central bank with monopoly of issue would be 
able to find profitable financial intermediation business where banks 
without right of issue could not. 
The profitability of developing DFI business, in particular, may 
depend upon the right of note issue. A financial intermediary which is 
holding an asset portfolio of loans denominated in the domestic 
currency will be bearing exchange risk if the liabilities it issues are 
not also so denominated. The bearing of exchange risk adds to the cost 
of the financial intermediation service being provided; business which 
would just be profitable in the absence of exchange risk may be 
unprofitable when this cost is added. But the development of DFI 
business without the carrying of exchange risk is limited by the market 
for liabilities denominated in the local currency. In an economy 
dominated by EFI, in which wealth-holders tend to use financial 
instruments denominated in the domestic currency only for transactions 
purposes, the scope for the issue of liabilities denominated in the 
domestic currency is rather restricted, and the issue of the currency 
itself looms large in relation to the sum of other types of 
liabilities. The scope for profitable DFI business, without bearing 
exchange risk, may in this case be quite restricted without the right 
of note issue. 
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Thus a central bank of issue, issuing H, may find DFI business 
profitable which had been rejected as unprofitable by private sector 
financial intermediaries, for the reason that the right of note issue 
gives it broader scope for developing DFI business without confronting 
the costs of exchange risk. Commercial deposit banks are limited in 
this to the extent to which they can attract domestic currency 
denominated deposits. This reason for the central bank finding profit 
where the commercial banks could not is independent of the identity of 
the shareholders; it derives entirely from the right of note issue, and 
usually a monopoly right at that. 
Exchange risk is at the root of what may be the most important reason 
why a government bank (in the strict sense defined above) can find 
profit in DFI business which private sector financial intermediaries in 
an EFI dominated economy would not be able to undertake profitably. In 
an economy in which (by assumption) wealth-holders prefer to hold 
foreign denominated assets, who is to put up the capital for private 
sector financial intermediaries, and on what terms? In an EFI 
dominated economy, the market for domestic currency denominated non- 
monetary financial instruments is thin or non-existent; shares offered 
to the public must either be foreign-denominated, or offer some rate of 
return high enough to overcome the preference for foreign-denominated 
assets if they are to be denominated in the domestic currency. In the 
latter case, this high rate of return must be achieved by finding 
borrowers willing and able to pay such high rates; scope for developing 
such business is limited by the range of projects providing 
sufficiently high rates of return, and by access by borrowers to 
cheaper funding from financial centres abroad. 
Consider the case in which the capital of private sector financial 
intermediaries is foreign denominated: If the capital is foreign 
denominated, profits and dividends are likewise evaluated in terms of 
the foreign denomination. Liabilities to the shareholders are foreign 
denominated. The investment of such foreign denominated capital in 
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domestic currency denominated assets involves carrying the cost of 
exchange risk. The scope for developing DFI business without carrying 
the cost of exchange risk is restricted, as we have seen above, by the 
scope for issuing domestic currency denominated liabilities. 
The position of a bank in which the government is the provider of 
capital contrasts sharply with that of a private sector bank whose 
capital is foreign denominated, because the currency denomination of 
the asset and liability structure of the government is very different. 
Governments tend to be much the largest single operator in domestic 
currency denominated contracts. Current government expenditure is 
normally primarily denominated in domestic currency, except for 
payments on foreign denominated debt. Government expenditure 
commitments, contracts (explicit or implicit), etc., constitute 
domestic currency denominated liabilities on a large scale. Government 
revenues may also largely be domestic currency denominated. There is 
therefore, for a bank with government capital, much more scope for 
developing DFI financial intermediation business without involving the 
cost of exchange risk than there is for private sector financial 
institutions whose capital is foreign denominated. This difference can 
make the development of DFI financial intermediation business more 
profitable for a government bank than it would be to the private 
sector. 
The principle just described would have particular pertinence in an 
economy in which the imported share of expenditure among the wealthy 
classes is known to be high. It can be a reason for the failure of the 
private sector to take up domestic currency denominated shares offered 
to raise capital for a financial institution whose business is to be 
DFI, when such an enterprise would be a profitable investment of 
capital for government. 
The immensely successful Banco de la Nacion, in Buenos Aires, founded 
in 1892, appears to me to have been just such a case; the shares for 
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this institution were offered to the public but the issue was not taken 
up. The extraordinarily high rate of capital formation during the 
period rules out, in my view, the idea that a lack of domestic capital 
can explain the failure of the public to take up this issue. The 
important contribution made by this bank in developing DFI financial 
intermediation business will be seen in the final section of this 
thesis. 
8 Conclusions 
An important role for government in developing DFI financial 
intermediation, in economies where the private sector financial 
structure is dominated by EFI, has emerged through the analysis offered 
above. This role has emerged for government because there are gains to 
the economy in developing the relative share of DFI, and because the 
government, as an investor, has opportunities for developing DFI 
business profitably which are not necessarily available to the private 
sector. 
It should be noted that the development of more extensive DFI 
financial services is of particular pertinence to the development of 
the non-traded goods sector. This sector is carrying a burden of 
exchange risk when it relies on EFI financial intermediation from which 
it is relieved by access to DFI financial services. Therefore, as in 
the regional distribution of financial services and development 
examined by Sylla, the relative weakness of DFI would presumably be 
associated with a relative under-utilization of productive resources in 
the non-traded goods sectors, in comparison with traded goods sectors: 
If prices of traded goods move pari passu with exchange rates, 
producers borrowing via the issue foreign denominated financial 
instruments are not burdened with exchange risk. Producers of non- 
traded goods, on the other hand, do bear exchange risk through such 
borrowing. In an EFI economy, therefore, the exchange risk involved in 
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access to financial markets would tend to yield a relative under- 
utilization of productive resources in non-traded goods sectors. These 
sectors would therefore be particular beneficiaries of the development 
of more extensive DFI financial services. 
The implications of the structure of the money supply for the non- 
traded goods sector will be analyzed further in Chapter IV. 
The determination of (G/F) * has been seen to depend upon the following 
factors: (a) the openness of the economy; (b) the variability of the 
trade balance; for this factor export concentration is here treated as 
a proxy; (c) the ratio of net debt service S to income; (d) the 
predominance of EFI relative to DFI; and (e) the quality of the 
performance of the central bank as a bank, i. e., the factors 
determining W*. Among the factors determining W* the soundness and 
profitability of its DFI asset portfolio has been stressed. The 
central bank can reduce (G/F)* by improving the quality of its banking 
performance. 
The justification for using export concentration as a proxy for 
variability of the trade balance is simply the "law of averages", or 
the principle of portfolio diversification. 
The first two of these factors, i. e. (a) and (b), have been 
identified in Chapter II as factors which contribute to the development 
of EFI at the expense of DFI also, while the third factor, S, is in 
part determined by the relative predominance of EFI in its geographical 
version. The determination of (G/F)* has thus been attributed to two 
factors which are also determinants of currency type EFI, and to one 
factor which is partly determined by geographical EFI, as well as to 
the relative predominance of EFI itself. EFI thus emerges as a major 
factor in the determination of (G/F)*. 
The fifth factor identified as determining (G/F)*, the quality of the 
performance of the central bank as a bank, particularly in developing 
the quality of its DFI asset portfolio, is the factor which gives 
government a direct policy approach to (G/F)*. The analysis developed 
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above shows that (G/F) * can be reduced by the successful operation of 
the central bank, as a bank, in developing a sound and profitable DFI 
asset portfolio. The very old-fashioned notion that a central bank 
needs to be protected from destructive pressures of government budget 
thus has re-emerged from the analysis developed here. In particular, 
the analysis shows that the bank needs to have sufficient independence 
from political pressure to enable it to reject excessive pressures to 
accept the "consumption loan" type of government borrowing and to 
develop a strong "production loan" DFI portfolio. We have seen that 
this would include the financing of productive forms of government 
expenditure, such as maintenance of infrastructure, as well as private 
sector investment. If, on the other hand, the central bank succumbs to 
political pressures which weaken the quality of its DFI asset 
portfolio, (G/F)* will tend to rise. The consequences of a rise in 
(G/F)* are not pleasant, as will be seen when they are analyzed in 
Chapter IV. 
The analysis developed here leads me to reject the ordinary notion of 
monetary policy independence as both unrealistic and dangerous. It is 
unrealistic because it ignores (G/F)*; it is dangerous because 
persistence in inflationary monetary expansion will tend to push up 
(G/F)*, with the very disagreeable consequences which will be analyzed 
in Chapter IV. 
The central conclusion of the analysis, however, is that it is 
possible for governments to operate successfully on (G/F)*, to reduce 
it, by means of improving the quality of the central bank's DFI asset 
portfolio. Moreover, the government is not inexorably stuck in a trap 
between the hazards of excessive monetary expansion on the one hand, 
and intolerable unemployment on the other. Credit creation for the 
financing of profitable productive expenditure has been the backbone of 
successful and profitable banking throughout history; there is no need 
to allow, as it were, the quality of the grazing commons to deteriorate 
for lack of finance, nor the fish pond to be drained for lack of 
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maintenance. The productive forms of government expenditure which are 
essential to the efficient and profitable functioning of private 
markets can be profitably financed through the central bank; such 
"production loan" type DFI assets will strengthen the bank in the same 
way that any other form of profitable "production loan" asset will. 
The importance of the central banks' role in the determination of 
(G/F)* will become more fully apparent when we analyze some of the 
consequences of changes in (G/F)* in Chapter IV. 
9 Empirical conclusions 
Table III. 1 gives figures taken from Cameron (ed. ) "Banking in the 
Early Stages of Industrialization", concerning the historical evolution 
of the structure of the money in England and Wales, and in France. 
"Specie in circulation" corresponds to what has here been referred to 
as Gp, and banknotes (in circulation) correspond to Hp, while deposits 
are "low-powered inside money". 
The historical fall in the share of Gp, and the increase in the share 
of deposits, in the circulating medium shows clearly for both 
countries. This fall in Gp relative to the domestic forms of money 
(banknotes and deposits) was the result of development of the domestic 
financial structure, as Cameron's discussion of banking history in the 
two cases makes clear. In his discussion of French banking history, 
Cameron stresses the importance of certain weaknesses in the 
development of French banking which caused the populace to continue 
holding private hoards of specie, to a much greater extent than in the 
English case, instead of relying on the use of bank deposits. 
Comparing the French and English figures for specie in circulation as a 
percentage of the total money stock (i. e. Gp/F) this difference in the 
structure of the money supply shows clearly. 
The column given for France entitled "total specie" gives the ratio 
(G/F) expressed as a percentage, i. e. it gives total specie (G) as a 
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percentage of the money stock. Unfortunately data on total G were not 
given for the English case, so that construction of (G/F) was not 
possible. 
In 1910, the French ratio (G/F) was 35.9%, having fallen over the 
preceding century from 97.4% (in 1803). This figure of 35.9% may be 
compared with the estimate (mentioned above in the text) of 6-8% of 
total monetary liabilities covered by gold in England during this 
period. This comparison is not precise, and, as mentioned in the text 
above, the actual percentage of gold coverage was seen as too low in 
England at this time. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the stronger 
development of the financial structure in Britain throughout this 
period gave Britain a lower (G/F)* than that achieved by France. 
In the historical literature, indeed, the fact that Britain was able 
to maintain such a strong currency, and such a strong financial centre 
in London, with gold reserves which were very low by the standards of 
the time, has often been remarked upon. I attribute this largely to 
the strength of British (DFI) financial development during this period, 
but also (and the two are not independent) to British leadership in the 
industrial revolution, which made Britain a major exporter of the new 
capital goods in much of the 19th century. This second factor, the 
strength of the international demand for these new British goods of the 
industrial revolution, was identified in the text above, in the 
discussion of fiat money, as one of the factors influencing the 
acceptance of a particular fiat money. In that context it was observed 
that people are willing to accept paper money in discharge of a debt 
when they know that their creditors, actual or potential, will accept 
the paper money in turn. People all over the world were willing to 
hold sterling paper money during this period because the creditors who 
would accept sterling paper money in discharge of debts were offering 
these exciting new goods of the British industrial revolution; in other 
words, it was not so much that sterling was "as good as gold", as is 
often said, but rather that sterling itself was so desirable because of 
the products of the industrial revolution which could be purchased with 
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it. Thus it was the international demand for British goods purchasable 
with sterling, as well as the international (and domestic) demand for 
the high quality financial services offered in sterling (i. e. the great 
strength of British DFI financial development), which gave Britain such 
a low (G/F)* during this period. 
Appendix III. 1 shows us that things have changed substantially 
concerning sterling. The figures given are taken from Bryant (1987), 
as noted, and correspond to what has here been called pure currency 
type EFI. The ratios given are the ratio of pure currency type EFI to 
the pure currency type DFI, for banking offices. This is distinct from 
the total currency type EFI/DFI ratio in that claims involving non- 
residents, which would be also of the geographical form, are not 
included. 
The data shows that this EFI/DFI ratio is now very much higher for 
Britain than for the other countries on the list (except for Singapore 
and Hong Kong). It also shows that this ratio has risen very 
substantially for Britain, from 0.03 in 1963 to 0.71 in 1983, while, by 
contrast, no such rise is shown for Germany. In accordance with the 
analysis developed above, I attribute the contrasting behaviour of the 
ratio in the British and German cases to the tendency for Britain to 
pursue a more inflationary monetary policy than has been characteristic 
of Germany. The banking sector in Britain has been evidently defending 
itself against the loss of its clientele to other financial centres, 
which the persistence in such inflationary policy would tend to 
threaten, by shifting out of DFI into EFI operations. It will be 
recalled that this means of the banking system defending itself from 
the dangers of losing its clientele because of excessive government 
issue of H was discussed in the text above: when excessive issue of H 
erodes the public's willingness to hold DFI (i. e. H denominated) 
assets, banks can defend themselves by shifting into EFI operations. 
According to the arguments developed above, this rise in the EFI/DFI 
ratio will have been causing (G/F)* to rise in Britain during this 
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period. As noted above, the case of a rise in (G/F) * will be analyzed 
in Chapter IV. 
As indicated in the notes given in Appendix II. 1, Bryant stresses 
that these foreign currency denominated claims held by UK banks are 
largely interbank claims, and London is, of course, a major 
international financial centre. These factors may help to explain the 
scale of the increase in the EFI/DFI ratio shown for the UK in the data 
here. The weakening of sterling during this period, as measured by the 
rise in its dollar exchange rate (see Table 11.2) would not seem 
sufficient to have caused such a dramatic change in the EFI/DFI ratio 
over such a short period, except in the case of a highly sophisticated 
financial centre. The Italian dollar exchange rate, for example, has 
risen very much more than the sterling exchange rate over the period, 
whereas the EFI/DFI figure given in Appendix II. 1 for Italy, for 1982, 
is only 0.04. I would explain the difference in the London response at 
least partly in terms of the discussion of the "diversifiers" and the 
"single currency strategy group" discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter: London's response to the softening of sterling has been 
stronger than elsewhere because of its position at the top end of the 
range of international financial sophistication. It is possible 
however that comparison of the ratio of interbank claims to private 
customer claims would be sufficient to explain the difference in the 
London response. 
The EFI/DFI ratios given for Japan also show a rise over the period 
1973-1985, but on a very much smaller scale than the rise in the 
British figures. The ratio remains low however. 
In Table 111.2, figures are given for 36 countries on Go, Gb, F, 
various versions of (G/F), and exchange rates, for the fourth quarter 
in 1967, in 1977, and in 1987. The data are taken from various issues 
of "International Financial Statistics", as indicated. The figures are 
all given in local currency, while the exchange rates are local 
currency per US$. The country-list includes most of those on the 
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tables of Goldsmith data given in Chapter II above. 
The ratios (G/F) shown in the tables exclude Gp, i. e. they are really 
[(Go+Gb)/F], because figures for Gp are unavailable. These ratios are 
given in two forms: (G/F) net, and "assets/(liab. +F)". Gross and net 
refer to the foreign assets Go and Gb; "assets / (liab. + F)" refers to 
the ratio {(Go+Gb) gross assets / [F + (Go+Gb) gross liabilities]). 
One of these ratios will be more pertinent than another under different 
circumstances, depending, for instance, on the nature of the 
liabilities. 
The first point to note from these tables is that gross assets and 
liabilities of commercial banks, "Gb assets" and "Gb liabil. ", are not 
small relative to the foreign assets and liabilities held by central 
banks; in some cases Gb assets and liabilities are indeed very much 
larger than those for Go. Net changes in Gb can thus be very large 
relative to Go. Therefore the use of an analytical formulation of the 
monetary base which leaves out Gb is surely not satisfactory, and must 
run risks of deriving very misleading results. The more general 
version used here seems much better suited to the realities shown in 
these tables. 
It will be noted that the net positions of Gb are quite often 
negative, while the official net Go position is much less frequently 
so. The negative figures for the net (G/F) ratios are of course due to 
negative figures for the sum of net Gb and net Go, since no country has 
a negative money supply F. 
Cross-country differences in these various (G/F) ratios are wide. 
What we would expect from the arguments developed above concerning the 
determination of (G/F)*, is that the countries which have strong 
domestic financial structures would be able to successfully maintain a 
lower ratio (G/F), relative to the openness of the economy, than would 
countries with weaker financial development. Countries with the 
weaker, LDC type, financial structure, which nevertheless maintain a 
low ratio (G/F) relative to the (X/Y) ratio, would be expected to show 
losses in the value of their domestic money F against G, i. e. a rise in 
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the exchange rate from one period to the next. Table 11.2 includes 
figures for the ratio of (G/F net) to (X/Y). 
Certain cases may be pointed out which illustrate the arguments 
developed here, but it can not be said that any very clear picture 
emerges. Looking at the net (G/F) ratios for 1977, for instance, we 
can pick out the following group of 16 countries with net (G/F) ratios 
of less than 10%: Chile, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, 
UK, USA, and Yugoslavia. Among these 16, only 6 countries (New 
Zealand, Spain, South Africa, Japan, UK, and USA) have the developed 
country (DC) type financial structure, according to the criteria used 
in discussing the Goldsmith data in Chapter II. If we look at the 
column in Table 111.2 in which these net G/F figures are deflated by 
the export ratio, and identify countries with low reserves as being 
those with ratios of (G/F net) to (X/Y) under 50%, the only difference 
in the country list which emerges is that the reserve ratio is not low 
(relative to the export ratio) for the USA, and it is low for 
Belgium/Lux. On the Goldsmith data criteria, the financial structure 
of Belgium/Lux is of the DC type. 
Looking at the exchange rates for 1977 and those for 10 years later, 
the arguments of this chapter lead us to expect that countries with the 
weaker (i. e. LDC type) financial structure which maintain low (G/F net) 
ratios would show a rise in the dollar exchange rate. The rise in the 
dollar exchange rate is interpreted, according to this argument, as 
resulting from the attempts by wealth holders to re-impose (G/F)*, 
while the government has been attempting to maintain in circulation a 
money supply with a ratio (G/F) which is below (G/F)*. When we 
compare the exchange rates, between 1977 and 1987, for the 8 countries 
with the LDC type financial structure which have been identified as 
having low G/F ratios, we see that the currencies of all 8 have lost 
considerable value against the US$ over that period (exchange rates for 
Peru are not comparable, but the currency did deteriorate in value). 
Among the 9 countries with the DC type financial structure which we 
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identified as having low G/F ratios, the currencies of the following 
five countries lost value against the US$ over that period: Italy, New 
Zealand, South Africa, Spain, and Yugoslavia; only in the case of 
Yugoslavia was the loss in value as great as the losses in value 
suffered by currencies in the LDC financial structure group, although 
the case of South Africa comes near (and is greater than the loss in 
value of the Egyptian currency). The rises in the price of a US$ 
among the 8 countries in the LDC type financial structure group range 
from 255% in the case of Greece to 15200% in the case of Ghana; the 
deterioration in the Peruvian currency was presumably worse still, 
since the units in which it is quoted have changed. 
Performing a similar exercise with the data given for 1967 yields 
similar, but more diverse, results. Fourteen countries have net (G/F) 
ratios of less than 10%. Among these 14 countries, we again see that 
the currencies of the LDC type countries have tended to lose value 
against the US$, while those of the DC type are able to maintain the 
value of the currency despite the low (G/F) ratio. There are a good 
many anomalies, however: The currencies of five of the LDC type 
countries maintain their value quite well over the period despite the 
low (G/F) ratio. In the case of Rwanda, this seems to be due to a 
change in monetary system, since the figures for 1977 and 1987 show 
Rwanda as maintaining very high (G/F) ratios. In the case of Sudan, 
the enormous size of the official foreign liabilities which shows in 
the figures for 1977 and 1987 suggests that the explanation for the 
maintenance of the value of the currency during the period 1967-77 lies 
in the scale of foreign borrowing. India, albeit to a lesser extent 
than Rwanda, built up its (G/F) ratio over this period, and the 
maintenance of the value of the rupee against the US$ may be 
attributable to this trend. The other two LDC type countries with low 
(G/F) ratios in 1967, Egypt and Ghana, however, both also show low 
(G/F) ratios in 1977. The theory of this chapter would lead us to 
expect that their currencies would show a deterioration over this 
period; however, the figures for the dollar exchange rate show that 
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this deterioration does not occur until after 1977. We saw above that 
the currency of Ghana experienced a very severe loss in value between 
1977-87; I can offer no explanation for the deterioration not having 
begun sooner. The case of Egypt may be akin to that of the Sudan, as 
the figures for Go liabilities do rise substantially between 1967 and 
1977. 
It will be recalled that the arguments of this chapter were concerned 
with the relative shares of EFI and DFI in the financial structure, 
rather than with the information which is covered directly by the 
Goldsmith data. It would be possible, in theory, for an economy to 
develop a full range of financial institutions on the basis of currency 
type EFI, such that it appeared in the Goldsmith data as being of the 
DC type, whereas the arguments of this chapter would still identify it 
as in the high (G/F) * range. The use of the Goldsmith data here has 
therefore been on the basis of the assumption that the pure currency 
type of EFI is not on such a scale in economies with the DC type of 
financial structure as would put them in the high (G/F)* category. In 
the case of Belgium and the UK this assumption may not be valid, 
according to the EFI/DFI figures shown in Appendix II. 1. However, in 
general terms the use of the Goldsmith data seems a valid approach to 
testing the theory, in view of the arguments which will be developed in 
Chapter III concerning the implications of EFI for cross-country 
differences in financial structure. 
In a crude way, the data given in Table 11.2 gives some support to the 
argument developed in this chapter that there are cross-country 
differences in (G/F)*, and that these differences are related in an 
important way to cross-country differences in financial structure. I 
would argue that the exercises just performed give support to the idea 
that (G/F)* is lower in countries which have a more strongly developed 
financial structure than in countries which have a weaker financial 
structure. In other words, the development of a strong financial 
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structure enables an economy to be successful in maintaining the value 
of its currency with a lower (G/F) ratio than is usually required for 
economies with weaker financial structures. 
Cross-country differences in (G/F)* imply cross-country differences 
in the structure of incremental money demand as between the imported 
and domestic components of the money supply. As has been explained 
earlier in this chapter, incremental demand for imported money 
can loom large relative to total export earnings, and thereby put 
considerable pressure on the balance of payments. For this reason 
analysis of the determination of (G/F)* is of immense practical 
importance. An implication of the conclusions drawn here is that the 
development of a stronger domestic financial structure can alleviate 
balance of payments pressures by reducing (G/F)* and altering the 
structure of incremental money demand. 
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Data on EFI/DFI ratios 
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Data from Bryant (1987), pp. 26-27, table 3.2. "Assets (including 
Interbank Claims) Reported by Banking Offices in Fifteen Industrial 
Countries and Eight Offshore Banking Centres, December 31,1982. " 
The following figures are the ratio of column (3), "Claims on home 
residents denominated in foreign currencies", to column (4), 
"Traditional domestic assets (claims on home residents denominated in 
home currency)": 
United Kingdom: 0.74 
Germany: 0.002 
France: 0.09 










USA: (data not given for column 3, but believed to be negligible) 
Singapore: 1.55 
Hong Kong: 0.6 
Table 3.9, p. 45, gives "Financial Assets of All Banking Offices in the 
United Kingdom, Selected Years, 1963-83". The following figures are 
the ratio of "Claims on UK residents Denominated in foreign currencies" 










The increase in the ratio for the UK has been very remarkable. Bryant 
stresses that these foreign currency denominated claims are largely 
inter-bank. 
Table 3.10, page 48, gives "Assets of All Banking Offices in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Selected Years, 1952-85". The following 
figures are the ratio of "Claims on domestic residents" denominated in 






Table 3.12, p. 52, gives "Assets of All Banking Offices in Japan, 
Selected Years, 1973-85". The following figures are the ratio of 
"Claims on domestic residents Denominated in foreign currencies" to 










Table 11.1: Historical structure of money supplies 
Components of money stock 
(percentage of total money stock) 
England and Wales 






1688 83.3% 16.7% 
1800 40.0% 50.0% 10.0% 3.9' 
1844 25.0% 20.0% 55.0% 2.8 
1885 18.3% 4.7% 77.0% 1.6 
1913 11.5% 3.5% 85.0% 1.8 
Source: Cameron, ed. (1967) p. 42 table 11.2 
France 
total specie in banknotes 
deposits velocity 
specie circulation 
1803 97.4% 94.7% 5.3% 0.0% 
1845 89.7% 82.1% 7.7% 10.3% 
1885 69.8% 51.9% 29.2% 18.9% 
1910 35.9% 32.9% 22.6% 44.4% 
Source: Cameron, ed. (1967) p. 116 table IV. 3 
Note: 

















































Table 11.2: Cross-country monetary data 
Go Go Go Gb Gb Gb 
assets liabil. net assets liabil. net 
1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 
232 84 148 28 -28 1223 1223 52 52 
137.6 137.6 80.1 119.1 -39 
448.4 212.6 235.8 22.9 38.7 
5974 5974 0 
2.93 2.93 0 
735 1166 -431 297 387 -90 
1749 2361 -612 145 202 -57 
140 186.6 -46.6 59.9 69.2 -9.3 
3.85 3.85 1.98 1.82 0.16 
98.9 210.4 -111.5 48 64.2 
34.57 34.57 0 
35.4 35.4 21.5 10.4 11.1 
108.2 135.2 -27 1.1 16.6 
9.27 9.27 0 
3.76 3.42 0.34 0 
3545 3545 2248 2226 22 
731 731 1118 1488 -370 
7.33 7.33 0 
9.5 9.5 6.24 5.93 0.31 
120 182.2 -62.2 36.6 10.4 26.2 
40.2 40.2 14.9 27.4 
4.79 4.79 1.85 1.92 
4.34 4.34 2.66 2.66 
432 921 -489 675 640 35 
708 788 -80 42 40 2 
13.25 3.81 9.44 0.21 5.17 
559 26 533 50 84 -34 
76.6 76.6 0 
23.07 15.58 7.49 1 5.5 -4.5 4.35 4.35 4.04 1.9 2.14 
15.98 15.98 0 
1123 3601 -2478 0 
14.8 14.8 0 
3307 3307 116 116 
3.18 2.12 1.06 0.84 1.12 
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IMF International Financial Statistics, 
various years, as follows: 
Go assets: line ll(Monetary authorities foreign assets) 
Go liabil.: line 16c(Monetary authorities foreign liabilities) 
Gb assets: line 21(Commercial banks foreign assets) 






F (G/F net)/ G/F assets / ex. rate 
(X/Y) net liab. +F $1 = 
assets 
1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1967 IV 1977 
IV 
Argentina 1092 1.37 0.11 0.19 3.5 
1757.3 
Australia 4495 1.89 0.28 0.28 0.895 3053 
Belgium / Lux 350.5 0.78 0.28 0.46 49.63 
Bolivia 1192 0.88 0.18 0.33 11.88 4726 










11.92 1.29 0.25 0.25 1.08 
3241 -1.15 -0.16 0.22 5.79 
13112 -0.46 -0.05 0.12 15.82 
832.4 -0.29 -0.07 0.18 6.62 1725 
21.21 0.65 0.19 0.25 7.462 9.76 
704.8 -1.01 -0.18 0.15 0.43 
344.5 
France 199.58 1.33 0.17 0.17 4.908 
110.05 
Germany 81.5 3.00 0.57 0.62 3.999 90.1 
Ghana 241 -1.04 -0.18 0.28 1.02 250 






51.01 0.17 0.01 0.07 7.547 
38.91 
18699 1.47 0.19 0.28 623.86 
17836 
13369 0.25 0.03 0.12 361.9 7057 














51.01 0.17 0.01 0.07 7.547 
18699 1.47 0.19 0.28 623.86 
19.5 1.17 0.50 0.62 3.596 
780.1 -0.21 -0.05 0.16 0.895 
160.1 1.33 0.17 0.29 0.36 
12.21 0.94 0.39 0.47 7.15 
16.53 2.65 0.42 0.42 38.7 
3345 -0.80 -0.14 0.23 3.92 
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Rwanda 1473 -0.44 -0.05 0.33 100 7447 
Sierra Leone 22.39 0.67 0.20 0.43 0.36 
36.04 
South Africa 499 3.85 1.00 1.00 0.72 883 
Spain 565.2 1.36 0.14 0.14 69.7 486 
Sudan 75.41 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.35 9.05 
Sweden 17.14 1.72 0.38 0.44 5.165 
17.04 
Switzerland 32.8 1.68 0.49 0.49 4.325 
36.37 
UK 14691 -0.94 
USA 191.9 1.29 
Venezuela 5537 2.38 
35167 
Yugoslavia 23.08 0.15 
-0.17 0.06 0.36 7100 
0.08 0.08 1 19.3 
0.62 0.62 4.5 
0.03 0.15 12.5 41.6 
Source: 
IMF International Financial Statistics, 
various years, as follows: 
F: line 34 (Money supply) 
G/F net: (Go net + Gb net) /F 
X/Y: World Bank Development Report, 1979,1985,1989 
Assets / (liab. + F): (Go assets + Gb assets) / (Go liabil. + Gb 
liabil. + F) 
Exchange rate: local currency per us$ line as 












































Go Go Gb Gb Gb F 
liabil. net assets liabil. net 





247.9 940.2 1049.2 -109 
662 4064 459 1610 -1151 7855 
2.46 139.66 19.49 95.76 -76.27 
5.04 19.39 18.27 1.12 















2432 17825 -15393 
345 73 272 4844 
15.85 12.99 2.86 
1333 625.3 707.7 2943 
257.28 280.94 -23.66 
125.5 80.8 44.7 
7.2 16.7 -9.5 
15.81 80.23 -64.42 
0 
16103 20359 -4256 
4452 8274 -3822 
0 



























2765.5 225.1 25.2 199.9 
12.22 4.22 2.99 1.23 37 
148.04 -104.21 18.28 -18.28 
5670 6189 6082 11123 -5041 
1489 5958 1292 23 1269 9355 
40.91 -4.87 8.06 0.91 7.15 
935 -52 138 665 -527 4647 
486 371 805 -434 2833 
228.76 -219.71 60.09 50.6 9.49 




8096 -996 87159 94183 -7024 
0.6 18.7 75.6 71.4 4.2 
35167 1393 1393 




Country (G/F net)/ G/F assets / ex. rate Go 
Go 
(X/Y) net liab. +F $1 = ... assets liabil. 
1977 IV 1977 IV 1977 IV 1977 IV 1987 IV 1987 
IV 
Argentina 4.13 0.54 0.60 
40348 
Australia 1.49 0.24 
Belgium / Lux 0.39 0.19 










Costa Rica 1.01 0.33 
14192 
Denmark 0.72 0.21 








Greece -0.72 -0.12 
India 2.81 0.22 
52.18 






Netherlands 0.83 0.45 









0.26 0.87 17439 
0.66 32.94 365.6 
0.51 20 915 542 
0.37 16.05 739.9 
0.53 1.09 10.65 
0.38 27.96 
0.59 38.112 1182.9 11.7 
0.39 8.57 35484 
0.35 5.78 67.07 0.8 
0.32 0.39 2646 6579 
0.46 4.705 401 13 
0.77 2.105 140.7 20.2 
0.10 1.15 57.5 
0.22 35.5 476.4 
0.23 8.21 83.81 
0.28 871.55 75333 127 
0.17 240 11816 
0.21 22.74 30306 
0.75 2.28 56.9 
0.20 0.98 4998.5 
0.57 0.65 4661 41 
0.41 5.14 89.62 
0.13 130.38 34 31 




Rwanda 0.77 0.80 92.84 11989 1758 
Sierra Leone 0.13 0.03 0.35 1.05 3560 7850 
South Africa -0.12 0.16 0.87 6867 963 
Spain 0.12 0.02 0.24 80.912 3617 
Sudan ERR -0.50 0.10 0.35 67.2 
8438.2 
Sweden 1.62 0.45 0.64 4.67 50.29 0.04 
Switzerland 1.55 0.57 0.57 2 49.38 
UK -1.09 -0.34 0.75 0.52 61.53 9.36 
USA 0.84 0.07 0.23 1 45.8 0.3 
Venezuela 2.88 0.95 0.95 4.293 109442 
Yugoslavia -0.38 -0.07 0.18 18.445 3204 7918 
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Country Go Gb Gb Gb F (G/F 
net)/ 
(X/Y) 
net assets liabil. net 
1987 IV 1987 IV 1987 IV 1987 IV 1987 IV 1987 
IV 
Argentina -20328 4932 29845 -24913 12580 
-35.96 
Australia 17439 7473 16706 -9233 31218 1.64 
Belgium / Lux 365.6 4943.9 6126.4 -1182.5 1088 
-1.19 
Bolivia. 373 80 145 -65 502 4.38 
Brazil -3.2 254.8 576.4 -321.6 
Canada 10.65 63.93 87.33 -23.4 85.07 
-0.58 
Chile 
Colombia 1171.2 83.7 249 -165.3 
Costa Rica 21292 6017 1441 4576 42611 1.79 
Denmark 66.27 167.75 159.1 8.65 235.4 0.99 
Egypt -3933 14581 8172 6409 18241 0.90 
France 388 474 104 370 1318 2.74 
Germany 120.5 367.9 207.8 160.1 365.7 2.40 
Ghana -126.91 4.78 8.66 -3.88 84.17 
-7.77 
Greece 476.4 235.8 1053.1 -817.3 1000 
-1.62 
India 31.63 543.17 0.83 
Italy 75206 71462 103453 -31991 368.261 
651.94 
Japan 11816 48346 80041 -31695 102.973 
-1485.00 
Mexico 18895 6241 1752 4489 12627 
26.46 
Netherlands 56.9 206.15 193.17 12.98 103.71 1.30 
New Zealand 3550.9 1391.7 1555.4 -163.7 6666.6 1.95 
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Nigeria 4620 3128 882 2246 14906 1.49 
Norway 89.62 52.99 124.44 -71.45 152.63 0.33 
Peru 3 10 73 
Philippines -14.71 46.25 59.37 -13.12 52.38 
-2.31 
Rwanda 10231 2117 674 1443 17791 8.20 
Sierra Leone -4290 288 33 255 2889 
-1.55 
South Africa 5904 2101 4365 -2264 32026 0.39 
Spain 3617 2804 3617 -813 8899 1.58 
Sudan -8371 1595.3 618.9 976.4 7510.3 
-12.31 
Sweden 50.25 0.00 
Switzerland 49.38 202.61 140.55 62.06 84.02 3.79 
UK 52.17 460.77 474.21 -13.44 91.91 1.62 
USA 45.5 229.3 264 -34.7 765.9 0.14 
Venezuela 109442 13501 5558 7943 133779 3.99 
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international financial intermediation 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter of the thesis I look at the influence of certain 
characteristics of the currency area structure of the international 
economy on patterns of international financial intermediation. The 
analysis will make use of certain concepts, including that of "the 
currency area structure of the international economy", and that of 
"external financial intermediation", which will be given explanation in 
some detail below. 
The question being addressed in this section is the following: What 
features of a currency area might we be able to identify as giving rise 
to a tendency for residents of that currency area to make use of 
external financial intermediation rather than domestic financial 
intermediation? That is, are there identifiable structural features of 
a currency area which would tend to cause resident savers to prefer to 
hold their savings abroad, or in foreign denominated financial 
instruments, or both? If the resident saver of a currency area do have 
a preference for foreign financial instruments for reasons which do not 
necessarily affect foreign lenders in the same direction, then there is 
a basis for a market involving external financial intermediation. 
Borrowers in such a currency area would tend to be faced with the 
choice of paying their fellow residents a sufficiently high return as 
would persuade them to accept domestic financial assets, or 
alternatively of seeking to obtain finance on better terms in a foreign 
financial centre. In such circumstances it may be that the use of a 
foreign financial centre would be advantageous to both borrowers and 
savers. When this is the case, we have the profitable basis for a 
market in external financial intermediation. 
In asking this question I am picking up a thread from an argument 
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which was offered by Ronald McKinnon in his 1963 article entitled 
"Optimum Currency Areas". McKinnon was exploring some ideas about how 
structural features of a currency area might cause a tendency for 
residents to export savings. The question seems worth exploring 
further for the light it sheds on ways in which the currency area 
structure of the international economy has been contributing to the 
patterns of international financial intermediation which have been 
evolving. 
A second way of phrasing essentially the same question is to ask what 
features of a currency area might give rise to reasons for residents to 
prefer to use two currencies, or denominations, for the performance of 
the various functions of money rather than one, preferring foreign 
denominated financial instruments for the store of value function, 
while retaining the domestic currency as the medium of exchange. I 
will argue that there are advantages for wealth holders in using two 
currencies which are not obtainable through merely choosing the 
stronger of the two currencies for all monetary functions. 
The most frequently offered explanations for the observed tendency 
for the wealthy in many countries to hold much of their financial 
wealth abroad run in terms of inflation rates, interest rates, and 
political instability. And indeed, these elements of explanation are 
undeniably indispensable. However, here my focus is instead on 
analysis of influences stemming from fundamental features of currency 
area structure. 
In his 1963 article McKinnon offered an explanation for a tendency to 
prefer foreign financial assets which ran in terms of the relationship 
between the structure of production in the currency area and the 
structure of representative consumption bundles. The idea was that 
domestic currency denominated financial assets of a currency area which 
featured a high ratio of traded to non-traded goods, T/NT, would not 
offer a store of value in a "representative bundle of goods", and that 
residents would therefore prefer to hold financial assets denominated 
in a foreign currency which offered a store of value in a more 
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attractive bundle of goods. "... Thus we have capital outflows from 
countries where the need for capital may be rather high and which arise 
from 'monetary' rather than 'real' considerations. " The implication 
for patterns of international financial intermediation is that capital 
outflows from such currency areas would tend to concentrate in 
financial centres situated in currency areas whose production structure 
featured the attractive bundles of goods, and that small currency areas 
would suffer a chronic shortage of capital. 
The ideas developed by McKinnon in that article concerning the 
contribution of the production structure of a currency area to the 
ability of that currency to perform the functions of money have always 
struck me as immensely rich and valuable, and I think more can be drawn 
from them. However, in terms of explaining patterns of international 
financial intermediation, what this line of argument does not offer is 
an explanation for the reverse flows of foreign capital into the small 
currency areas. 
McKinnon's line of argument could also be made to yield a somewhat 
different conclusion, as follows: McKinnon's conclusion was that 
residents of a small currency area would tend to export savings because 
they prefer to hold their savings in foreign currencies, thereby 
tending to cause a shortage of capital, on a "chronic" basis. However, 
we could argue that when capital scarcity pushes up local rates of 
return, innovative domestic financial institutions would find it 
profitable to develop a local market in financial instruments 
denominated in the more attractive currency. Domestic resident 
financial intermediaries may be supposed to have some informational and 
other advantages over foreign or non-resident financial intermediaries, 
and it may therefore be argued that they could compete successfully 
with foreign institutions for a good share of the domestic loan 
business. In other words, the factors identified by McKinnon could 
lead to the development of domestic capital markets on the basis of 
foreign denominated financial instruments, instead of just to the 
export of capital. If financial instruments denominated in the desired 
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currency are available at home, the desire to hold savings in a foreign 
currency need not, by itself, lead to capital export. Savers may 
prefer the wider array of financial instruments available in a major 
foreign financial centre of course, but this is a different line of 
argument. 
Thus to reach McKinnon's conclusion actually needs another step in 
the argument: Having argued that savers who are residents of small 
currency areas would prefer foreign denominated financial instruments, 
we must then also explain why this preference leads to capital export 
rather than to the development of a domestic financial structure which 
makes use of foreign denominated financial instruments. Legal factors 
may be one reason; the attractions of a larger financial centre may be 
another reason. In fact, of course, we do sometimes observe the use of 
foreign denominated financial instruments, as well as the use of 
foreign financial centres. 
In this thesis I make use of a simple principle of portfolio 
diversification to develop a further explanation for a tendency among 
residents of certain types of currency areas to prefer foreign currency 
denominated financial assets. The idea, taken from standard modern 
theory of finance, is simply that wealth holders take into account 
covariance risk when choosing among alternative financial assets. The 
covariance risk of present interest is that between the returns on 
wealth holders' major real assets and returns on alternative available 
financial assets. The argument is that wealth holders have an 
incentive to avoid financial assets denominated in domestic currency 
when the returns on their major real assets are closely related to 
exchange rate behaviour; that is, wealth holders have an incentive to 
choose financial assets denominated in a currency which has a high 
probability of appreciating against their domestic currency at the same 
times as the returns on their major real assets are low. A wealth 
holder who was the single exporter of the sole export item from his 




It should be noted that this argument is a "structural" one in the 
sense that wealth holders are pictured as having long term ties to 
their major real assets, as opposed to treating these real assets as 
freely tradable. Although there can be a variety of reasons for wealth 
holders to have long term ties to particular real assets, the most 
obvious case historically has been that of wealth holders whose social 
position and personal identity are tied up with the ownership of land. 
Indeed, the argument has particular force, as will be seen, when the 
ownership of the major real assets in question is associated with a 
sufficiently strong social position to give these owners significant 
influence in government policy. 
The line of argument offers an explanation both for savings outflows 
and for reverse inflows, since the covariance risk considerations 
causing the outflows need not influence prospective foreign lenders in 
the same directions. Therefore it is possible for foreign lenders to 
find it attractive to offer finance to domestic borrowers at a lower 
price than domestic savers would find attractive. By contrast, 
explanations for savings export which are based on inflation rates, 
interest rates, political instability, or the T/NT ratio would apply 
with at least equal force to prospective foreign lenders, so that the 
reverse inflow characteristic of external financial intermediation is 
not thereby explained. A line of argument based on consideration of 
covariance risk, however, offers an explanation for a tendency for 
certain types of currency area not just to export savings, but to make 
use of financial intermediation conducted through foreign denominated 
financial instruments. Since financial intermediation conducted 
through foreign denominated financial instruments has tended to be 
concentrated in channels which run through major foreign financial 
centres, this line of argument does yield an explanation for capital 
flows in both directions between major financial centres and currency 
areas with these structural characteristics. 
An implication of the argument is that when the international economy 
is divided into a large number of currency areas, many of which are 
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characterized by the particular features to be analyzed, there would 
tend to emerge a few major financial centres serving many of these 
currency areas, while the currency areas tending to use external 
financial intermediation would show relatively underdeveloped 
institutions specializing in domestic financial intermediation. The 
influences to be analyzed here should thus be seen as elements among 
what Kindleberger [1984] has called the "centripetal forces" in banking 
which tend towards the growth of major financial centres as opposed to 
the growth of similar financial structures in every country. The 
argument therefore offers a contribution towards the explanation of 
patterns of international financial intermediation in terms of the 
currency area structure of the international economy. 
The argument that we can identify certain structural features which 
would give rise to a tendency for a currency area to use external 
rather than domestic financial intermediation is equally pertinent to 
questions about issues in financial structure and economic development, 
since it leads to predictions about characteristics of the financial 
structure which is likely to emerge in such currency areas. Some of 
these predictions will be considered here, and related to Goldsmith's 
[1969 and 1972] data on financial structure. Policies designed to 
foster the development of domestic financial intermediation would need 
to take into account the influence of structural features of the 
currency area which would lead residents to prefer external financial 
intermediation. 
The concept of the "currency area structure of the international 
economy" was explained in detail in Chapter II. The present chapter 
builds on that concept. I will identify and discuss certain structural 
features of a currency area which would tend to give rise to the 
development of external financial intermediation at the expense of 
domestic financial intermediation. A simple cross country comparison 
of some of the structural features in question will be offered, 
together with some of Goldsmith's cross country data on financial 
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structure, with the claim that this comparison does lend support to the 
argument. Some more detailed statistical information will be given for 
the case of Argentina in Chapter V. 
2 Covariance risk and external financial intermediation 
Structural features of the type of currency area under consideration 
give rise to a preference among domestic savers for foreign denominated 
financial assets. Three structural features characterize the type of 
currency area in question. These features will first be described, and 
the reason why they give rise to currency type EFI will then be 
explained. 
Consider a currency area with the following features: 
(1) Earnings of foreign exchange are concentrated on the export of a 
single item, or of a very few items. These earnings are subject to 
fluctuations which are beyond the control of the exporters. 
(2) The major real assets in the wealth portfolios of large wealth 
holders are in the export sector. By "real assets" I refer to such 
things as land and buildings and machinery, and other tangible assets 
which are used in the production of real output, and thereby yield an 
income to their owners; "real assets" are to be distinguished from 
"financial assets". As noted earlier, wealth holders are here treated 
as having a long term tie to their major real assets, as opposed to 
treating these as freely tradable. As indicated previously, the most 
familiar reason for this historically has been that the social position 
and identity of wealth holders has been tied up with the ownership of 
land. However, the major real assets might instead be a factory 
producing for export, or any other tangible productive assets. 
Note that this feature derives from the distribution of wealth and 
income in the economy and not solely from the share of exports in 
national income. This feature would naturally tend to arise in an 
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economy which has experienced very rapid growth concentrated in the 
export sector, such as was the case for so many "primary export 
economies" during the period of rapid growth of international trade 
prior to WWI. 
(3) The currency area features a tax structure which relies heavily on 
customs duties. Actually, this tax structure feature may be the 
consequence of the use of external financial intermediation (EFI) at 
least as much as it is a contributing cause, as will be seen. To the 
extent that the tax structure is influenced by EFI it could be argued 
that feature (3) derives from features (1) and (2). However, for the 
present it will be treated as an independent feature. 
Next consider the reasons why features (1) and (2) result in 
covariance risk considerations giving rise to a preference for foreign 
denominated financial assets. 
Implications of feature (1) 
The implication of feature (1) is that fluctuations in the earnings on 
one individual item will have a significant influence on the total 
supply of foreign exchange to the currency area. In the case of a 
currency area which exports a single item, and ignoring capital flows 
and all other sources of foreign exchange such as inflows on factor 
services, etc., fluctuations in earnings on this export determine the 
total supply of foreign exchange. As the number of exports increases, 
if fluctuations in the earnings on each item are independent, then the 
probability of the total supply of foreign exchange rising and falling 
with the fluctuations in earnings on one individual item is reduced. ' 
When earnings on a single export item are thus strongly correlated 
with total foreign exchange supply, the probability of an exchange rate 
depreciation resulting from a fall in the earnings on an individual 
export item is also high, unless foreign exchange reserves are kept so 
high that a fixed exchange rate can always be maintained by drawing on 
these reserves. Thus the covariance of fluctuations in earnings on 
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each of these export items with exchange losses on financial assets 
denominated in the domestic currency would be strongly positive. 
Considerations of covariance risk would lead holders of such export 
sector real assets to prefer foreign denominated financial assets on 
which there is a high probability of exchange rate gains being made 
precisely in those times when returns on the export assets are in a 
slump. 
In such a case, as in standard modern theory of finance, it would be 
rational for a wealth holder to choose a foreign financial asset 
carrying a lower expected return than those offered on domestic 
financial assets in order to achieve a desired reduction in the 
variance of the returns on his total wealth portfolio. Simple 
comparison of rates of return on domestic and foreign financial assets 
does not constitute an adequate assessment of the portfolio choice 
being made, any more than it does within domestic financial markets. 
Now consider a borrower in such a currency area. If he issues 
financial instruments denominated in the domestic currency to these 
export sector lenders, he will have to offer a return that is 
sufficiently high to offset the covariance risk reasons for these 
lenders to prefer foreign denominated assets. Foreign lenders, on the 
other hand, will not necessarily be influenced by covariance risk in 
the same direction, and indeed may find these assets useful in their 
own pursuit of portfolio diversification. The borrower may therefore 
be able to obtain cheaper finance from the foreign lenders. 
However, foreign lenders may be supposed to use the foreign currency 
as the unit of account when valuing returns on these assets, and 
therefore if domestic currency denominated assets are to attract 
foreign lenders, returns would normally have to cover exchange risk. 
Finance from foreign lenders may therefore be attainable on better 
terms through foreign denominated financial instruments, with the 
borrower assuming the exchange risk. 
In order to borrow through a domestic currency denominated 
instrument, the borrower in this currency area thus faces the choice of 
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paying the domestic lender a high enough return to offset the 
covariance reasons for preferring foreign denominated assets, or paying 
foreign lenders a high enough return to cover exchange risk. 
Alternatively, he can assume the exchange risk himself, and offer a 
foreign denominated financial asset to either domestic or foreign 
investors. 
Thus covariance risk considerations could lead to domestic savers 
lending to domestic borrowers through financial instruments denominated 
in a foreign currency. This financial intermediation could be achieved 
through domestic financial institutions, unless there were legal 
restrictions on enforcing contracts payable in foreign currency. As 
noted earlier, local investors and financial intermediaries are likely 
to have informational and other advantages over their foreign 
counterparts, so that they could profitably compete for a good share of 
this local loan business, if permitted to conduct business using 
foreign denominated financial instruments. 
However, when issuing financial instruments denominated in the 
foreign currency, large borrowers are likely to find that better terms 
are attainable in a bigger market, so that they would choose to issue 
those instruments in a major financial centre rather than in a narrower 
domestic market. Similarly, savers may be attracted by the broader 
array of assets offered in a big financial centre. 
Therefore these covariance risk considerations are likely to lead to 
external financial intermediation both in the sense of using financial 
instruments denominated in the foreign currency (currency type EFI) and 
in the sense of domestic savers and borrowers both making use of a 
major foreign financial centre (geographical EFI). 
Implications of feature (2) 
Feature (2) determines whether the covariance risk considerations 
deriving from feature (1) have significance for the economy as a whole. 
If these influences pertain only to a small proportion of the wealth 
holders, then even if these few do use foreign financial markets their 
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influence on the structure of financial intermediation patterns will be 
slight. On the other hand, if feature (2) is pronounced, external 
financial intermediation is likely to make a significant impact on the 
development of domestic financial institutions. 
If feature (2) is sufficiently pronounced that these export sector 
wealth holders have a dominant position in determining government 
policy, then the familiar asymmetry between surplus and deficit 
positions in balance of payments adjustment introduces a further 
element into the situation which will accentuate the tendency for 
residents to hold foreign denominated financial assets. However, 
unlike the covariance risk considerations, this further element would 
apply with equal force to all prospective lenders, both domestic and 
foreign. 
The asymmetry in question here is that it is possible to prevent 
exchange rate appreciation by hoarding foreign exchange without very 
definite limits, but it is not possible to prevent the exchange rate 
from depreciating when reserves are gone (and borrowing opportunities 
have been exhausted). It follows that it is possible for our export 
sector wealth holders to remove exchange risk on their holdings of 
foreign denominated assets through influencing the government's 
exchange rate policy such that the exchange rate is not allowed to 
appreciate. Then they have only to ensure that the exchange rate is 
allowed to depreciate during the downturns in foreign exchange earnings 
for the foreign denominated financial asset to become one on which they 
can win exchange rate gains but do not face risks of exchange rate 
losses (against the domestic currency). This is attainable because our 
wealth holders can themselves force a depreciation during the downturns 
in foreign exchange earnings by speculative buying of foreign exchange. 
Such an exchange rate policy of course makes domestic currency 
denominated financial assets less attractive to all lenders; it would 
therefore tend to increase the cost of borrowing in domestic currency 
denominated financial instruments. 
Lest the description of this asymmetric exchange rate policy appear 
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unrealistic, I should point out that it has historically been 
characteristic of various economies. Prior to 1930, in Argentina, for 
example, the occasions when the exchange rate was fixed, by means of 
the issue of paper money in exchange for the purchase of gold, were in 
each case during periods when the domestic currency was appreciating 
against gold, and threatening interests in the export sector. Export 
sector interests in favour of a "soft", or depreciating, domestic 
medium of exchange have been discussed in a range of different contexts 
with reference to other economies also. De Cecco, for instance, 
discusses these quite extensively, with particular reference to India; 
the Indian case was also analyzed by Alfred Marshall. The same export 
sector preference for a "soft" medium of exchange are also described 
with reference to the Philippines in the 1904 "Report on the 
Introduction of the Gold-Exchange Standard" prepared by the US 
Commission on International Exchange. 2 
Reconciling the conflict of interest between producers and wealth 
holders: the asymmetric exchange rate policy and EFI 
The combination of pursuing this asymmetric exchange rate policy and 
holding financial wealth abroad may be seen as representing a 
successful method of reconciling the conflict of interests between 
producers and holders of financial assets over exchange rate policy to 
which attention has often been drawn in the currency area literature. 
This conflict is that while producers benefit from the stabilization of 
nominal income against fluctuations in export earnings which is 
attainable through flexible exchange rates, financial interests lose 
through the resulting exchange risk. When the same wealth holders are 
both producers and holders of financial assets, how is this conflict to 
be reconciled? It can be reconciled through the use of two currencies, 
by holding savings in foreign currency denominated financial assets and 
pursuing the above asymmetric exchange rate policy. Thus in a downturn 
for foreign exchange earnings the depreciation of the exchange rate 
reduces the resulting contraction in nominal domestic income while at 
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the same time producing gains for wealth holders on their foreign 
denominated assets. There will be losers of course, but we have been 
considering the case when feature (2) is sufficiently pronounced that 
it is the gainers who are dominating government policy, with the help 
of the natural asymmetry between deficit and surplus positions in 
balance of payments adjustment. 
Reconciliation of the conflicting interests of producers and holders 
of financial assets over exchange rate policy thus offers one line of 
explanation for the "two money strategy". Here we do have advantages 
in the use of two currencies for the functions of money which could not 
be attained by using the stronger of the two currencies for all 
monetary functions. 
Implications of feature (3) 
Next consider the implications of feature (3) on the choice facing our 
domestic wealth holders between domestic and foreign government bonds, 
on the assumption that both are issued in the same foreign currency. 
The large share of customs duties in government revenues implies that 
government revenues will fluctuate with foreign trade. The combination 
of this feature (3) with feature (1) then implies that fluctuations on 
earnings on a particular export item will have a high probability of 
moving with government revenues. During depressions in international 
trade declines in export earnings will be accompanied by declines in 
government revenues. Since the ability of the government to pay its 
bondholders depends on the government budget, it follows that domestic 
government bond prices could have good reason to fall at the same time 
that export revenues are depressed. Indeed, a really severe decline in 
export earnings can make it very difficult for such a government to pay 
its bondholders. 
Moreover, exchange rate depreciation increases the domestic currency 
costs of such debt service, so that government budget difficulties are 
aggravated. Thus there is a significant danger that the big downturns 
in export earnings will coincide with downturns in domestic government 
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bond prices, while I can not think of any reason to hope for a 
systematic negative covariance between these returns. Therefore 
covariance risk considerations would point towards a preference for 
foreign government bonds rather than domestic government bonds even 
when these are denominated in the same foreign currency. And again, 
these covariance risk considerations will not necessarily influence 
other lenders in the same direction, so that our domestic government is 
likely to obtain finance on better terms by floating its bonds in a 
major financial centre abroad than by offering them at home. 
Thus features (1), (2), and (3) give rise to a preference for external 
financial intermediation as the consequence of covariance risk 
considerations. Moreover, since these considerations apply with 
particular force to the case when the government is the borrower, the 
above arguments lead to the prediction that the government of a 
currency area with these features would tend to borrow abroad, while 
the private residents of the currency area lend substantially to 
foreign governments. 
Notes on feature (1) 
The operational significance of feature (1) is the nature of the 
resulting covariance risk facing wealth holders with real assets in 
this sector. I have observed that this feature will fade as exports 
become more diversified on the important assumption that fluctuations 
in returns on different export items are independent. If, on the other 
hand, these fluctuations are not independent, then a currency area may 
have diversified exports and nevertheless display this feature of 
strong positive covariance between exchange rate movements and returns 
on individual real assets in the export sector, such that 
considerations of covariance risk lead these wealth holders to prefer 
foreign denominated financial assets. In the case of primary exports 
such as wool and corn, for instance, the assumption of independence is 
normally valid, since export earnings on corn are likely to be 
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dominated by the effects of the weather on the harvest in any given 
season, while earnings on wool depend on other factors. There is thus 
some hope that the effect of a bad corn crop on total export earnings 
may be partly offset by good earnings on wool; at worst there is no 
reason to expect a bad year for wool to coincide with a bad corn crop. 
However, there can be circumstances when this assumption of 
independence is not appropriate. 
One reason why fluctuations in earnings on various export items would 
not be independent would be if the exports were all being sold in the 
same market, and if the normal cause of fluctuations in earnings was 
demand fluctuations in that market, as opposed to supply fluctuations 
caused by such things as weather. Consider for instance an economy 
which exports a variety of manufactured exports, the majority of these 
going to a single large market. Ignore supply shocks, and assume that 
fluctuations in export earnings are caused by demand fluctuations in 
that single large market. In this case, as in the case of the economy 
which exports a single item, wealth holders whose major real assets are 
in this export sector will face a high probability that the exchange 
rate will depreciate at the same time as the earnings on their export 
assets are down, so that covariance risk considerations would lead them 
to prefer foreign financial assets. If the downturns in that single 
large market are normally associated with high interest rates, then 
financial assets featuring variable interest rates, denominated in the 
currency of this large market, would prove particularly valuable to 
these export sector wealth holders, for portfolio diversification 
purposes. We should expect wealth holders with real assets in the 
export sector in a currency area of this type to take covariance risk 
into account when choosing among financial assets, and to choose to 
hold substantial financial assets in this large foreign market. 
These considerations might, for instance, have relevance to Taiwan. 
A recent study by Maxwell Fry [19891, entitled "Taiwan's Current 
Account Surplus: Incipient Dutch Disease? ", begins with a quote from 
Bela Balassa and John Williamson: "It does not make sense, in terms of 
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future development or current welfare, to place 20% of GDP in low- 
yielding foreign assets. " Fry agrees with the general assessment that 
Taiwanese are choosing to hold foreign assets when domestic yields are 
higher. I would suggest the following questions might be asked: Does 
this portfolio choice result from Taiwanese wealth holders taking into 
account considerations of covariance risk such as those described 
above? How do returns on these foreign financial assets vary in 
relation to returns on domestic assets? It would be rational for 
Taiwanese to choose foreign financial assets with lower yields if 
holding these assets achieved a desired reduction in the variance of 
their total wealth portfolios; simple comparison of returns is not an 
adequate assessment of the choice. 
Notes on feature (2) 
It should be noted that, for an identical share of exports in national 
income, feature (2) may be more pronounced in -one economy than in 
another, according to differences in the distribution of wealth and 
income within sectors, as follows. An economy which features a very 
egalitarian distribution of wealth and income within the export sector, 
but a very unequal distribution of wealth in other sectors, would not 
tend to have this feature (2), since in this case the economy may have 
large wealth holders but they are not in the export sector; in a 
relatively poor economy especially, an egalitarian distribution of 
wealth in the export sector would not give rise to large wealth holders 
in that sector. In this type of economy feature (2) might not be 
present even if the share of exports in income is large. By contrast, 
feature (2) would be most pronounced in an economy in which the 
distribution of wealth and income is most unequal in the export sector, 
and egalitarian in sectors producing for the domestic market. Although 
I can not offer cross country data on this feature, this latter 
pattern, of wealth distribution being more unequal in the export 
sector, was probably characteristic of many of the "primary export 
economies" prior to the great industrialization drives which began 
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during the depression of international trade in the 1930's. (See, for 
instance, Foreman-Peck [1983), Furtado [1976), Lewis [1978), and Munro 
(1976). ) Among these primary export economies, this feature might have 
been more pronounced when exports derived from plantation production 
than when they derived from peasant production, although in the latter 
case great concentrations of wealth certainly did emerge among the 
export traders. One of the effects of industrialization drives has 
been to alter this feature, although often in such ways as have not 
reduced incentives to make use of EFI. 
Notes on feature (3) 
It was noted above that the tax structure feature, feature(3), may be 
as much consequence as cause of EFI. In this case it is geographical 
EFI which is particularly important. The tax structure of a currency 
area is influenced by EFI, and indeed restricted by EFI, for the 
following reasons: (a) EFI involves major domestic wealth holders 
holding much of their financial wealth abroad, which gives them the 
opportunity to avoid paying domestic income taxes on the earnings of 
that share of their income. (b) The other side of EFI is that domestic 
borrowers are selling financial assets abroad; such assets are more 
attractive to foreign lenders if they are not subject to taxation. 
Thus when a large share of financial intermediation is done through EFI 
rather than through domestic financial intermediation, serious 
difficulties arise for imposing an effective income tax system, and the 
government is forced to rely more heavily on revenues from customs 
duties. 3 Moreover, if the share of foreign trade in total income is 
falling but the share of financial intermediation done through EFI is 
not falling, revenues derived from international trade taxes would tend 
to be an increasingly inadequate source of government revenue. 
Pressures therefore emerge on the government budget towards increasing 
reliance on the inflation tax, which in turn will intensify pressures 
on residents to hold financial wealth abroad. 
Why should the share of EFI not fall as the natural consequence of a 
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falling share of foreign trade in national income, since this would 
tend to involve a weakening of feature (2) above, as well as a decline 
in the T/NT ratio? The arguments developed here would suggest that the 
share of EFI would tend to fall with the share of foreign trade. 
However, much depends upon the historical circumstances causing the 
share of foreign trade to fall. In particular, if the change is 
precipitated by a major adverse foreign shock, there would be strong 
pressures on a government which depends on EFI towards policy responses 
which would intensify incentives for residents to hold foreign 
financial assets. The role of EFI might then not diminish. These 
pressures emerge in the following manner. 
Consider an economy which has been using EFI such that government 
long term debt is held abroad and denominated in the foreign currency; 
the costs of debt service as measured in the domestic currency then 
depend on the exchange rate. Suppose that initially the government 
budget is balanced, and that the tax revenue structure is as feature 
(3). Now consider a sudden decline in export values due to world price 
movements, such that the equilibrium price of foreign exchange for this 
currency area has risen sharply. As is well known, the crisis of 
1929/30 put many economies in this position. How is such a government 
to survive such a sharp rise in the domestic currency cost of its debt 
service as would result from allowing the exchange rate to depreciate 
to a new, much lower, equilibrium value? Suppose the price of foreign 
exchange would have to rise 30% to reach a new equilibrium, so that the 
cost of foreign debt service likewise rose 30%. To stay solvent, the 
government must suddenly increase its domestic currency revenues 
accordingly. Its customs revenues might also be denominated in the 
foreign currency, which would help, but help from this source would be 
offset by declines in the values of exports and imports. A government 
in such a position would be caught between the threat of its own 
collapse, on the one hand, if it tries to be too drastic in raising 
domestic revenues or cutting expenditures, and the threat of insolvency 
on the other, with foreign bondholders taking major losses. Therefore 
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such a government would be under considerable pressure to prevent the 
exchange rate from such severe depreciation via the introduction of 
controls on capital movements, on the exchange rate, and restrictions 
on imports. By these means the domestic currency cost of foreign debt 
service is reduced, and government solvency defended. 
The policy response just described could be seen as a form of 
increasing taxation: the increased domestic currency cost of the debt 
service is in this case being paid by buyers of restricted imports and 
black market foreign exchange, as the prices of these items are driven 
up by the restrictions. This indirect method of meeting the increased 
domestic currency costs of external debt service may be politically 
much easier to implement than large and visible increases in taxation; 
large and visible tax increases have been known to precipitate the 
collapse of governments in the past, and may be quite impossible to 
implement. Also, this indirect method invites the support of large and 
concentrated interests which will be the beneficiaries of the quota 
rents, cheap official foreign exchange, etc., created by the 
restrictions, whereas the incidence of costs of the restrictions is 
more diffuse. Thus it is difficult to imagine the emergence of any 
politically powerful groups pressing the government to raise the needed 
revenues through less distortionary forms of taxation. 
But the maintenance of an exchange rate which is above its 
equilibrium creates new incentives to hold savings abroad. And the 
larger the share of residents' financial assets which is held abroad, 
the larger the share of residents' income which escapes taxation, so 
that the weakness of the government's tax base is aggravated, and 
pressures to rely on the inflation tax intensified. Moreover, the more 
residents hold their financial assets abroad and the stronger their 
incentives to do so, the weaker must become the market for domestic 
currency denominated government bonds; therefore it is hard to see how 
such a government could reduce the foreign denominated share of its 
funded debt and thereby reduce the sensitivity of its expenditures to 
the exchange rate. 
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As the consequence of these pressures, a currency area which has been 
relying heavily on EFI as the natural and healthy market response to 
features (1) and (2), may emerge from the adjustment to a major change 
in international trade and relative prices in the manner just 
described. It is not at all obvious how a government in such a 
position might be able to escape (other than by letting its foreign 
bondholders take losses and defaulting on the external debt), although 
the destructive effects of the distortionary policies used to cope with 
such pressures have abundantly been observed in analyses of particular 
historical cases. 
Thus the historical circumstances associated with a given decline in 
the share of foreign trade in national income are of critical 
importance in answering the question of why EFI might not fall with the 
share of foreign trade. And the subsequent evolution of the tax 
structure is not independent of the economy's historical dependence on 
EFI as just described. 
Argentina offers an example of an economy in which the tax structure 
has evolved in precisely this way, to an extreme degree. The 
imposition of exchange controls in response to the 1929-32 
international crisis has been described many times. (See for example, 
Diaz Alejandro [1970], Peters (1935], Quintero Ramos [1965], Prebisch 
(1932] and [1944], and Salera [1941]. ) The pertinence of the present 
argument to the formulation of these policy responses is indicated by 
the fact that in allocating the cheap official supplies of foreign 
exchange, government needs for external debt service were given first 
priority. 
The magnitude of the effect of exchange rate depreciation on the 
domestic currency cost of foreign exchange may be illustrated by the 
September, 1932, figures: Cost of service of external national public 
debt in thousands of paper pesos: (a) at par: 94,854; (b) at actual 
rates of exchange: 131,832. At this time Argentine bonds were selling 
at about 50% of their face value in New York, but bondholders had been 
consistently paid. 4 In the Argentine case, the government was still at 
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this stage using gold held by the Conversion Bureau to service its 
foreign debt, and obtaining this gold at par; in effect the government 
took exchange rate gains on these gold holdings. 
The figures given here show that the magnitude of the potential 
government budget problems resulting from the combination of EFI and 
adjustment to a major adverse foreign trade shock has not been 
exaggerated in the hypothetical case described above. The Argentine 
government budget position was already in difficulty prior to the 
crisis, and budget difficulties resulting from the economic crisis 
contributed to the collapse of the constitutional government, by 
military coup, in 1930. 
The adverse effects on the Argentine economy of the policies of 
exchange and foreign trade restrictions have often been described. 
Among these have been intensified incentives to hold savings abroad. 
The entrenchment of interests built on the restrictions and consequent 
difficulties in reducing them, have also been discussed. In the 
Argentine case, to the pressures towards maintaining an overvalued 
exchange rate which derive from government budget implications of EFI 
are added pressures deriving from the fact that the country's major 
exports are basic foodstuffs, so that increases in the price of foreign 
exchange which push up the domestic price of exported items hit real 
wages hard. That this factor has been of considerable importance as an 
influence on exchange rate policy has often been persuasively argued. 
Nevertheless, influences deriving from the government budget 
implications of EFI have also been important. 
An income tax was imposed in Argentina in 1931 as reliance on 
revenues from customs duties became increasingly inadequate, but 
effective collection of income taxes from a significant share of the 
population has never been achieved, so that the government still has to 
rely heavily on customs revenues and other indirect taxes, and 
persistent recourse to the inflation tax has been made in the post-WWII 
period. Recourse to the inflation tax and the associated depreciation 
of the currency have indeed stimulated savings outflows, weakening the 
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income tax base still further; at present only a tiny proportion of the 
Argentine population pays income tax, so that government revenue 
pressures on the customs duties and inflation taxes have been very 
severe, as is well known. 
The historical evolution of the Argentine tax structure has been the 
consequence of many influences, and an adequate explanation of this 
evolution is certainly not being attempted here. However, there is a 
striking feature in the history of Argentine exchange and foreign trade 
policy which I do think the prior history of EFI helps to explain. 
This feature is that prior to 1930 Argentina was among the most open of 
economies, entirely free of exchange control and restrictions on 
capital movements, with a long history of strong dedication to free 
trade, while since 1930 the country has been noted for its 
protectionism and exchange controls. The sharpness and persistence of 
this policy reversal are very striking indeed, particularly when 
considered against the length and strength of the country's previous 
dedication to openness. The mechanisms I have described above in a 
hypothetical case do offer a possible approach to explaining such a 
remarkable and long term policy reversal. In applying these ideas to 
the Argentine case I have stressed the importance of other influences 
on exchange rate policy. Nevertheless, influences on the evolution of 
the tax structure deriving from the prior history and continued use of 
EFI do seem to be important. 
For these reasons I would certainly not claim that the evolution of the 
Argentine tax structure has been independent of EFI. 
More generally, while one might want to treat feature (3) as given 
and an independent third feature of a currency area at any particular 
moment, or for analytical purposes, it is surely not an independent 
feature in the longer view. 
3 Currency area structure of the international 
economy: implications for patterns of 
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The considerations of covariance risk influences on choices made by 
wealth holders have very strong implications concerning the 
relationship between the currency area structure of the international 
economy and patterns of international financial intermediation. 
Consider two extreme possibilities. 
Imagine first an international economy (call it structure A) which is 
divided into a small number of large currency areas, each of which 
exports an equally diversified range of items. For each of these 
currency areas, fluctuations on some of these items are largely due to 
supply shocks caused by such things as weather, while fluctuations on 
other items tend to be due more often to demand conditions. 
Fluctuations in earnings on individual items are approximately 
independent of fluctuations in the total supply of foreign exchange to 
the currency area, except in the case of fluctuations in the volume of 
international trade for the world as a whole. Assume each currency 
area pursues identical monetary policy, so that we can abstract from 
influences of differences in expected rates of inflation and the 
associated expectations of exchange rate movements. In such currency 
areas there would be no covariance risk reason for wealth holders with 
real assets in one of these export sectors to prefer foreign to 
domestic currency denominated financial assets, since the probability 
of gains from exchange rate movements coinciding with downturns in 
earnings on their real assets is approximately zero. Portfolio 
diversification could be adequately achieved through investing in the 
financial instruments issued by other domestic enterprises. In 
particular, investments in the issues of enterprises in sectors of the 
economy not directly connected with foreign trade would offer the 
advantage that fluctuations in the earnings on these assets might have 
some degree of independence from fluctuations in the total volumes of 
international trade. 
An international economy with this first type of currency area 
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structure would not offer the basis for a market in external financial 
intermediation based on the considerations of covariance risk discussed 
in this chapter. On the contrary, the advantages, for exporters, of 
assets in non-traded goods sectors on which returns might be at least 
independent of returns on export assets, would be an influence tending 
to strengthen the basis for markets in domestic financial 
intermediation. In an international economy with this type of currency 
area structure, consideration of covariance risk influences would lead 
us to expect the development of domestic financial intermediation to be 
at least as strong as external financial intermediation, and give us no 
reason to expect any one particular currency area to emerge as a 
financial centre serving the others. 
Now consider a second type of currency area structure, one which 
contrasts sharply with the first. In this version the international 
economy is divided into many small currency areas and a single large 
currency area. The small currency areas each display features (1), 
(2), and (3), above, while the large currency area displays none of 
these features; the large currency area features a diversified range of 
exports such as just described above for the first type of currency 
area structure. In an international economy with this type of currency 
area, the combination of the covariance risk influences with the 
advantages of a larger market would lead us to expect a major financial 
centre to emerge in the large currency area, and to expect the 
development of institutions serving external financial intermediation 
in each of the small currency areas to far outstrip the development of 
those serving domestic financial intermediation. 
The currency area structure of the real world international economy 
is something between the two types described, and there are many other 
influences, notably striking differences in monetary policies and 
political stability, on patterns of international financial 
intermediation. Nevertheless, in very broad terms, we do observe 
patterns similar to those described. The many small economies with 
concentrated exports have a long history of using external financial 
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intermediation which has tended to be combined with much weaker 
development of institutions serving domestic financial intermediation. 
This use of external financial intermediation has contributed to the 
emergence of a few large financial centres which are situated in 
economies which do not display features (1), (2), and (3) above. This 
pattern will be discussed in more detail below, when we look at the 
Goldsmith data on financial structure in connection with statistical 
detail on features (1), (2), and (3). 
4 Implications for characteristics of domestic financial structure 
How can the above arguments be related to observable characteristics of 
domestic financial structure, so that a cross country study may be used 
to test the hypothesis that these features of currency area structure 
are important influences on the relative importance of EFI and DFI? I 
will look briefly at two possible approaches which I will not pursue, 
and then develop a third approach which will enable me to make use of 
Goldsmith's cross country data on financial structure. 
One approach would be to begin with the observation that an economy 
which uses EFI to a substantial degree must be served by institutions 
which contribute to this process, and then to compare the relative 
prominence of such institutions in different countries with cross 
country information on the various features. In currency areas 
displaying these features we would expect to find important local 
financial institutions which borrow in the major foreign financial 
centres and on the basis of these funds distribute loans to domestic 
borrowers. However, the "institutions" which contribute to the 
outflows of residents' savings are often quite invisible because of the 
capital movements involved being illegal. The long history of such 
illegal acquisition of foreign financial assets makes the direct study 
of the institutional structure supporting this side of EFI quite 
impossible. The argument that currency areas displaying features (1), 
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(2), and (3) would tend to use EFI would, in the presence of a long 
history of restrictions on savings outflows, lead to the following 
further predictions: Financial structure in such currency areas would 
be characterized by well developed black markets and illegal channels 
for capital export, together with weak markets for domestic government 
bonds and domestic equity. Naylor [1987] has offered us a descriptive 
account of this aspect of EFI. While I do not deny that LDCs do tend 
to be troubled by well developed channels for illegal capital outflows 
as well as tending to have the structural features in question, I do 
not propose to develop this approach here. 
A second approach would be to make use of a measure of EFI analogous 
to the sort of measures used by Goldsmith, and to compare this with 
Goldsmith's cross country data on financial structure. Construction of 
such a measure would involve summing the volumes of capital inflows and 
outflows, rather than using figures for net capital movements, since 
the process of EFI is netted out in these latter figures. A country 
which makes extensive use of geographical EFI would show relatively 
large gross capital movements, but not necessarily any substantial net 
capital movements; nor is there any reason to assume that extensive use 
of EFI would be associated with net capital movements in a particular 
direction. Analytically, comparison of the relative importance of EFI 
and DFI would be best served by using a measure of EFI based on 
information about gross capital flows. However, the availability of 
information, particularly in the face of a long history of illegal 
capital movements, is again a major obstacle. The cumulative effect of 
the inflow aspect of EFI would be visible in figures of external debt, 
while the accumulation of residents' assets abroad, which is the other 
side of the process of EFI, remains hidden. It is quite impossible to 
develop a new issue ratio or financial interrelations ratio for EFI 
which requires summing the volumes of inflows and outflows or the two 
sets of assets, when the outflow side of the process has been hidden to 
such an important extent. 
It has already been noted that under these circumstances it is also 
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quite impossible to identify the direction of international net capital 
movements resulting from the use of EFI. An economy which looks like a 
spectacular international debtor might turn out not to be a net debtor, 
or even to be a net creditor, if there were full information about the 
outflow side of EFI. Studies of spectacular South American debtors 
have sometimes drawn attention to the accumulation of some of the types 
of foreign financial assets which were on the other side of the EFI 
process; however, figures for these foreign assets have necessarily 
excluded important ranges of assets, such as holdings of property and 
equity, on which statistical information is not available. Since these 
excluded assets are popularly known to be substantial, the available 
range of statistical information can not serve as a satisfactory 
measure of EFI. 
The approach I will develop here is to return to the question posed 
in the currency area literature, of how structural characteristics of a 
currency area influence the ability of that currency to perform the 
functions of money. The functions of money are carried out through 
financial instruments and institutions of a wide range of types. 
Goldsmith has given us substantial statistical information on the 
structure of this range of financial instruments and institutions on a 
cross country basis. I propose to treat the Goldsmith data as 
information about the way in which the different currencies have been 
performing the functions of money in the different countries, comparing 
features of financial structure across countries and relating them to 
the structural features under discussion. I am ignoring the fact that 
the Goldsmith data does not include information about currency 
denomination of financial instruments, despite the relevance of the 
question; where domestic issues of foreign denominated financial 
instruments have been substantial the data is less relevant to the 
question at hand, but I do not believe the approach is fruitless, 
despite this difficulty. 
The question addressed in this section of the thesis concerns the 
relationship between structural features of a currency area and the 
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ability of the currency to perform the store of value function. It 
will be recalled that I have been defining "currency area" as the 
geographical domain within which a particular currency has legal tender 
status, and that I have been using the word "currency" to refer to a 
denomination which includes a wide range of financial instruments. The 
currency performs the functions of money through the medium of the 
range of financial instruments denominated in that currency. The range 
of financial instruments denominated in the domestic currency reflects 
the range of monetary functions performed by that currency. 
In a currency area which makes extensive use of external financial 
intermediation, we would expect the issue of domestic currency 
denominated financial instruments serving the store of value function 
to be low relative to the issue of domestic currency denominated 
financial instruments serving the medium of exchange function. An 
economy which is not much monetized would be expected to have low rates 
of issue for all types of financial instruments; on the other hand an 
economy which is highly monetized and financially sophisticated, but 
uses EFI extensively, relative to DFI, would show high new issue rates 
for financial instruments serving the medium of exchange function 
relative to the new issue rates for financial instruments serving the 
store of value function. While it is of course true that financial 
instruments cannot be so neatly divided into monetary functions, 
nevertheless I believe that the Goldsmith data on financial structure 
can be made to tell us something useful on this subject. 
Goldsmith offers cross country data on the structure of new issue 
ratios for the main types of financial institutions. ' What I suggest 
is that the issues of central and commercial banks are those which are 
to the greatest extent associated with the medium of exchange function, 
while the other types of institutions concentrate more on the issue of 
financial instruments designed to attract savers as a store of value. 
The crudeness of this categorization is readily acknowledged. 
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I have mentioned that the three structural features which have been 
identified here as giving rise to incentives for using EFI are 
structural features which tend to be associated with LDCs as opposed to 
developed countries (DCs); the data given in Tables 11.2 and 11.3 
will be seen to confirm this generalization for features (1) and (3). 
Data on feature (2) could not be offered however; as explained below, 
data on the ratio of exports to income is offered in these tables as a 
proxy for feature (2); it is an unsatisfactory and uninformative proxy, 
for the reasons explained in the notes on feature (2) above. 
Generalizations about the association of feature '(2) with LDCs can 
therefore neither be confirmed nor denied by using the data in these 
tables. 
As concerns cross-country differences in financial structure, one of 
Goldsmith's general conclusions is that the share in the total of new 
issues of financial institutions is greater for central and deposit 
banks in the less developed countries than for developed countries. 
That is, the types of financial institutions (central and deposit 
banks) which are associated with the provision of financial instruments 
serving the medium of exchange function have a relatively larger share 
in the total financial structure in LDCs than is characteristic of 
DCs. This is the pattern of financial structure which I have suggested 
would emerge if LDCs in general tend to make use of EFI to a greater 
extent than DCs. The interpretation of the pattern, following this 
line of argument, would be that the needs of the medium of exchange 
function are being met in LDCs by local financial institutions, whereas 
residents tend to make use of non-resident financial intermediaries 
(EFI) for financial instruments serving the store of value function; 
hence financial institutions serving the store of value function have 
remained undeveloped in LDCs relative to those serving the medium of 
exchange function. The Goldsmith data shows that this pattern has been 
consistently present, since the late 19th century, or early 20th 
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century, when the period covered by his data begins, so the pattern 
cannot be attributed to post-WWII policy changes. 
This data tells us nothing about the volumes of capital inflows and 
outflows which geographical EFI involves, and without this information 
we can not know whether the relatively low issue ratios for the non- 
monetary financial institutions represent low financial savings 
relative to the monetization of the economy, or whether these low issue 
ratios represent the use of EFI as a substitute for DFI. However, the 
financial structure revealed in the Goldsmith data is at least 
consistent with the argument that these LDCs have shown a stronger 
tendency to make use of EFI than the developed economies. 
Table II. 1 gives data on financial structure taken from the Goldsmith 
books identified in the source note. The columns labelled A give the 
value of new issues for all types of financial institutions as a 
percentage of GNP, referred to as the "new issue ratio". The new issue 
ratio, A, for all financial institutions, is the sum of the new issue 
ratios for five different groups of financial institutions, data for 
only two of which are given here. The five groups used by Goldsmith 
are as follows: Ac, refers to central banks; Ab, refers to commercial 
(deposit) banks; At, refers to thrift institutions, such as savings and 
loans; Ai, refers to insurance organizations; and Ao, refers to 
miscellaneous financial institutions, among which mortgage banks have 
been of particular importance in certain countries (notably Denmark, 
especially, and also Argentina, Egypt, and Germany, each during 
particular periods only). 
The data given in Table II. la has been constructed from the figures 
given in Table II. 1 in order to bring out the point mentioned above 
concerning the larger share of monetary financial instruments in the 
total new issue ratio for LDCs as compared with DCs. The data show the 
ratio (Ac+Ab)/A, i. e. the ratio of monetary new issues to total new 
issues of financial instruments. As shown in the table, the share of 
monetary financial instruments in the total new issue ratio is 
substantially larger for the group "average LDCs" than for the group 
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"average DCs", in both periods. (The figures for "average LDCs" and 
"average DCs" are as given by Goldsmith in the source indicated. ) 
Table 11.2 gives data on the three structural features of a currency 
area which were identified above as, jointly, giving reason for a 
tendency to use EFI instead of DFI, particularly in the range of 
financial instruments which serve as a longer term store of value, 
i. e., the non-monetary range of financial instruments. Data is given 
for feature (1), export concentration (export conc. ); for the ratio of 
exports to GDP, (X/Y); and for feature (3), the share of current 
government revenue derived from taxes on international trade and 
transactions (ITT). The figures given for export concentration are the 
values of the top three items (or group) as a percentage of total 
export earnings. The data on (X/Y) are given as a rather 
unsatisfactory proxy for feature (2), as well as in response to the 
suggestion from McKinnon (1963] concerning the openness of the economy 
and the issue of whether the domestic currency offers a store of value 
in a "representative bundle of goods". 
Comparison of the data given on financial structure in Tables II. 1 
and II. la, with the data given in Table II, does give a measure of 
support to the idea that the arguments developed above are pertinent to 
explaining the geographical pattern of cross-country differences in 
financial structure. The tables give figures for "average DC" and 
"average LDC" at the bottom. As I have just mentioned, for both 
periods the figure for the new issue ratio for all financial 
institutions is markedly higher for the "average DCs" than for the 
"average LDCs"; on the other hand the share of the central and deposit 
banks in this total new issue ratio, i. e. (Ac+Ab)/A, is higher in both 
periods for the "average LDCs". We can thus identify individual 
countries as having the "LDC type" financial structure by picking out 
countries which have these two features. I will do this by the 
method of picking out countries which have total new issue ratios (A) 
of 4 or less for the earlier period, and of 8 or less for the later 
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period; and which have a central and deposit bank share, (Ac+Ab)/A, of 
70 or above in the early period and 50 or above in the later period. 
The following 11 countries may be identified on these criteria as 
having the LDC type financial structure: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Egypt, Greece, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru. Philippines, and 
Venezuela. In the more recent period, Argentina and Brazil show the 
LDC type structure only in the relative size of the central and deposit 
bank share of the total new issue ratio; an explanation of this pattern 
is suggested below. Mexico, on the other hand, has a figure for the 
relative share of the central and deposit banks which is in the DC 
range in the later period, while meeting the criteria used here for LDC 
type in other respects. It will be noticed also that certain developed 
countries (Belgium, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland) show high figures 
for the central and deposit bank share, in one or both periods, while 
showing total new issue ratios in the "average DC" range. Spain seems 
to be a sort of borderline case, since the total new issue ratio is on 
the low side of the DC range in both periods, while the central and 
deposit bank share in the total ratio is in the LDC range in both 
periods. 
We can now use this categorization of countries by type of financial 
structure to relate the type of financial structure to the structural 
features which I have argued would tend to give rise to EFI. As a 
crude generalization, this exercise shows that the LDC type of 
financial structure does tend to be associated with features (1) and 
(3). Among the 11 countries identified above as having the LDC type of 
financial structure, only Mexico and India show export concentration 
percentages under 50%. By contrast, among the remaining countries 
listed in table II. 1, only Australia, New Zealand, have export 
concentration percentages above 50%. As concerns feature (3), only 
three of the eleven countries have ITT shares of less than 10% 
(Venezuela, Brazil, and Greece), whereas among the remaining countries 
listed, only two (Switzerland, 16%, and Spain, 10%) have percentages 
of government revenue deriving from ITT as high as 10%. For Australia 
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and New Zealand, the two anomalies on the export concentration feature, 
the ITT shares are low, at 5.2% and 3.4% respectively. However, no 
identifiable pattern seems to relate the openness feature, (X/Y), to 
this data on financial structure. As concerns feature (2), as was 
explained above, the distribution of wealth in the economy is as 
important as the export ratio, so the (X/Y) data is an unsatisfactory 
proxy for feature (2). Therefore its failure to relate to the pattern 
of financial structure which appears in Table II. 1 is not particularly 
informative concerning the relationship between feature (2) and 
financial structure. 
The case of Brazil is particularly interesting in that, for the more 
recent period, the total new issue ratio A is in the DC range rather 
than the LDC range, while the structure of that issue ratio has 
continued to be of the LDC type, in having a large share for monetary 
financial instruments. This could be interpreted as the financing of 
investment expenditure through the (inflationary) issue of monetary 
financial instruments instead of through the issue of store of value 
type financial instruments, perhaps because resident wealth holders 
prefer to use EFI (in both geographical and currency sense) for 
financial instruments serving the store of value function. The real 
saving which is the counterpart of the investment expenditure is then 
imposed (as forced saving) by the inflation which results from the 
excessive issue of monetary financial instruments. In the more recent 
period, Argentina shows a similar pattern, which could be interpreted 
in the same way. 
Argentina would not have been in the LDC type financial structure 
category, on either criteria, had I used the data given by Goldsmith 
for the earlier period, 1900-13, however: the figure given for A is 
5.6, and the share of "central and deposit banks" in the total new 
issue ratio was 65.3%. The Goldsmith data thus identifies a sort of 
break in Argentine development as beginning with the first World War. 
It may be seen from Table V. 1 that the rates of fixed capital formation 
in Argentina, which were extremely high in the period preceding WWI, 
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fell during WWI and have never returned to quite such high levels. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to speculate about what relation 
there might be between these two variables. 
In Table 111.3, data on the same three features is given for a larger 
group of countries. The strength of the association between features 
(1) and (3) stands out clearly in this table. The idea discussed above 
that feature (3) (the structure of government revenue), may not be 
independent of the other two features thus receives some support from 
the data given in this table. On the other hand, as above, no clear 
pattern appears concerning any relationship between the export ratio 
and the other two features. I would conclude from this that the 
openness of an economy by itself is not particularly important in 
determining the choice between EFI and DFI. As noted above, the 
pattern of wealth distribution is as important as the export ratio in 
giving rise to feature (2), so no conclusions can be drawn here 
concerning a possible relationship between feature (3) and feature (2). 
The association of features (1), (2), and (3) with LDCs in contrast to 
developed countries is familiar, as has been mentioned above. The long 
history of the association of these structural features of currency 
areas with these characteristics of financial structure gives support 
to the idea that these phenomena are related in important ways. 
Moreover, the contrasts between the financial structures of these two 
main types of currency area were clearly visible long before the 
introduction of the distortionary (and inflationary) policies in the 
post-WWII period, associated with the various types of development 
drives, whose harmful effects on financial development have often been 
pointed out. 
I do not for a moment deny the importance of policy differences, nor 
the fact that persistence in an inflationary policy can destroy the 
effective functioning of a financial structure. In Chapter III the 
influence of inflationary monetary policy on the relative predominance 
of EFI will be further discussed. However, as concerns the broad 
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patterns of international financial intermediation in the international 
economy as a whole, one would expect the geographical distribution of 
structural characteristics to dominate the geographical distribution 
of policy wisdom or error. As we have just seen, there has been a long 
history of the association of the structural currency area features 
identified above, with the international patterns of financial 
structure identified by Goldsmith; I would therefore argue that the 
influence of currency area structure on financial development is of 
considerable importance, and does indeed dominate the geographical 
distribution of policy wisdom or error. In Chapter III, however, I 
will be stressing the importance of policy measures which can be 
applied to overcoming the disadvantages of structural features which 
would tend to cause a predominance of EFI. 
Notes 
1. Capital flows and earnings on factor services may or may not be independent of earnings 
on individual export items, and their influence on the probability of the total foreign 
exchange supplies being correlated with movements in earnings on individual items would 
vary accordingly. I will not analyze here reasons why export earnings and capital flows 
have, historically, often moved together, as this has been analyzed by many people. Here the 
assumption is that the behaviour of capital flows and other sources of foreign exchange is 
such that the probabilities of earnings on individual export items moving with the total 
supplies offoreign exchange are not reduced. 
2. De Cecco, Marcello, 1974. 'Money and Empire". Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Alfred Marshall, 1887. "Memoranda and evidence before the Gold and Silver Commission". 
Commission on International Exchange (1904). 
3. This problem was discussed by H. E. Peters (1935). 
4. Data from Economic Review, Banco de la Nacion, given in Peters (1935) pp. 148-9. 
5. Raymond W. Goldsmith, 1969. 'Financial Structure and Development'. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 
1972. "A Century of Financial Development in Latin America". Caracas, Venezuela: Banco 
Central de Venezuela. 
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AA Ac Ab Ac Ab 
country 1914-29 1949-63 1914-29 1914-29 1949-63 
1949-63 
Argentina 2.9 9.6 0.87 1.27 2.51 4.12 
Australia 5.2 8.5 0.58 1.85 0.6 1.76 
Belgium 6.5 10.6 1.25 3.4 1.3 2.84 
Brazil 4 19.5 0.81 2.84 8.7 6.32 
Canada 7.4 10.1 0.25 2.83 0.31 3.06 
Chile 7.7 
Colombia 8.7 
Denmark 7.4 11.8 0.25 1.96 0.2 4.84 
Egypt / UAR 1.7 6.9 1.25 0.48 1.04 3.02 
France 8.5 11.4 2.45 2.57 1.55 3.37 
Germany -2.9 12.8 0.66 0.17 0.92 2.17 
Greece 5.7 9.3 1.53 3.28 2.77 3.39 
India (b) 0.5 3.5 1.03 0.25 0.66 1.01 
Italy 7.2 18.6 1.02 3 1.8 5.99 
Japan 14 29.3 0.79 5.87 1.3 13.65 
Mexico -0.1 6.1 0.19 -0.49 0.93 1.02 
Netherlands 5.9 13.5 0.61 2.62 0.65 2.39 
New Zealand (b) 6.7 8.1 2.31 1.67 0.35 1.07 
Nigeria (a) 0 1.8 0.06 0.03 0.67 1.07 
Norway 9.8 8.8 0.56 3.02 0.14 1.07 
Peru 7.15 
Philippines 1.5 5.2 0.24 0.95 0.97 1.97 
South Africa 4.3 13.4 0.7 0.8 0.6 2.01 
Spain 4.3 12 0.91 2.21 1.71 5.92 
Sweden 6 10.9 0.4 1.99 0.7 3.12 
Switzerland 12.2 20.4 0.69 6.98 1.63 10.03 
UK 5.2 8.6 0.53 1.83 0.4 1.73 
USA 7.8 9.6 0.43 3.53 0.13 2.54 
Venezuela (c) 1.3 5.4 2.07 0.89 0.74 2.13 
Yugoslavia (d) 0.7 21.5 0.24 0.79 4.86 -0.11 
Average DC 6.81 13.34 0.68 2.76 1.11 3.95 







































































Average DC 50.51% 37.93% 
Average LDC 81.18% 68.97% 
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Source: 
Figures for Chile, Colombia and Peru are from Goldsmith (1972) p. 100. 
All other countries data from Goldsmith (1969) pp. 190-191,218,220, 
226-227 
Notes: 
Some figures are for 1930-38, not 1914-29, as follows: 
(a) all figures 
(b) figures for Ac 
(c) figures for A and Ab 
(d) all figures; most recent figure for Ab is 1939-48 
A is new issue ratio of all financial institutions (% GNP) 
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Ac is new issue ratio of central banks (% GNP) 
Ab is new issue ratio of deposit (commercial) banks (% GNP) 
"New issue ratio" means new issues of financial instruments as a 
percentage of GNP. 
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Argentina 57% 8% 18.5% 
Australia 52% 15% 5.2% 
Belgium 16% 36% 1.0% 
Brazil 57% 8% 7.0% 
Canada 38% 19% 4.4% 
Chile 85% 14% 10.0% 
Colombia 85% 11% 20.3% 
Denmark 28% 29% 3.1% 
Egypt / UAR 81% 18% 18.7% 
France 24% 14% 0.3% 
Germany 25% 18% 0.8% 
Greece 54% 9% 6.7% 
India 42% 4% 23.5% 
Italy 22% 16% 0.2% 
Japan 34% 11% 
Mexico 33% 9% 13.1% 
Netherlands 15% 43% 
New Zealand 81% 22% 3.4% 
Nigeria 79% 18% 17.5% 
Norway 26% 41% 1.6% 
Peru 53% 16% 15.7% 
Philippines 73% 17% 23.0% 
South Africa 31% 26% 6.1% 
Spain 20% 11% 10.0% 
Sweden 28% 22% 1.5% 
Switzerland 28% 29% 16.7% 
UK 23% 20% 1.7% 
USA 15% 5% 1.6% 
USSR 18% 
Venezuela 99% 31% 6.1% 
Yugoslavia 25% 22% 19.5% 
Sources: 
ITT, X/Y: World Bank Development Report, 1985 
Export Concentration: Bird (1982) Pp. 54-56 
Also United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 
Notes: 
ITT is the percentage of current government revenue derived from 
taxes on international trade and transactions 




Export concentration is the percentage of total export revenue 
derived from the top three exports 
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Venezuela 99% 31% 6.1% 
Zambia 94% 50% 14.3% 
Senegal 91% 24% 30.9% 
Congo 90% 36% 26.5% 
Chad 89% 23% 45.2% 
Uganda 88% 26% 36.3% 
Sudan 87% 15% 40.5% 
Uruguay 87% 19% 6.1% 
Chile 85% 14% 10.0% 
Colombia 85% 11% 20.3% 
Ghana 85% 17% 40.8% 
Ethiopia 83% 12% 30.4% 
Egypt 81% 18% 18.7% 
Malawi 81% 16% 20.0% 
New Zealand 81% 22% 3.4% 
Bolivia 80% 17% 46.0% 
Nigeria 79% 18% 17.5% 
Malaya 77% 44% 27.9% 
Indonesia 75% 5% 14.3% 
Philippines 73% 17% 23.0% 
Nicaragua 72% 29% 24.3% 
Costa Rica 71% 23% 18.1% 
Guatemala 70% 17% 26.2% 
Honduras 68% 27% 28.2% 
Paraguay 58% 15% 24.8% 
Argentina 57% 8% 18.5% 
Brazil 57% 8% 7.0% 
Greece 54% 9% 6.7% 
Tanzania 54% 26% 21.7% 
Peru 53% 16% 15.7% 
Australia 52% 15% 5.2% 
Kenya 51% 31% 24.3% 
Canada 38% 19% 4.4% 
Mexico 33% 9% 13.1% 
South Africa 31% 26% 6.1% 
Denmark 28% 29% 3.1% 
Sweden 28% 22% 1.5% 
Switzerland 28% 29% 16.7% 
Norway 26% 41% 1.6% 
Germany 25% 18% 0.8% 
France 24% 14% 0.3% 
UK 23% 20% 1.7% 
Italy 22% 16% 0.2% 
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Spain 20% 11% 10.0% 
Belgium / Lux. 16% 36% 1.0% 
USA 15% 5% 1.6% 
Sources: 
ITT, X/Y: World Bank Development Report, 1985 
Export Concentration: Bird (1982) pp. 54-56 
Also United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 
Notes: 
ITT is the percentage of current government revenue derived from 
taxes on international trade and transactions 
X/Y is exports of goods and non-factor services as a percentage 
of GDP 
Export concentration is the percentage of total export revenue 




Implications of using 
193 
an imported money supply 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter II I have developed a theoretical framework for analysis of 
cross-country differences in the "required", or long run equilibrium, 
share of the imported component of the money supply. I have denoted 
this share as (G/F)*. In the present section I will make use of this 
theoretical framework to explore some of the implications of this 
restriction on the imported share in the money supply. 
This framework will enable us to analyze the proposal that countries 
with soft currencies and intractable inflation problems should change 
to using an imported money supply, or at least to an imported monetary 
base as in the currency board system. Many of the world's smaller (or 
poorer) countries have experienced intractable problems of monetary 
instability and capital flight associated in the post-WWII period with 
unsuccessful attempts to manage a monetary system based on a larger 
domestic credit component of the monetary base than had been maintained 
during gold standard or currency board days. In some of these 
economies "dollarization" has been quite severe. It is often argued 
that these economies should return to a Type II (currency board) 
monetary system. Eastern European countries which are presently 
opening their doors to western capital, and to western banks, are 
confronting similar questions of monetary system. Western banks may 
prefer to deal in hard currencies, and may perceive a Type II system as 
being in everyone's best interest. Analysis of the implications of 
using an imported monetary base is pertinent to all of these policy 
decisions. 
The analysis offered here is also pertinent to economies which have 
undergone significant change in the imported share of the monetary 
base, or in any of the factors which have been identified by this 
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theory as determining the required structure of the monetary base. In 
short, it has a very wide application. 
To illustrate the application of this theoretical framework, the 
analysis of this section will focus on three questions: 
(1) What are the implications of using a completely imported monetary 
base, as in the Type II (currency board type) system which is sometimes 
advocated for "soft currency" countries? 
(2) What are the implications for an economy of significant change in 
the required foreign share of the monetary base? The case of an 
increase in (G/F)* will be analyzed. 
(3) What are the implications for an economy of a fall in the traded 
share of national output unaccompanied by a fall in (G/F)*? The 
analysis developed in Chapters II and III of this thesis identifies 
reasons why this can occur, which will be explained. I believe this 
question to be pertinent to the many countries which have, in the post 
WWII period, been pursuing import substitution industrialization 
policies associated with substantial restrictions on trade and capital 
flows. In particular, I believe it to be pertinent to the case of 
Argentina; the Argentine case will be examined in some detail in 
Chapter V. 
The section begins by setting out the theoretical framework which has 
been developed in Chapters II and III, and elaborating on certain 
aspects of that framework. 
Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter II identified the 
following factors as influencing cross-country differences in (G/F)*: 
(1) the relative predominance of EFI in comparison with DFI, which I 
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denote as (EFI/DFI); (2) the share of imports in national expenditure, 
M/Y; (3) the variability of the trade balance, for which I have been 
using export concentration as a proxy, denoted (cov) in Chapter III; 
and (4) the ratio of net debt service, S, to national income, S/Y. In 
referring to G/F in Chapter II we had been implicitly expressing G, M, 
S, etc. in domestic currency. Now it is necessary to be explicit, and 
we will instead define G (and these other terms) as expressed in the 
foreign currency, so that the ratio we have been using becomes instead 
(eG/F)*, where e is the domestic currency price of a unit of G. 
Denoting (eG/F)* as "b*", for brevity, we have, therefore, the 
following: 
(4.1) b* = (eG/F) *= f( EFI/DFI, M/Y, cov, SlY ) 
In Chapter III EFI/DFI was seen as determined by the expected real 
return on alternative financial instruments, net of anticipated 
exchange losses, as well as by the structural features of an economy 
which were discussed in that context, and which included both M/Y and 
export concentration, "cov". 
We now make the following assumptions: 
(4.2) F= kY 
(4.3) P= (PtT + PntNT) / (T + NT) 
where P is a price index; Pt and Pnt are prices of traded and non- 
traded goods respectively, both expressed in terms of the domestic 
currency. T and NT are quantities of traded and non-traded goods 
respectively. 
(4.4) dG = (X-M -S+ K) 
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where X-M is the current account (except for returns to capital), S is 
net debt service payable abroad, and K is net capital inflow. X, M, S, 
and K are all expressed in the foreign currency. 
(4.5) dG = dGo + dGb + dGp 
or, for brevity, 
(4.5a) dG = dGo + dGbp 
where dGbp = dGb + dGp; 
(4.6) Y= PQ 
where P is as defined above, and Q= (T + NT). 
(4.7) Pt = ePt* 
where Pt* is the foreign currency price of traded goods. Foreign 
currency prices of both imports and exports are assumed to be 
determined in foreign markets, and to be independent of the exchange 
rate e. 
Making use of (4.1) and (4.2) gives a relation between the imported 
money stock and nominal income: 
(4.8) eG* = b*kY 
Denoting the actual ratio (eG / F) as "b", we portray the actual 
relation at any particular moment as: 
(4.8a) eG = bkY 
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In Chapter II no interpretation was offered for the relationship 
between the total nominal money supply and nominal income, expressed as 
F= kY; k was simply defined as k= F/Y. Here however it is necessary 
to place some interpretation on the relationship because of the role k 
will have in the subsequent analysis. 
The interpretation of the relationship F= kY used here derives from 
the models developed by Gurley and Shaw in their book "Money in a 
Theory of Finance". ' Following Gurley and Shaw money F is held by both 
households and firms. Liquidity for firms is seen as making some real 
contribution to the efficiency with which factor inputs can be 
transformed into output. Real money, or liquidity, thus enters into 
the production function, and has a real marginal product. This 
marginal product is assumed to be diminishing in relevant ranges; the 
marginal product is here assumed to fall to zero quite sharply as real 
money supply is increased beyond some F= k*Y, to avoid the implausible 
implication that an increase in real money could by itself lead to 
substantial increases in real output. On the other hand, losses in 
real output caused by negative shocks to liquidity are not ruled out; 
at levels of liquidity under F= k*Y real output would be less than the 
level achieved at F= k*Y. Since money enters the production function 
as a complementary input, growth in the supplies of other factor inputs 
will increase the marginal product of real money at any given level of 
real output. Following Gurley and Shaw, we assume that firms equate 
the value of the marginal product of money balances to the cost of 
holding these balances. 
This gives the following production function: 
(4.9) Q= q(K, L, R, k) 
where k is the liquidity term, defined as above; K is internationally 
mobile capital, L is internationally mobile labour, and R is "land", in 
which term is included all factor inputs which are not internationally 
mobile. The term R thus includes labour which is immobile 
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internationally due to restrictions on labour migrations (or for other 
reasons), as well as such things as immovable infrastructure, and land 
itself. Returns to internationally mobile factors are assumed to be 
determined abroad, like prices of traded goods, while returns to the 
fixed factor, R, are residual. The distinction is analytical rather 
than descriptive: an individual person or item may have an element of 
the mobile and an element of the fixed, with actual returns neither 
"horizontal", as in the mobile factor case, nor "vertical", as in the 
fixed factor case. 
I assume the production function to be identical for both traded and 
non-traded sectors. This assumption is not intended to be realistic; 
differences in the range of technologies available to the different 
sectors are often described, and considerable importance has been 
attached to such differences. However, my purpose here is to analyze 
the implications of the assumption made here about the role of money, 
in the context of a model in which the marginal rate of transformation 
between traded and non-traded goods is not constant. I assume the 
production function to be identical for both sectors for the purpose of 
focusing attention on the role of money. This approach yields some new 
perspectives on observed differences between traded and non-traded 
goods sectors which I have found very illuminating, and which also have 
important policy implications. 2 
Analysis of the role of money seems particularly important in view of 
the fact that the facilitation of access to foreign technologies, via 
imports of foreign capital, is often stressed as a reason for adopting 
a Type II monetary system. This framework shows that adopting the Type 
II system, as opposed to using a Type IV system, would alter the way in 
which resources are allocated between the sectors. If these effects 
are not taken into account, the results of importing capital and 
technology may turn out rather differently than had been either 
anticipated or desired. 
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Households are assumed to equate marginal utilities of goods and 
monies. Portfolio choice between alternative financial assets, 
including money, is assumed to be as discussed earlier in the thesis: 
some households hold domestic currency only, others are "diversifiers" 
and hold both domestic currency and the imported money. 
Firms, like households, can hold either domestic currency only or a 
combination of domestic currency and the imported money. Gp refers to 
balances of the imported money held by either non-banking firms or 
households. 
As noted above, this formulation of the production function implies 
that in increase in the supply of other factor inputs would increase 
the productivity of money; likewise, as also noted, technological 
progress which enhanced the productivity of other factor inputs could 
also increase the productivity of money. These implications are in 
accordance with the "demand-led" explanations of banking and monetary 
development which have been put forward in studies of banking and 
monetary history. We could, for example, interpret the money creation 
of the English country banks of issue in the 18th and 19th centuries as 
a response to a rise in the productivity of money brought about by the 
technological advancements of the industrial revolution. Similarly, we 
could interpret the rapid expansion in the 19th century of money 
creation by banks of issue in both the USA (prior to the Civil War) and 
Argentina as a response to increases in other factor inputs, K, L, and 
R, as the value of R (land resources especially) was raised by the fall 
in ocean shipping costs (among other causes). 
In the economic history literature there have also been "supply-led" 
arguments developed, in which financial innovations have been portrayed 
as bringing factor resources into more productive use and thereby 
taking an active, leading, role in propelling economic development. 
These arguments also fit easily into this formulation of the production 
function: we can portray them as altering the productivity of money in 
relation to other factors such that k* may change, or there may be a 
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change in the structure of the money supply such that the more 
productive forms of money increase their share in the total supply. 
Successful banking innovations, for instance, have historically 
resulted in an increase in the share of bank money in the total money 
supply. In terms of the identity which I have been using here to 
portray the structure of the money supply, if this were domestic 
banking development, it would appear as a fall in g, tending to reduce 
the imported component of the money supply. 
The formulation of the production function used here thus fits in 
neatly with major lines of argument which have been well developed in 
existing economic history literature. 
This framework can now be used to address the questions indicated 
above. 
2 What are the implications of using a completely imported monetary 
base, as in the Type II (currency board type) system? 
The comparison being assumed here is between the Type II system, in 
which H= eGo, and a Type III or Type IV system, in which H> eGo. I 
repeat the identity used in Chapter III, but now with G defined as 
expressed in the foreign denomination: 
(4.10) F= eGp +1 (eGo / W) + eGb 1/g 
Since the Type II system has W=1, whereas in the Type III and Type IV W 
< 1, the difference which a change to a Type II system brings about in 
the total imported share of the money supply depends on whether changes 
in g are induced by the change in W. If there is no induced change in 
g, then the change to a Type II system increases the imported component 
of the money supply. As indicated in Chapter II, it could be that 
there would be an increase in confidence in H sufficient to enable low- 
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powered bank money to displace Gp to such an extent that the total 
imported share in the money supply could fall. However, I will 
consider the case in which the change to a Type II system raises eG/F. 
I assume that this policy change to a Type II system brings the 
actual ratio eG/F up to a level at least as great as (eG/F)* (and 
maintains eG/F at or above this level), so the concept of (eG/F)* will 
not enter into the discussion of this question. 
The cost to the economy of the imported component of the money supply 
would be reduced if G is held in interest bearing form, as noted in 
Chapter III. If Go is held largely in interest bearing form, and if 
the change to the Type II system enabled H to displace non-interest 
bearing forms of Gp and Gb (such as, for instance, the US$ bills which 
mingle with the linen in Buenos Aires chests of drawers), a substantial 
reduction might be achieved in the cost of G. 
We can make use of the above framework to identify changes which are 
implied by the rise in eG/F, and which will have to occur, in some 
combination, by some means or other. 
We have seen, in (4.8a), that eG = bkY, and we are considering the 
case of an increase in the total imported share of the money supply , 
eG/F, denoted here as b. Since (4.8a) is an identity, we can use it to 
identify the possible range of changes implied by an increase in b. 
Total differentiation of this identity gives the following expressions: 
(4.11) de(G) + dG(e) = db(kY) + dk(bY) + dY(bk) 
(4. lla) db = [de(G) + dG(e) - dk(bY) - dY(bk)]/kY 
These expressions show us that a rise in b (caused here by the policy 
change to a Type II system) implies either a rise in eG or an 
offsetting fall in kY, or some combination of the two. As for the rise 
in eG, this may occur through a rise in e or a rise in G or through 
some combination of the two. Likewise, the fall in kY may be achieved 
by a fall in k, or by a fall in Y, or by some combination of both. 
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Furthermore, since Y= PQ, a fall in Y itself includes a range of 
possibilities: this could occur through a fall in P or a fall in Q, or 
some combination of the two. A fall in P has further implications 
which we will examine in a moment. 
I will consider changes in the terms k, e, and G sequentially, 
implicitly holding all the other terms constant except where there is a 
direct relationship. 
The interpretation I have given to the relation F= kY implies that a 
fall in k would reduce Q, since the marginal product of real money is 
assumed positive at this point. The assumption of the diminishing 
marginal product of money implies that as k falls the marginal product 
of money would be rising. It also implies a fall in the productivity 
(i. e., a "downward shift" in the marginal product function) of other 
factor inputs; the reduction in firms' liquidity is reducing the 
efficiency with which factor inputs are transformed into output. Since 
an imported money supply is more expensive, and, - following Gurley and 
Shaw [1960], I have assumed firms to equate the value of the marginal 
product of money to the marginal cost of holding it, it may be that the 
change to a more expensive money supply might be associated with a fall 
in k. However, this reduction in liquidity is likely to be 
concentrated in the non-traded goods sector, as will be seen below. 
Let us now hold k constant and consider other possibilities. 
With k constant, we are left with the possibility of increasing the 
imported component of the money stock, eG, sufficiently to maintain the 
total quantity of money, F, constant, or with a fall in Y, or some 
combination of the two. Let us first consider the case of a change in 
e, the exchange rate, revaluing existing stocks of G to such an extent 
as to achieve the requisite ratio H= eGo, and eG = bkY. 
A rise in e would tend to raise the price level P via the term Pt, 
since Pt = ePt*, and Pt* is fixed. With output Q unchanged this would 
raise Y, and with bk fixed, eG would have to rise again. However, I 
want here to analyze characteristics of a new equilibrium position, 
with the higher level of b associated with the new monetary system, so 
203 
Chapter IV 
I will assume Y to be unchanged by the revaluation of G. From (4.3) we 
observe that the tendency for P to rise via the rise in Pt may be 
offset by a fall in the prices of non-traded goods, Pnt. Since the 
rise in e raises Pt, a change in relative prices in favour of traded 
goods (a rise in Pt/Pnt) is indicated; if the rise in e is a large one 
the increase in Pt/Pnt would likewise be large. There are of course 
income distribution implications of changes in Pt/Pnt, to which I will 
return. 
I say that a rise in Pt/Pnt is "indicated", when e rises, advisedly: 
the identity eG = bkY shows us that if Q were to fall sufficiently the 
new equilibrium position could be achieved without any change in 
relative prices, with P rising through both Pt and Pnt but Q falling to 
offset the rise in P and maintain Y constant. Put differently, some 
combination of a rise in Pt/Pnt and a fall in Q would be required to 
maintain Y constant and achieve the new ratio eG /Y= bk, as b is 
raised. If a fall in output Q is to be avoided, with Y held constant, 
prices of non-traded goods, Pnt, must fall sufficiently to offset the 
effect on the price index P of the rise in Pt. The implications of a 
rise in Pt/Pnt will be considered further below. 
The revaluation of G would also have the wealth distribution effects 
discussed in detail in Chapter II: net holders of G gain while net 
holders of stocks of H or other domestic currency denominated assets 
(including contracts such as wage contracts, etc. ) lose; "diversifiers" 
gain at the expense of the "single currency strategy" group. If, as is 
probable, expenditure patterns differ between losers and gainers, these 
changes in wealth distribution will alter the structure of demand and 
require a host of adjustments in production structure at the micro 
level. These changes would bring disagreeable shocks to some and open 
up new opportunities to others, frictional unemployment very likely 
rising during an adjustment period. Adjustments within the production 
structure to changes in the micro structure of demand caused by the 
change in wealth distribution would be in addition to the more general 
adjustments necessitated by the rise in Pt/Pnt. However, if we assume 
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our new equilibrium, under the new monetary system, to be independent 
of the adjustment path, these adjustment traumas are not pertinent to 
the present analysis. 
Before going into detail concerning the implications of a rise in 
Pt/Pnt, let us suppose that instead of revaluing existing stocks of G 
(by raising e), the stocks of G are increased via government purchase. 
Assume the exchange rate e to be held fixed, and nominal income Y to be 
held fixed, so that the adjustment to the rise in b is entirely through 
a rise in G. We must, however, also assume that this increase in G is 
not a gift from abroad, but purchased, in this case by the government. 
Can the change in relative prices, with the associated changes in 
income distribution, be avoided by this means? Unfortunately for fixed 
factors in the non-traded goods sector, the answer to this is no, 
except under improbable special circumstances: the fact that G is 
imported means that increments to the stocks of G compete with other 
items in the balance of payments for available foreign exchange. 
Unless these imports of G are entirely at the expense of other traded 
items, the structure of demand is altered by the addition of the demand 
for these imports of G to demand for other traded items; when the 
production possibilities frontier between traded and non-traded goods 
is not a straight line the change in the structure of demand yields a 
change in relative prices Pt/Pnt. I repeat (4.4) for clarification of 
this: 
(4.4) dG = (X-M -S+ K) 
Costs of increasing the imported share of the money supply and 
implications for relative prices Pt/Pnt 
From (4.4) it may be seen that unless the imports of G are entirely at 
the expense of reduced domestic expenditure on other traded items, the 
expenditure on G alters the structure of expenditure in favour of 
traded goods. Historically, increments to the imported component of 
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the money stock have been obtained through imports of capital, as I 
have mentioned in Chapter II; here it can be seen that the required dG 
could be obtained by an increase in K. However, if the increase in G 
is achieved through borrowing abroad, there will be a rise in S in 
subsequent periods. Increasing the stock of G relative to the share of 
the money supply which is produced by domestic financial intermediaries 
constitutes a shift in the composition of expenditure on financial 
services in favour of an imported item; in the course of time the 
change in the composition of expenditure in favour of traded goods must 
make itself felt in the relative price structure, pushing Pt/Pnt up. 
Furthermore, as income grows year by year, increments to the money 
stock will continue to generate a larger demand for imports of G than 
would be the case if a larger share of the money supply were produced 
domestically, by domestic monetary institutions or financial 
intermediaries. This can be seen clearly from (4.8a): 
(4.12) (dG / dY) = bk /e (assuming db = dk = de = 0). 
This change in monetary system in effect constitutes a permanent 
shift away from domestic suppliers of money services in favour of 
foreign suppliers. As in the case of any large shift in expenditure in 
favour of foreign suppliers, the consequence is to push up relative 
prices Pt/Pnt. The stock of money is a large item; the effect of a 
shift to a foreign supplier of a significant share of such a large item 
must have significant impact on relative prices. 
As noted above, the cost would be lower if G is held in interest 
bearing form. In this case, the cost would be reduced to the 
difference between borrowing and lending rates, i. e. the cost of 
importing the financial services concerned, as I have noted in Chapter 
II. 3 
The increase in imported financial services associated with the 
change to a Type II system could still come to a large sum for a poor 
economy; if the economy is already feeling overburdened with balance of 
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payments pressures and external debt these additional pressures could 
be less than welcome. 
These imported financial services are competing for available foreign 
exchange (or loans) with items such as imported capital equipment for 
which the contribution to the real productivity of the country's fixed 
factors may be very much larger. Since these imports of G do tend to 
come from the same hard currency countries as do the imports of capital 
goods, this is certainly a possibility that should be considered 
carefully. Since the change in the structure of the monetary base 
under consideration here is a policy decision, it cannot be assumed 
that the allocation of a share of available foreign exchange in this 
way would be such as to equate the marginal product of available 
resources in alternative uses, as we might want to assume if the 
structure of the monetary base were left to market forces. 
The possibility that the increased imported financial services may be 
using foreign exchange which would be more productively employed in the 
purchase of imported capital equipment from these hard currency areas 
might seem blindingly obvious, especially in countries where hard 
currencies are perceived as very scarce. The recent study by Michael 
Bleaney on "East European Economic Growth and Convertible Currency 
Imports, 1971-86" ` may be construed as providing some confirmation of 
this possibility. I quote Bleaney's abstract: "Constant returns to 
scale Cobb Douglas production functions were estimated in first 
difference form for gross industrial production and the net material 
product of six east European countries and the USSR. The volume of 
imports from the convertible currency area was entered as a factor of 
production along with capital and labour. Output was strongly 
correlated with [these] imports in Poland and Rumania, and weakly 
correlated in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The downward trend to total 
factor productivity growth apparent throughout the area during the 
1970's appears to have been halted since 1980, except in Bulgaria and 
Hungary. " Since technological leadership in capital goods has tended 
since the 19th century to be in the countries whose currencies have 
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been used as reserve currencies °, a positive relationship between the 
volume of imports from these areas and total factor productivity is not 
surprising. 
"Scarcity" of a currency of course means that demand for that 
currency is tending to push up the relative price of that currency to 
such an extent as is deemed intolerable, so that some form of rationing 
is preferred. Referring to the post WWII period of "dollar scarcity", 
for instance, it has been observed that there would have been no 
"dollar scarcity" if only the price of the dollar had been allowed to 
rise sufficiently to clear the market. The notion that a change to a 
Type II monetary system would be absorbing "scarce" hard currencies 
which would be more productively used in the purchase of capital goods 
thus brings us back to the question of the implications of a rise in 
relative prices, Pt/Pnt, which I had said would require further 
examination. 
Relative prices Pt/Pnt and the allocation of the money stock between 
sectors 
The assumption that the use of money enables factor inputs to be more 
efficiently transformed into output, i. e., that real money enters into 
the production function, has implications concerning the effects of 
changes in Pt/Pnt which I believe to be of considerable importance. 
This assumption is commonly used in literature on the role of financial 
development in economic growth, and it is an assumption which I 
consider to be eminently realistic, usefully illuminating many 
historical and current real world experiences. As I indicated earlier, 
it is a formulation which fits neatly with certain very well developed 
lines of argument in the literature on economic and financial history. 
The use of this assumption jointly with the distinction between traded 
and non-traded goods, together with the other (all very ordinary) 
assumptions I have made here, enables us to achieve a theoretical 
explanation for certain real world phenomena which I had for a long 
time found both fascinating and unsatisfactorily elusive at a 
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theoretical level. I have not seen anyone comment on these particular 
implications of this assumption before. 
One of these puzzling historical experiences has been the persistence 
of subsistence farming and other forms of non-market activity in which 
there would seem to be enormous possibilities of gains through 
specialization and exchange, through the use of monetized markets. 
(See, for instance, Munro [1976] and Todaro [1985]. ) Sometimes 
"irrational behaviour" is offered as an explanation for this, or 
perhaps I should say "instead of an explanation"; if this line of 
explanation is ever satisfactory, it certainly does not seem so when 
the actors whose behaviour is being analyzed show very alert 
entrepreneurial response in other ways. The theoretical framework 
provided here offers an explanation in terms of an inadequate supply of 
monetary services occasioned by a high cost of money in terms of non- 
traded goods. 
The many historical instances of imaginative innovation in the 
provision of money substitutes gain in significance when they are 
viewed through this framework of analysis: The view which will emerge 
here is that innovations in the provision of money substitutes are 
motivated by the potential gains attainable through specialization and 
exchange, in circumstances where the existing forms of money were too 
expensive to support the markets in question. This theoretical 
framework thus brings useful lessons with important policy implications 
out of what had been a motley bundle of interesting anecdotes in the 
history of money. 
The assumption that real money enters into the production function 
with a diminishing marginal product, together with the assumption that 
firms equate the marginal cost of holding money balances with the value 
of the marginal product of these balances, implies the following: 
A fall in the relative price of non-traded goods reduces the value of 
the marginal product of money in this sector (vmpnt) relative to that 
in the traded goods sector (vmpt). If we assume the (mcf) cost of 
money to be the same for both sectors, this implies a reallocation of 
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the money stock in favour of the traded goods sector, to the point at 
which the assumed condition of vmpnt = mcf = vmpt is satisfied; the 
real marginal product of money must rise enough to offset the fall in 
the price Pnt (or to match the rise in Pt, if the relative price change 
occurs by that means). Other mobile factor inputs may be assumed to 
follow the same route, as in standard micro analysis. The result is, 
of course, that fixed factors in the non-traded goods sector suffer a 
loss in earnings and in their (average) productivity through these 
reductions in complementary inputs. For standard factor inputs this 
result is familiar from basic micro analysis; in the context of 
analyzing international adjustments the losses in rents to fixed 
factors are also very familiar. 6 What I have not previously seen is 
any discussion of the implications concerning the reduction in the use 
of money balances in the non-traded goods sector. I believe the 
examination of these implications to be quite illuminating. 
The allocation of the money stock between sectors and sectoral 
differences in the efficiency of markets 
In standard micro analysis, the reallocation of mobile factors away 
from a sector leaves the fixed factors having to work harder for less, 
as it were, to satisfy the firms' condition for efficient uses of 
factor inputs. But what about money? The functioning of markets 
depends upon money. Moreover, the efficient functioning of markets 
requires sufficiently large volumes of activity that individual 
transactions will be "small"; this requires ample liquidity. One way 
in which people and firms economize on the use of money balances is to 
withdraw from the use of markets and revert to barter or subsistence 
production. As this occurs the volume of excess demands for goods and 
services which is put on the market shrinks; as the volumes traded 
shrink, the markets become increasingly vulnerable to manipulation and 
other inefficiencies. Also as the volumes traded shrink, the cost of 
providing and maintaining infrastructure supporting these markets 
becomes increasingly difficult to cover; since infrastructure tends to 
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involve large lumpy expenditure (very far indeed from being infinitely 
divisible without loss of efficiency! ), markets do need to be of a 
certain size before it becomes possible to cover these costs. And of 
course when markets are small and inefficient the range of goods and 
services which can be produced or obtained at a lower opportunity cost 
outside the markets is increased. In short, the reduction in the 
relative price of non-traded goods can force reductions in liquidity in 
this sector which can have very important - and very disagreeable - 
implications for the functioning of markets in the non-traded goods 
sector. 
Among the immobile factors in the non-traded goods sector, included 
in the term "R" in the production function for that sector, would be 
any immobile parts of the infrastructure, such as roads or storage 
structures which support distribution services in that sector. 
Sometimes such items serve both sectors, but sometimes the distinction 
is easily made. In many economies the differences in the quality of 
transport and distribution infrastructure between traded and non-traded 
goods sectors is very extreme. In applying the arguments just 
developed to a real historical situation, what one would expect to see 
in association with the sort of trend rise in relative prices Pt/Pnt 
which we have just been analyzing would be a relative deterioration of 
infrastructure in the non-traded goods sector. This could take the 
form of a failure to maintain existing infrastructure, or of a slower 
rate of investment in upgrading the existing infrastructure; flows of 
goods and information which are necessary to the functioning of markets 
become increasingly obstructed as the infrastructure deteriorates. 
The deterioration of infrastructure in declining regions is a 
familiar phenomenon. What we have just seen is that through its 
influence on relative prices Pt/Pnt, the structure of the money supply 
is a factor influencing the quality of infrastructure which can 
profitably maintained in the different sectors. The greater is the 
demand for imported money services, the stronger the upward pressure on 
Pt/Pnt deriving from this source. The influence of this factor would be 
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more visible in economies in which the two sectors are more clearly 
distinguishable, as can occur when exports are concentrated in a few 
items. 
The relatively poor functioning of markets, and weak infrastructure 
support, of non-traded goods sectors in comparison with traded goods 
sectors is of course a very familiar phenomenon in much of the world. 
In particular, it is characteristic of numerous countries which 
formerly used a Type II (currency board) system. The analytical 
framework I have been using here offers a rather simple explanation of 
this pattern which relies on a few very ordinary assumptions and 
principles of microeconomics. The discussion in the previous 
paragraphs added the (uncontroversial) idea of lumpy infra-structure 
costs to previous assumptions. Most of the explanatory work in the 
analysis derives from the assumption that firms hold money balances 
because this enables more efficient use of other factor inputs, 
together with the assumption that the production possibility frontier 
between traded and non-traded goods is not a straight line. The 
explanation offered here has not relied on any reference to social or 
cultural differences. on the other hand, the analysis does show that 
something can be constructively done to improve matters. This is the 
pertinence of those historical anecdotes I mentioned above concerning 
innovative responses to just such liquidity pressures as I have been 
describing. 
It should also be noted that the theoretical explanation of low 
productivity and poor market structure in non-traded goods sectors 
which I have just offered has made no use of the idea of differential 
access to credit. In the analytical framework I have been using, the 
two sectors are assumed to have access to money at the same 
(horizontal) marginal cost, mcf. The weaker monetary support of the 
non-traded goods sectors has occurred in this model through the 
assumption that firms in both sectors adjust money balances to satisfy 
the firms' condition for efficient use of resources, such that vmpnt = 
mcf = vmpt. Money has been assumed to be a perfectly mobile factor, 
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since I have treated the marginal cost function as horizontal. The 
model shows that the tendency to lower productivity and returns to 
fixed factors in the non-traded sector would remain even if credit 
policy of a banking system were altered to give access to money on 
equal terms to firms in all regions. The model therefore remains 
pertinent to analysis of regional differences within economies in which 
branches of large banks offer credit to customers in all regions on the 
same terms (as might be nearly true in the UK perhaps). 
in reality of course differential access to credit between traded and 
non-traded goods sectors has been notorious in much of the world. In 
the context of this framework, we can portray this as differences in 
the cost of money, say mcfn for the non-traded sector and mcft for the 
traded sector, where mcfn > mcft. Then we see that even if Pnt = Pt 
productivity of other factor inputs will be lower in the non-traded 
sector if firms in both sectors satisfy the efficiency condition vmpnt 
mcfn and vmpt = mcft. 
Studies of peasant economic behaviour in China in the inter-war 
period offer an illustrative example of the sort of withdrawal from 
markets which I have just described. (See, for instance, Huang 
[1985]. ) It was found that the middle income groups among the peasants 
continued the subsistence farming and craft practices more persistently 
than either the richer peasants or the poorer groups. In the case of 
grain, middle peasants tended to grow their own, whereas both poor 
peasants and rich peasants tended to purchase grain on the market. The 
explanation for this falls very neatly into the above analysis: money 
was scarce and the grain market thin, weakly supported by transport and 
storage infrastructure. Grain dealers with storage facilities would 
buy grain cheap at harvest time, and sell it at monopolistic prices 
later in the season; poor peasants would be forced into the market by 
debt to sell grain, at harvest when prices were down, and forced into 
the market to buy at monopolistic prices by the inadequacy of their 
land and storage facilities. Rich peasants could buy grain when it was 
cheap and store it. Middle peasants avoided the monopolistic prices by 
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providing for their own needs and staying out of the market. The 
facility which we take so much for granted of being able to buy our 
bread, ready made, a single loaf at a time, rests on an enormously 
costly infrastructure; the gains from specialization and exchange which 
make the cost of such market infrastructure worthwhile rely on the 
services of money. 
The grotesque inefficiencies associated with the collapse of monetary 
functions in hyperinflations are well known; there are many stories of 
individual city dwellers trudging out to the country-side with portable 
items to barter for food during the German hyperinflation of the 
1920's, for instance. But can I really be claiming that the structure 
of the money supply offers an explanation for the sort of situation 
just described? Do we really not need reference to social factors or 
to inadequacy of capital, for instance? Let us use the review the 
analysis offered through this framework with closer consideration of 
the Chinese case just described. 
The peasant region just described used an entirely imported money 
supply, a Type I system, in fact, rather than a Type II system, since 
we have no money creation by banks. Thus we have F= Gp. The money 
supply, Gp, consists mostly of non-interest bearing forms, and comes 
into the region through "exports" to outside areas. 
If we are to explain the inefficiencies of the situation through the 
structure of the money supply, it must be shown that the situation 
could be improved through the creation of some local form of money, 
thereby moving this peasant region from a Type I system to a Type II 
(or III or IV) system. How might this be done? What has money to do 
with the situation? It will be realized that this discussion is 
pertinent to villages and regions in a wide variety of countries, even 
though the country as a whole may be operating a Type II (or III or IV) 
monetary system. 
Consider first the question of capital in this Chinese peasant region 
with the Type I monetary system. First of all, there is capital tied 
up in the very expensive form of money being used. The introduction of 
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a local banker providing convertible paper notes or some other form of 
payments service would release some of this capital from its present 
extravagant use as a medium of exchange. Even a very conservative 
cash/deposit ratio of say 50% would release a substantial sum which 
could be put to productive use. 
However, it cannot be claimed that inadequacy of capital is the cause 
of the problem of grain storage facilities, since the grain consumed in 
the region is in fact being stored locally. But instead of being 
stored centrally, it is being stored in the more costly form of 
numerous private storehouses. (How many UK residents would be able to 
store a full year's supply of grain in their existing accommodation? 
Consider the vast capital investment that would be required if 
residents suddenly had to provide such storage individually! ) Gurley 
and Shaw rightly drew attention to the inefficiency in the use of 
capital which results from investment being dependent upon the 
investor's own resources, as in this illustration from Chinese history. 
The inefficiency of the use of capital in this form of grain storage 
implies scope for improving the functioning of the grain market (and 
making a profit as well), through the provision of inside money. Let 
us see how this may be done. 
We introduce a bank with the right of note issue. The bank issues 
transferable notes which entitle the bearer to purchases of grain at 
any time of year at (or just above) the seasonally low price. It also 
guarantees convertibility between these notes and the imported money at 
a fixed rate of exchange; it might offer a special favourable rate of 
exchange for the payment of taxes or other major obligations to 
peasants who had reasonable sums on deposit. By these means our 
bankers persuade peasants to deposit their cash balances at the bank. 
The investments department of our bank then uses the funds thus 
concentrated to build its own grain store and to buy grain at the cheap 
harvest season prices. This grain will then be sold throughout the 
year to two groups of people, who will pay different prices: those who 
hold our notes will be entitled to the low harvest season price. This 
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privilege gives them a return on the cash they have deposited with us 
without inflicting on us the need to provide a return in the form of 
imported cash we would have to buy. We sell to other buyers at a price 
which undercuts the monopoly price charged by the existing grain 
dealers. We will be able to continue charging a price which is 
something above the price we pay at the harvest because individual 
households will be able to make other uses of the resources formerly 
absorbed by grain storage. 
Middle peasants who formerly found the opportunity cost of relying on 
purchased grain too great will now face a reduced opportunity cost to 
entering the grain market; we would therefore expect from this group 
some increased participation in the market, enticed by gains from 
increased specialization and exchange. The concentration of funds we 
have achieved through the provision of our notes enables us to reduce 
the total cost of grain storage in the region (by centralizing it), 
achieving a more efficient allocation of existing capital resources. 
These gains can offer both profits for our banker and gains to his 
clients. 
The bank I have described is of the investment sort; a market in 
capital, in which investors compete through interest rates for 
available funds, could have been portrayed as achieving similar 
results. The illustration I have used has been adapted from actual 
Chinese historical experience, from one of those cases I mentioned 
earlier of creative financial innovation, in response to the potential 
gains from specialization and exchange. ' In the case of German 
economic development, considerable importance has been attributed to 
the activities of the Raiffeisen co-operative banks; some of the 
activities of these banks were very similar to what I have just 
described: "Such banks became collective purchasers of fertilizer and 
fodder and managers of wholesale warehouses, the centre of the 
village's economic existence. " So wrote Milward and Saul, concerning 
the Raiffeisen banks. 
The efficiency gains which I have just been discussing come into the 
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category of the gains achieved through the use of inside money; there 
has also been a release of capital achieved through the change to a 
cheaper medium of exchange. The peasant region under discussion has 
achieved these gains by developing a local banking system and thereby 
moving from a Type I to a Type II monetary system (on a local basis). 
The efficiency gains attainable through the use of inside money have 
been analyzed by Gurley and Shaw, and have subsequently been made 
familiar through the work of numerous contributors to the literature on 
monetary and financial history. The analytical framework of this 
thesis extends the analysis by enabling us to ask whether these gains 
must necessarily require the development of domestic banks, operating 
in a domestic form of money, or whether the required services can 
equally well be provided by the introduction of foreign banks and 
capital. 
As noted above, one argument in favour of the proposed change to a 
Type II system has been that such a change would facilitate the 
attraction into an impoverished economy of much needed banking services 
and capital. Could the efficiency gains of improved banking services 
be brought to benefit an impoverished non-traded goods sector by this 
means? 
Could the efficiency gains of improved banking services be brought to 
benefit an impoverished non-traded goods sector by introducing a Type 
II monetary system? 
Here the issue under consideration is not a local village or regional 
change from a Type I to a Type II system, but a change at the national 
level from a Type III-Type IV mixed system (or a Type IV system which 
has been debased into a Type III system) to a Type II system. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, the assumption is being made here that this 
change to a Type II system involves an increase in the imported share 
of the money stock for the national economy as a whole. By contrast, 
the development of local banking in our Chinese village had reduced the 
"imported" share in the local village money stock. Here we are looking 
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at the money stock at a national level, and at the effects of an 
increase in the imported component caused by a policy change to a Type 
II system. 
The answer which emerges from the analytical framework developed in 
this thesis is that such a solution is more likely to increase 
discrepancies between the traded and non-traded goods sectors than to 
bring assistance to the latter. This conclusion follows from the 
inclusion of the liquidity term in the production function, together 
with the assumption that the production possibilities frontier between 
traded and non-traded goods is not a straight line, combined with 
standard micro theory of the firm in perfect competition. Let us now 
retrace the steps of the analysis to see how this conclusion emerges. 
We begin by returning to the firm's condition for efficient use of 
factor inputs. The satisfaction of this condition requires that firms 
in both sectors equate the value of the marginal product with the 
marginal cost of each factor input; for money balances this gives us 
vmpnt = mcf = vmpt, as was seen above. For any given money stock and 
state of financial technology, there is thus an equilibrium allocation 
of the available money services between the two sectors which depends 
on relative prices, Pt/Pnt. 
Next we must review the assumed structure of the money supply. Let 
us be optimistic, and assume that the introduction of a Type II system 
enables H to entirely replace Gp and Gb, i. e. we achieve Gp = Gb = 0, 
and that we have achieved the gains attainable by holding G in interest 
bearing forms. The structure of the money supply is as follows: 
(4.13) F= kY = (H / g) 
where H= eGo, and g reflects both the distribution of H between banks 
and public, and the average bank cash/deposit ratio. This gives us the 




(4.14) eGo = gkY 
this being equal to bkY as it was defined in (4.8a), since we have 
assumed Gp = Gb = 0, so that G= Go. 
We can see that if we assume g, k, and e to be fixed, so that de = dg 
dk = 0, then we have: 
(4.15) (dG/dY) = gk /e 
It will be recognized that this is analogous to (4.12), the difference 
being that in the present case Gb and Gp are assumed zero, so that b=g. 
This term is unambiguously positive; it is smaller as g is smaller, and 
it is smaller as k is smaller. It is also smaller as e is larger, for 
the obvious reason that each unit of foreign exchange yields a larger 
contribution to the domestic money supply as the domestic currency 
price of foreign exchange is higher. 
The expression given in (4.15), (dG/dY) = gk / e, shows us in 
algebraic form what I had already explained in the discussion of the 
Type II system in Chapter II. If the structure of bank credit is 
altered to favour the non-traded goods sector, such that growth in real 
output is concentrated in that sector, the consequence will be that 
relative prices in that sector will be pushed down. If the traded 
goods sector is not expanding, and dG = 0, then, as we can see from 
(4.15), prices in the non-traded goods sector would have to fall 
sufficiently that dY = dG = 0. The increase in output in the non- 
traded goods sector generates a demand for increases in the imported 
item, G, without increasing the supply of traded goods; relative prices 
of traded goods are thereby pushed up. Since the exchange rate is 
fixed, Pt can not rise, and Pnt must therefore be pushed down. A bank 
which persisted in such a policy would soon be in difficulties. 
As I mentioned in Chapter II, the much criticized tendency for ex- 
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patriot banks in the former currency board economies to favour the 
traded goods sector in their extension of credit emerges in this model 
as the expected consequence of this structure of the money supply. 
When base money is entirely imported, excessive extension of credit to 
finance productive activities which will not increase the supply of 
foreign exchange would reduce g; a bank which is known to be operating 
on unusually low cash/deposit ratios would lose the confidence of its 
depositors. The maintenance of prudent cash/deposit ratios, together 
with a given allocation of H between banks and public determine g. The 
profitable allocation of credit between the two sectors is thus 
restricted by the structure of the monetary base. 
We can also see from (4.15) that any measures which would enable 
banks to function safely with lower cash/deposit ratios, or which would 
increase the share of H held with banks, would benefit the non-traded 
goods sector, since such measures would reduce (dG/dY). Upward 
pressure on relative prices Pt/Pnt is caused by the demand for an 
increase in the size of the money stock as income rises, unless there 
is commensurate increase in the supply of traded goods. This upward 
pressure on relative prices Pt/Pnt is weaker as (dG/dY) is smaller; a 
given increase in output and income generates a smaller increase in the 
quantity of G required to satisfy the incremental money demand when the 
share of G in the total money supply is smaller. The share of G in the 
total money supply is smaller as g is smaller. 
One of the major factors historically which have enabled the average 
cash/deposit ratio to be reduced, has been the development of the 
lender of last resort role offered by central banks. However, we have 
already seen (in Chapter II) that the true lender of last resort 
function cannot be performed in the Type II monetary system, and that 
the quasi-lender of last resort role which could be performed was very 
expensive to the economy. This was because the true lender of last 
resort function requires the domestic creation of the base money; in 
the Type II system base money is entirely imported. The quasi-lender 
of last resort described in Chapter II involved the holding of large 
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stocks of G by some entity whose role in a liquidity crisis would then 
be to give assistance to other banks out of its own resources, perhaps 
covering some of its expenses by imposing a penalty rate of interest on 
such loans. The Type II system might well be expected to show a 
tendency to a higher g than is usual in successful Type IV systems, as 
a consequence of the problematic nature of the lender of last resort 
function in the Type II system. 
Advocates of the introduction of a Type II system into impoverished 
economies suffering from monetary difficulties have sometimes pointed 
to Hong Kong as a successful user of a currency board system. The 
pointing to Hong Kong has been done with the implication that some of 
Hong Kong's economic success might be attainable by these other 
economies if they were to emulate its monetary system. The analysis 
developed here shows that this implication is not well grounded. The 
relationship between the structure of the money supply and the 
structure of production in the economy between traded and non-traded 
goods sectors has not been recognized by these proponents of the Type 
II system. 
Hong Kong is listed as having exports of goods and nonfactor services 
of 71% GDP in 1965, and of 124% in 1987; for Kenya the figures are 31% 
and 21%, for Sudan 15% and 8%, for Ghana 17% and 20%, for Nigeria 13% 
and 31%; for China 4% and 13%; all figures for the same two years. s 
If we treat these figures as an indication of the relative size of 
traded and non-traded goods sectors, we can see that the non-traded 
goods sector in Hong Kong is extremely small. For Hong Kong, 
therefore, the use of a wholly imported monetary base would not result 
in the sort of disagreeable pressures on the non-traded goods sector 
which we have been examining above. Since nominal income, Y, is 
measured in values, the share of traded goods in nominal income can be 
increased by increasing relative prices Pt/Pnt, as well as by 
increasing the physical share in production. For an economy with a 
large land mass, such a large share of traded goods in actual output as 
is measured for Hong Kong is hardly possible. However, the share of 
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the traded sector in nominal income could be raised by increasing 
Pt/Pnt; it could be raised further by pushing some of the non-traded 
sector activity out of the monetized sector of the economy altogether. 
As we have already seen, reduction in Pnt would tend to push activities 
in this sector out of monetized markets. The use of a wholly imported 
monetary base in economies with large non-traded goods sectors would 
have adverse effects on the functioning of markets in non-traded goods 
sector, which do not appear in the Hong Kong case. 
Among the historical experiences which I mentioned earlier as having 
for a long time puzzled me and eluded satisfactory theoretical 
explanation, has been the persistence of subsistence activity in 
certain regions which have been celebrated for the vitality of their 
entrepreneurial response to market opportunities in export sectors. 
West African regions in which the major export crops were peasant 
produced fall into this category. Supplies of cash crops for export 
were increased very rapidly in response to the international market, 
yet the efficiency gains attainable through a monetized market were 
left so largely un-exploited in non-traded goods sectors. The analysis 
of this section has shown that such under-monetization and weak 
functioning of markets in the non-traded goods sector would be likely 
to occur in an economy as the consequence of restricting the 
composition of the monetary base to a Type II system. 
Only where the geographical peculiarities of the economy permit the 
non-traded goods sector to be extremely small, as in the case of Hong 
Kong, could a Type II system be maintained without putting these 
pressures on the functioning of markets in the non-traded goods sector. 
The introduction of a Type II system in an economy covering a very 
large land mass could easily lead to the "marginalization" of large 
sectors of the population. 
Conclusions 
In this section I have been analyzing the implications of using a 
completely imported monetary base by government decree, as in the Type 
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II, or currency board, monetary system. This case may be contrasted 
with the case in which the composition of the monetary base is 
determined by market forces, and is allowed to change in responses to 
changes in the factors determining (G/F)* which we analyzed in Chapter 
II. In the Type II system we have just been considering, the 
proportion, W, is fixed at W=1, such that H= Go, and is not 
permitted to change in response to banking (or any other) developments 
in the economy. 
Under this system the only ways in which the share of the imported 
money in the total money supply, G/F, can be reduced are by reducing 
the average banks' cash/deposit ratio, or by increasing the share of H 
held by banks as opposed to the public. The consequence is that the 
incremental demand for money associated with income growth yields a 
relatively large incremental demand for the imported money: (dG/dY) _ 
bk / e. 
The inclusion of the liquidity term in the production function, with 
the marginal product of money assumed to be diminishing, results in an 
equilibrium allocation of the existing money stock between the traded 
and non-traded goods sectors. This allocation depends on relative 
prices, Pt/Pnt; in the model used here this allocation is determined by 
the satisfaction of the firm's condition for efficient use of factor 
inputs. Any attempt to expand the extension of credit to the non- 
traded goods sector beyond this point in order to develop production in 
that sector, would result in downward pressure on prices in that sector 
by generating incremental demand for the imported component of the 
money supply, G. 
The implication has been that, unless the non-traded goods sector is 
extremely small, the non-traded goods sector would suffer from the weak 
development of monetized markets and poor infrastructure, with under- 
utilized resources and un-exploited efficiency gains. 
Restrictions imposed by law on the composition of the monetary base 
preclude domestic financial innovation which might otherwise be 
expected to respond to the potential profits attainable where weak 
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development of monetized markets imply under-exploited gains from 
specialization and exchange. 
The introduction of a Type II system in place of a Type III or Type 
IV (or mixed Type III and IV) would therefore be more likely to lead to 
increased discrepancies between the traded and non-traded goods sectors 
than to bring assistance to impoverished regions. The implications of 
introducing a Type II system are particularly disagreeable for 
economies comprising a large land mass and population, in which the 
size of the non-traded goods sector can not easily be reduced without 
"marginalizing" large groups and regions. For the former USSR 
economies, for instance, the income distribution implications of a Type 
II system would surely be socially intolerable. 
3 What are the implications for an economy of a significant rise in the 
required foreign share of the monetary base, i. e., a rise in (G/F)*? 
In Chapter II we have identified various reasons why a rise in (G/F) * 
can occur. I will consider the case in which the cause of a trend rise 
in (G/F)* has been a trend increase in the relative share of currency- 
type EFI at the expense of DFI. In turn, I will assume that the cause 
of the increase in EFI/DFI has been a perceived tendency for over-rapid 
expansion of the domestic component of the monetary base, H, such that 
the risk of exchange losses on H denominated financial assets is 
perceived to have increased. 
I have chosen these assumptions because they are pertinent to the 
notion which has been so fashionable in the post-WWII period that 
economies could make "independent" choices (whether in the long run or 
the short run) in a "trade-off" between rates of inflation and 
unemployment. In particular these assumptions seem to me to be 
pertinent to the UK post WWII experience. 
The analysis developed in chapter II led me to conclude that the 
ordinary notion of countries having monetary policy independence is 
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unrealistic, in that it ignores (G/F)*, and dangerous, because 
persistence in inflationary monetary expansion will tend to push up 
(G/F)*. These conclusions should not be taken as a re-statement of 
the hypothesis that countries have some fixed permanent "natural rate" 
of unemployment. In the analytical framework developed in this thesis, 
an economy which attempts to reduce unemployment by pursuing a policy 
of faster monetary expansion and higher inflation than are being 
pursued elsewhere, will experience a trend rise in (G/F)* which will 
seriously worsen BOTH unemployment and inflation. The worsening of 
unemployment which is portrayed here would certainly include a 
worsening of kinds of phenomena which are normally understood as 
included in the "natural rate" of unemployment. In other words, a rise 
in (G/F)* would tend to raise what is normally referred to as the 
"natural rate" of unemployment, as well as worsening basic inflationary 
trends. 
In Chapter III, exchange risk was included as one of the factors 
determining the relative shares of EFI and DFI. An economy which 
persists in excessive monetary expansion is expected to show a trend 
rise in EFI/DFI, as the share of wealth held by currency "diversifiers" 
increases at the expense of the group which persists in holding only 
domestic currency denominated financial assets. Where the pure 
currency type EFI is not permitted by law, this diversification would 
involve the export of savings, legal or otherwise. Where the domestic 
banking system is permitted to operate in both domestic and foreign 
denominated instruments, we would expect an increase in the currency 
type EFI share in financial intermediation. 
In the UK case, the figures provided by Bryant (which I have included 
in Chapter II) show a striking increase in EFI/DFI over the period 
1963-1983: The ratio of claims on UK residents denominated in foreign 
currencies to claims on UK residents denominated in sterling, for all 
banking offices in the UK, rose from 0.03 in 1963 to 0.71 in 1983. 
This contrasts sharply with the German experience, in which the ratio 
(given for 1975-1983) has been approximately constant, at 0.002. 
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In Chapter II we saw that an increase in the ratio EFI/DFI would tend 
to cause a rise in (G/F)*. Since the EFI/DFI ratio for the UK has 
risen substantially, it seems to me that the case I have chosen to 
analyze here must be pertinent to the UK experience. The disagreeable 
implications of a rise in (G/F)* which will emerge from the analysis 
also seem to me to be pertinent to UK post-WWII experience. However, I 
acknowledge that a fuller consideration of the pertinence to the UK 
case of the ideas developed here would require the exploration of more 
empirical material than I can attempt to offer here. 
Implications of a rise in (G/F)*: under-utilized resources and a 
worsening "balance of payments constraint" on growth 
We can see from (4.8) that a rise in (G/F)* will aggravate what is 
commonly referred to as a "balance of payments constraint" on output 
growth: 
(4.8) eG= b*kY 
where b* has been defined as (G/F)*. 
Since I want to consider the case of an economy which has been allowing 
its currency to depreciate, I will not assume e to be fixed. Instead, 
we can treat eG, the domestic currency value of the imported money 
stock, as a single variable, and observe that: 
(4.16) [d(eG)/dY]=b*k. 
This simple approach is sufficient to bring out the points which I 
wish to make. 
What (4.16) shows very clearly is that a rise in b* increases the 
incremental demand for the foreign component of the money supply 
associated with incremental money demand as income grows. A rise in b* 
constitutes a change in the structure of money demand in favour of 
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foreign suppliers at the expense of domestic suppliers. This is why it 
aggravates a "balance of payments constraint" on growth. In (4.15) we 
see that this incremental demand for the imported money must be met 
either by a rise in e, or by an increase in G, or by some combination 
of the two. 
In the previous section we analyzed a rise in dG/dY caused by a rise 
in b imposed by a policy decision. The same analysis is pertinent 
here. The important difference between the two cases is that in the 
previous case we did not have the emergence of an inflationary spiral 
and repeated exchange rate devaluations, since the exchange rate was 
held fixed. Here such a spiral could emerge, in the following manner: 
The rise in b* requires a rise in eG or a fall in kY, or some 
combination of the two. Assume k constant. We then have the position 
discussed in the previous section, of the rise in b* requiring some 
combination of a rise in eG or a fall in Y or both. Since e is being 
allowed to rise, we could observe a repeated sequence: The increase in 
demand for the imported money causes excess demand for foreign exchange 
which is allowed to result in a rise in e. This pushes up the prices 
of traded items, Pt, increasing the cost of imported inputs and eroding 
the real value of wages, and generally putting upward pressure on the 
price level through all the familiar mechanisms. We saw in the 
previous section that for an economy to reach a new equilibrium, in the 
sense of a fixed price level and without loss in real output, it was 
necessary for the relative price of non-traded goods to fall. This 
fall in the relative price of non-traded goods entails a relative loss 
in income for fixed factors in the non-traded goods sector. If these 
losses are resisted by labour in this sector, unemployment and a fall 
in output would result; if these losses are resisted by the persistent 
extension of credit, such that rises in Pnt tend to follow rises in e 
and Pt, and nominal income rises, then the demand for (eG) rises also, 
and another devaluation would be required. 
Each successive devaluation would tend to push b* up further, as the 
currency "diversifier" group is increased, as described in Chapter II. 
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With each rise in b*, the deterioration in the relative incomes of 
fixed factors in the non-traded goods sectors which would characterize 
a new equilibrium is worsened. Pressures to continue expanding credit 
in an effort to alleviate the situation would therefore tend to 
intensify. A most unpleasant combination of intractable, and 
worsening, unemployment and inflation can be the result. 
In the theoretical framework developed here, the only way out of this 
unpleasant position is to halt, and reverse, the rise in b*. The means 
by which this can be done were discussed in Chapter II. 
Conclusions 
The implications of a rise in (G/F) * are very disagreeable. A new 
equilibrium position with a stable price level and full employment 
would require a rise in relative prices Pt/Pnt, and a deterioration in 
the relative incomes of fixed factors in the non-traded goods sector. 
A rise in b* alters the equilibrium allocation of the money stock 
between the two sectors in favour of the traded goods sectors. 
Liquidity pressures in the non-traded goods sector would reduce the 
productivity of other factor inputs in that sector. If wages were not 
allowed to fall, unemployment would rise. Inflationary pressures to 
extend credit in an attempt to alleviate the situation could be 
difficult to resist, and could result in a worsening spiral. 
The notion that an economy can pursue an "independent" policy in 
choosing its own preferred "trade-off" between inflation and 
unemployment appears through the perspectives offered by this 
analytical framework to be dangerously mistaken. In a short-term 
crisis, the suspension of convertibility of a currency, on a strictly 
temporary basis, has an eminently useful role in defending an economy 
from destructive effects of shocks. In Chapter III, we saw that it is 
a necessary adjunct to the performance of the lender of last resort 
function in a crisis, since the extension of domestic credit required 
in the performance of this function would alter relative supplies of 
the two components of the money stock. However, the suspension of 
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convertibility on a strictly temporary basis does not create the 
incentives for the expansion of the currency "diversifier" strategy 
which are created by persistence in an inflationary monetary policy. 
The recent UK decision to join the European economies in a regime of 
(approximately) fixed exchange rates, instead of continuing in a higher 
inflation rate policy, appears through this analysis to be a sound 
decision, since it may serve to halt the rise in EFI/DFI and hence in 
(G/F)*. A reduction in (G/F)* should also be actively sought, by the 
various means identified in this thesis. 
4 What are the implications for an economy of a fall in the traded 
share of national output unaccompanied by a fall in (G/F)*? 
The implications for an economy in which the traded share of national 
output is reduced by such means as are unaccompanied by a fall in 
(G/F)* are exceedingly disagreeable. In the terminology I have been 
using here, this would involve holding the actual ratio, (G/F), 
persistently under the required ratio, (G/F)*, as we shall see. The 
theoretical framework of this thesis yields the expectation that such 
an economy would experience increasingly intractable problems of 
currency softening and inflation, together with increasingly severe 
unemployment and deterioration of infrastructure. I will first explain 
how an economy can get into such a position, and then review the 
analysis which leads to the prediction of such disagreeable 
consequences. This is the case which I believe to be pertinent to the 
experience of many countries which have been pursuing import 
substitution industrialization policies associated with substantial 
restrictions on trade and capital flows, and to post-WWII Argentine 
experience in particular. 
How can the traded share in output fall without inducing a fall in 
(G/F) *? 
The relative size of the traded goods sector appeared in the analysis 
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developed in both Chapter II and Chapter III. In Chapter III, 
following McKinnon [1963], it was argued that domestic currency 
denominated financial instruments can serve more satisfactorily as a 
store of value when the non-traded goods sector of the economy is 
relatively large. An increase in the relative size of the non-traded 
goods sector was therefore treated as tending to reduce EFI/DFI. In 
Chapter II we saw that a reduction in EFI/DFI would tend to reduce 
(G/F)*. The share of imports in income also entered into the 
determination of (G/F)* in Chapter II separately, as one of the factors 
determining reserve adequacy more directly. We therefore have two 
lines of argument which tell us that a reduction in the traded share in 
output would tend to reduce (G/F)*. 
There are, however, other factors influencing (G/F)*. We have just 
seen, in addressing the previous question, that an increase in the 
perceived risk of exchange losses would tend to increase (G/F)*. The 
pursuit of a policy of exchange controls which persistently tends to 
maintain an artificially low price of foreign exchange would generate 
such expectations. The tendency for wealth holders in such economies 
to export their savings, often by secret means, is well known. This 
leads to a rise in the share of EFI in the geographical sense as well 
as in the currency sense. In Chapter II we saw that a rise in 
geographical EFI also contributes to raising (G/F)*. 
Trade restrictions also have implications for (G/F)*. The monetary 
implications of these have not been adequately recognized. Consider 
how this may occur: 
An economy considers itself to be facing a balance of payments 
constraint on growth, and pursues a policy of selective trade 
restrictions designed to concentrate available foreign exchange 
earnings on purchases of the most productive items. Severe 
restrictions or high tariffs are placed on imports of "luxury" and 
"unnecessary" consumption goods, so that available foreign exchange may 
be concentrated on imports of essential raw materials and capital 
goods. When an economy is suffering from unpleasant problems of under- 
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utilization of domestic labour for lack of complementary imported 
inputs, such a carefully devised policy of selective trade restrictions 
may seem eminently sensible. Historically, moreover, there have been 
numerous successful cases of fostering domestic industry through such 
trade restriction: England in the "Mercantilist" era, Germany and the 
USA in the 19th century, and so on. The inefficiencies of trade 
restrictions are well known, and do not concern me here. What are the 
monetary implications? 
The monetary implications are that the domestic currency ceases to be 
as useful, especially to those large wealth holders whose financial 
portfolios dominate the financial structure of the economy in a 
quantitative sense. The restricted "luxury and unnecessary" items 
figure more largely in the expenditure patterns of the wealthy. Prior 
to the imposition of restrictions, these items were supplied in bulk to 
the economy by importers, and could then be purchased locally. If they 
become unavailable locally, individuals have to acquire them through 
the much more costly means of private shopping trips abroad. If they 
are available locally, but at an artificially high price, the real 
value of the local money to consumers of these items is reduced. Any 
overvaluation of the domestic currency is thereby made more severe for 
these groups. 
Trade restrictions thus aggravate real overvaluation of the currency 
for the wealthy in particular, and create incentives for these groups 
to maintain foreign balances and make shopping trips abroad. What good 
is a currency if you can't buy anything much you want with it? Trade 
restrictions reduce the range and inflate the prices of the items 
available in the country in which the currency of the economy in 
question is legal tender, reducing the real value and usefulness of the 
currency. The wealthier residents of Buenos Aires are very much in the 
habit of making shopping trips abroad, as well as holding foreign 
balances. 
It is my opinion, therefore, that trade restrictions have combined 
with exchange and capital controls in tending to keep (G/F)* from 
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falling while the traded share in income has been reduced through the 
pursuit of these import substitution industrialization policies. 
Implications of expanding the non-traded output share with (G/F)* fixed 
I will now review the steps in the analysis which I said above would 
yield such exceedingly unpleasant implications for this economy. 
We begin by assuming that the economy in question had been, in a 
previous period, in a position of a stable price level and full 
employment equilibrium, in which the allocation of the existing money 
stock between the traded and non-traded goods sectors satisfied the 
firm's condition for efficient use of factor inputs, such that vmpnt = 
mcf = vmpt. 
We also assume that in this period the actual composition of the 
money stock, (G/F), was equal to the required ratio, (G/F)*. 
In the balance of payments, the current account surplus covers net 
debt service and net imports of G; net capital imports, K are assumed 
zero: 
(4.17) X-M = dG +S 
In this initial period, it is assumed that there are no restrictions 
on trade and capital flows. We have free trade, a competitive economy, 
and no restrictions on financial innovation. The exchange rate is 
fixed at e. 
In order to provide a reason for such a drastic policy change as I am 
analyzing, I assume that the economy now suffers a very major shock 
from abroad: export values, X, plummet relative to import values, M, 
such that the trade surplus (X-M) is now too low to cover S, and (still 
assuming K= 0) the deficit must be covered by exports of gold and 
foreign exchange, such that dG < 0. For the sake of simplicity, assume 
that the fall in export values relative to import values is entirely 
due to price changes (i. e. assume no quantity changes), but that the 
change is due to a combination of rising import prices and falling 
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export prices, such that the composite price index for the foreign 
currency prices of traded goods, Pt*, is not changed. This external 
shock therefore does not, at the outset, alter domestic relative prices 
Pt/Pnt, nor the domestic price level P. 
If we add to these assumptions, the assumption that the external 
shock is associated with (and partly caused by) a change in the climate 
of trade policy abroad, away from free trade and towards a 
multiplication of trade restrictions, we have what I consider to be a 
plausible reason for the sort of major policy shift I want to analyze. 
our economy now confronts the familiar dilemma in the face of an 
adverse external shock: Does it maintain convertibility at a fixed 
exchange rate, and allow the gold and foreign exchange to be exported, 
and the money stock to fall? Or does it suspend convertibility and 
attempt to maintain income by expanding domestic credit as may be 
required by the crisis? We can use (4.8) to examine these options: 
(4.8) eG = b*kY 
If we maintain convertibility at the fixed exchange rate, e, and let 
G fall, we face a liquidity crisis which will bring income and output 
down. Since Pt* and e have been assumed unchanged, Pt can not change; 
as seen in previous sections, the only way output could be maintained 
would be by a fall in Pnt so great as to offset the fall in G and bring 
Y down to match the fall in G without altering Q. This would alter the 
allocation of the money stock between the two sectors, and would also 
alter the structure of production in favour of traded goods T, as 
follows: The firm's condition for efficient use of factor inputs gives 
us vmpnt = mcf = vmpt; since Pt/Pnt has risen, the reallocation of 
mobile factor inputs in favour of the traded goods sector yields an 
increase in output in that sector and a fall in output in the non- 
traded goods sector, as in standard micro analysis. Returns to fixed 




These possibilities exist algebraically, and the algebraic analysis 
serves to identify clearly the direction of major pressures. In 
reality, such adjustments are difficult and immensely costly, and a 
major liquidity crisis such as would be involved if the fall in G were 
large would involve discontinuous losses. None of these adjustment 
costs appear in the analytical framework I have been using; hence the 
algebraic appearance of these unrealistic possibilities. However, in 
identifying the direction of pressures, the simple formulation used 
here is sufficient for my purpose. 
The implication of major losses in rents to fixed factors in the non- 
traded goods sector shows us that political pressures towards a 
different policy would be expected from this sector. This gives us a 
further explanation for the major policy shift we are examining. 
The economy pursues a policy of developing its non-traded goods sector, 
in an attempt to become more independent from external shocks 
The policy approach I wish to analyze is the following: the official 
exchange rate eo is held fixed, but convertibility and the free export 
of G are suspended. Available foreign exchange is allocated according 
to official priorities, and trade restrictions (of the type discussed 
above) are introduced. Domestic credit is expanded, and directed 
through various policy devices towards developing production of non- 
traded items. By these and other policy measures, the size of the non- 
traded goods sector is increased relative to that of the traded goods 
sector. We can make use of (4.8) and (4.8a) to analyze the 
implications: 
(4.8) eG = b*kY 
(4.8a) eG = bkY 
We have already seen (in the section on the introduction of a Type II 
system) that the expansion of the non-traded share in output would 
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imply a fall in prices Pnt if e, b, and k are held fixed. Here we are 
assuming that b* is fixed, but that the actual ratio b is allowed to 
fall. The official exchange rate eo is held fixed. Domestic credit 
components of the money supply are expanded to maintain a constant k as 
income Y grows; over time, the discrepancy between the actual ratio b 
and the required ratio b* is allowed to increase. We may refer to this 
as a rise in the ratio b*/b. 
The policy of manipulation of relative prices allows the non-traded 
goods sector to expand while satisfying the firm's condition for 
efficient use of factor inputs with respect to money: vmpnt = mcf = 
vmpt. For simplicity I am not portraying any sectoral difference in 
credit cost, since it is not necessary to the conclusions. I do 
recognize that in historical cases such policies have often been used. 
The position of this economy becomes increasingly untenable as b*/b 
rises. The structure of production which has been developed on the 
basis of a policy manipulation of relative prices Pt/Pnt, could not be 
maintained if relative prices and the allocation of the money stock 
were allowed to alter to satisfy b* as in (4.8), for the following 
reason: Let us denominate the relative prices which would satisfy b* in 
(4.8), as (Pt/Pnt)*. Since b* > b, we know that (Pt/Pnt) * must be 
greater than the actual relative prices, Pt/Pnt. The larger the ratio 
(b*/b), the greater the difference between (Pt/Pnt)* and Pt/Pnt. What 
would happen if we abolished all market distortions and allowed the 
economy to reach equilibrium relative prices (Pt/Pnt)*? The 
satisfaction of the firm's condition for efficient use of factor 
inputs, vmpnt = mcf = vmpt, would involve a reallocation of the money 
stock. If (b*/b) is very large, such a reallocation would reduce 
liquidity in the non-traded goods sector so severely as could cripple 
production in that sector utterly. Since the expansion of that sector 
over time must have involved investment in considerable fixed capital 
and infrastructure, as well as involving large sectors of the 
population, such a policy could scarcely be pursued by any government. 
As b*/b rises, the official exchange rate becomes increasingly 
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divorced from the actual prices people are willing to pay for foreign 
exchange. Some pressures may be relieved by permitting a black market 
to operate, but eventually there must come a crash; the greater the 
rise in b*/b, the worse the crash, in the sense of a larger jump in e. 
Temporarily, the rise in e will bring the actual ratio, b, nearer to 
the required ratio, b*, because of revaluation of stocks. However, the 
reduction in b*/b must be at the expense of a crippling liquidity 
crisis, since it has involved a reduction in the real money stock. 
Liquidity pressures, and all of that combination of pressures which has 
already been described, would require sufficient expansion of domestic 
credit, reducing b, to prevent liquidity pressures from crippling the 
production structure. Over time, therefore, b*/b would tend to rise 
again, leading to a repeated cycle. 
Each devaluation would tend to increase the share of "currency 
diversifiers" in total financial activity; b* would therefore tend to 
be rising over time, aggravating the situation. 
The pursuit of this policy of reducing the share of traded goods in 
output through such means as do not reduce (G/F)* would therefore tend 
to involve a step-wise pattern of exchange rate movements, in which 
periods of fixed exchange rates are followed by sudden sharp rises in 
the exchange rate. During the periods of fixed exchange rates, (b*/b) 
would be rising, and Pt/Pnt would tend to be falling, as the exchange 
rate is becoming increasingly overvalued. During these periods the 
economy is making fuller use of its productive capacity, since 
liquidity pressures are being eased. 
The only way this economy can make full use of its productive 
capacity is to raise (b*/b), since, as we have seen, restricting b to 
match b* would cripple production with liquidity pressures. 
Analytically, we can identify the existence of some particular ratio 
(b*/b)*, which we may define as that ratio (b*/b) which is necessary in 
order to bring existing productive capacity into approximately full 
utilization. This is the ratio of (G/F) * to the actual ratio (G/F) 
which would result if domestic components of the money supply were 
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expanded sufficiently to achieve approximately full use of productive 
capacity in both sectors. 
I say "approximately", in recognition of the fact that expansion of 
credit to this extent to the non-traded goods sector, in reducing 
relative prices Pt/Pnt, is likely to lead to some reduction of 
utilization of capacity in the traded goods sector in response to the 
adverse movement in relative prices. "Full utilization of capacity" 
can have no very precise meaning when relative prices are alternating 
in the manner just described. At any given moment, one sector or the 
other may be claiming that relative prices are out of line and causing 
under-utilization of capacity. The concept (b*/b)* is therefore 
necessarily a vague one; nevertheless, I consider it useful. 
The severity of pressures arising when the structure of productive 
capacity has become incompatible with (G/F) * (i. e. when (b*/b) * has 
become very high) 
Pressures arising from (G/F)* being incompatible with full use of 
productive capacity yield intractable inflationary pressures, which can 
only be kept at bay by allowing intolerable under-utilization of 
domestic labour and other immobile factors. These pressures are of the 
same sort as were described in the previous section, when the case of a 
rise in (G/F)* was analyzed. In this case they can be much more 
extreme, if manipulation of domestic prices has continued over a long 
period such that the ratio (b*/b) which enables the productive capacity 
of the economy to be tolerably well utilized has become very high. 
We can use (4.16) to see that the reduction of the traded share in 
output can cause incremental money demand to put immense pressure on 
the balance of payments: 
(4.16) [d(eG)/dY] = b*k 
From (4.16), we can see that the ratio of incremental demand for 
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(4.17) dG/eX = b*kdY/xY, where x= eX/Y. 
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The smaller is the ratio eX/Y, the larger the share of export 
earnings which would have to be used to meet the incremental demand for 
the imported money stock, as income rises. If eX/Y has been allowed to 
fall substantially, without reducing b*k, it may be quite impossible to 
meet demands for such imported inputs as are necessary to keep 
productive capacity in operation, and simultaneously to meet the 
requirements of incremental money demand. 
Cycles 
It may be noticed that immediately following a devaluation would be a 
very good time to bring funds into this economy: the price ratio Pt/Pnt 
has risen to something nearer (Pt/Pnt)*, and can be expected to fall as 
credit is expanded to bring sectors suffering from liquidity 
difficulties back into fuller production. Prices Pnt will therefore be 
rising faster than prices Pt; if the funds can be brought out again 
before the next devaluation, a profitable opportunity might arise. 
Response to this opportunity would tend to accelerate the reduction of 
Pt/Pnt, by attracting funds into the sector with the fastest rising 
prices. 
In the case of Argentina, Guido di Tella [1983] has argued that post- 
WWII experience has been characterized by a cyclical movements of funds 
of this nature; he shows that this cyclical movement of funds has been 
associated with a repeated sequence of falling relative prices Pt/Pnt, 
increasing over-valuation of the currency, which then leads to a crash 
in which there is a sudden rise in the exchange rate and in these 





This analysis has provided some new perspectives on some of the post- 
WWII problems of economies which have been pursuing import-substitution 
industrialization policies involving substantial restrictions on trade 
and capital flows. We have seen that such policies can involve an 
expansion of the non-traded share in output, unaccompanied by a fall in 
(G/F)*, and that this combination implies some very unpleasant and 
intractable problems. 
I believe that this analysis is pertinent to many economies, and 
particularly to the Argentine case. It offers an explanation for what 
has been a striking puzzle about the Argentine case: Argentina 
experienced a long period of exceptional price level stability, over a 
50 year period, prior to WWII. In the post-WWII period, the 
accelerating deterioration of the currency has been no less than 
spectacular. The deterioration is often explained in terms of policy 
errors, but this is hardly satisfactory: What then explains the 
distribution of policy errors over the last 100 years? The above 
analysis provides what I believe to be a far more satisfactory line of 
explanation. 
The analysis developed in Chapter III offers a way forward even in 
such intractable cases: the way forward is to reduce (G/F) * by the 
means which were analyzed in that section. The intolerable "trade-off" 
between hyper-inflation and gross under-utilization or impoverishment 
of domestic resources which has been the experience of these economies 
should not be treated as a lamentable but unalterable fact of life. 
The analysis of this thesis has shown that such situations can be more 
constructively approached by the pursuit of policies which will reduce 
(G/F)*. 
5 Empirical note on relative prices, pt, p, 
As will have been observed, the theory developed in this section of the 
thesis yields an approach to explaining cross-country differences in 
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the relative price ratios Pt/Pnt. This approach to explaining cross 
country differences in relative prices is quite different from that 
which was used by Kravis, Heston, and Summers in their study 
"International comparisons of real product and purchasing power. "° 
Both approaches can be used to explain the observed tendency for 
relative prices Pt/Pnt to be considerably higher in poor (LDC) 
countries than in the developed countries (DCs). However, in 
explaining time trends in the movements of these relative prices, the 
two theories would tend to yield different predictions, so that 
through the examination of time trends they may be distinguished. In 
the next chapter time series data on relative prices in Argentina are 
offered for this purpose. 
The implication of the theory developed here is that the relative 
prices of non-traded goods will be lower in countries for which (G/F)* 
is high, and particularly where the incremental demand for imported 
money as income grows, (G/F)*kdY, or, using b* as above, (b*kdY), is 
large relative to export earnings. In countries where the ratio of 
export earnings to total income (X/Y) has been falling, but (G/F)* has 
not been falling, incremental demand for imported money, (b*kdY), will 
be rising relative to export earnings, with the implication (as we have 
seen) that the relative prices of non-traded goods would be under 
downward pressure. Some downward trend in these prices would be 
expected to appear over time, despite the fluctuations discussed above. 
This trend does indeed appear in the data given for Argentina. 
That these arguments give us a means of explaining the international 
pattern that prices of nontraded goods tend to be relatively low in 
LDCs may be seen as follows. In section II certain features of 
currency area structure were identified which would tend to give rise 
to a predominance of EFI over DFI; we saw that these features are 
characteristic of many impoverished LDCs, and also that Goldsmith's 
study of cross country differences in financial structure identifies a 
relative weakness in the development of (geographical) DFI savings 
instruments as characteristic of LDCs. In Chapter II we saw that the 
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relative predominance of EFI over DFI (currency type), and the 
development of the domestic financial structure, were major factors in 
the determination of (G/F)*. This leads to the view that (G/F) * would 
tend to be relatively high in LDC economies. The arguments developed 
in Chapter IV bring us to the conclusion that the relatively low 
prices for non-traded goods in LDCs are caused by the weakness in 
domestic financial development in general, and of currency type DFI in 
particular. 
The arguments developed in this thesis also show that there are 
policy measures which can be undertaken to bring down (G/F)*, to 
improve the monetization and productivity of the non-traded sector, and 
reduce the burdensome cost to the economy of maintaining its money 
stock. The policy conclusion of this line of explanation has been that 
in these economies the central bank of issue must take an active and 
major role in developing a productive and profitable DFI asset 
portfolio. To repeat the advice given by Sayers, mentioned above, 
these central banks must develop their business actively as banks. 
A brief version of the explanation for these cross country 
differences in relative prices which is given in the Kravis, Heston, 
and summers study follows. It will be observed that their explanation 
does not give rise to policy conclusions of the sort derived here. 
"... The relationships outlined above [i. e. the relatively low prices of 
non-traded goods in poorer countries] may be explained in terms of the 
productivity differential model described in chapter 1... Briefly, the 
argument runs as follows: (1) International competition makes the 
prices of traded goods equal in all countries. (2) Wages in each 
country's traded goods industries will depend upon the productivity of 
its labour in those industries. (3) Wages in each country's traded 
goods industries will prevail in its non-traded goods industries as 
well. (4) Productivity differentials are smaller in nontraded goods 
industries than in traded goods industries. (5) It follows that 
nontraded goods, of which services are a major component, will be 
relatively cheap in low income countries. That is, low wages of low- 
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income countries, established by their low productivity in traded goods 
production, extend to the nontraded goods industries in which 
relatively better productivity produces low prices. " 
The Kravis, Heston, and Summers explanation would be suited to a 
"stages of growth and development" type of approach to explaining 
cross-country differences, in which countries are seen as progressing 
at different times through a similar sequential series of stages of 
growth and development. I am not an adherent of this approach. In 
this thesis various characteristics of the currency area structure of 
the international economy have instead been stressed in explaining 
observed patterns in cross country differences. 
The policy implication of the Kravis, Heston, and Summers 
explanation, as concerns alleviating the poverty of these countries, 
would seem to be that technology and capital need to be applied to the 
traded goods sectors of these economies. As is well known, the 
popularity of such a view has declined in recent years as the results 
of policy initiatives in such directions have been extremely 
disappointing. The analysis developed here has shown that the 
structure of the money supply will influence the allocation of other 
resources between the traded and nontraded goods sectors in ways which 
would tend to cause such influxes of foreign capital to aggravate the 
relative poverty and low productivity of the nontraded goods sectors. 
In fact many observers have described just such trends among the 
disappointing results of the great development drives which had been 
based on the view that the solutions to poverty lay in the introduction 
of foreign capital and technology. 
According to the analysis developed in this thesis, policy 
initiatives of the type identified here should give more satisfactory 
results in addressing these problems of low productivity and 
impoverishment. Policy initiatives of this type also have the virtue 
of being much more attainable, since they do not require the 
introduction of unattainable quantities of capital, but are instead 
directed towards bringing into productive use underutilized domestic 
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resources. The arguments developed above have shown that a central 
bank would not require unavailable capital to undertake such a role as 
suggested here. As a case in point, we can consider the example of the 
Argentine Banco de la Nacion, whose role in the development of DFI was 
mentioned above; the original "capital" of the Banco de la Nacion 
consisted in nothing more substantial than a paper note issue. This 
course was taken because the shares in the bank which were offered for 
sale to the public were not taken up. Neither the exhaustion of 
foreign sources of capital, nor any lack of domestic capital 
constitutes any obstacle to the implementation of the policy 
conclusions derived here. 
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to the case of Argentina 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter statistical material is presented which has been 
gathered for the purpose of applying the theory developed in this 
thesis to the case of Argentina. The theory developed in Chapter III 
concerning the use of EFI will be addressed first. 
Chapter II identified certain structural features of a currency area 
which would cause residents to tend to use EFI. The three features 
identified were the following: 
(1) Earnings of foreign exchange are concentrated on the export of a 
single item or of a very few items. These earnings are subject to 
fluctuations which are beyond the control of exporters. 
(2) The major real assets in the wealth portfolios of large 
wealthholders are in the export sector. This feature derives from the 
distribution of wealth and income in the economy, and not solely from 
the share of exports in national income. 
(3) The currency area features a tax structure which relies heavily on 
customs duties. 
We saw in Chapter II that these three features jointly could also lead 
to the practice of what was called in that context the "asymmetric" 
exchange rate policy. 
Argentina is an economy which has made substantial use of EFI, in one 
form or another, throughout its history. Prior to the introduction of 
the emergency measures taken in response to the 1929-30 crisis, the 
financial sector in Argentina was free to develop in accordance with 
market influences, to a perhaps exceptional degree, indeed, if 
comparison is made with other countries. (See, for instance, Diaz 
Alejandro [1970]. ) The only noteworthy restriction was that the export 
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of gold was prohibited with the outbreak of WWI, in August 1914, when 
convertibility of the domestic paper currency was also suspended, not 
to be restored until 1927. Since the financial structure had been 
allowed to develop entirely freely during this early period, but has 
subsequently been subject to a long history of restrictions and 
distortions, the influence on the currency composition of the financial 
structure of the non-policy factors I wanted to analyze shows through 
much more clearly in the early period. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, this early period was one of price and exchange rate stability, 
in sharp contrast with recent times. For these reasons the statistical 
material on the currency composition of the Argentine financial 
structure which is offered here covers the period 1900-1931, instead of 
a more recent period. 
The statistical material offered here on the relative shares of EFI 
and DFI covers the pure currency type of EFI only. Since financial 
transactions were free during this early period, there was not the 
strength of motivation to hold secret money balances abroad which has 
been so important in the post-WWII period. Gold denominated bank 
accounts could be held reliably and freely in Buenos Aires, so money 
balances held abroad were presumably not on the same sort of scale as 
in more recent times. 
The data also only covers the banking system, together with the 
biggest of the mortgage banks (the Banco Hipotecario Nacional), so that 
the important question of the extent of EFI in non-monetary financial 
instruments is largely unaddressed. The use among domestic resident 
savers of geographical EFI for non-monetary forms of financial 
instruments, such as holding stocks and bonds purchased through the 
great London financial markets, may or may not have occurred on a 
substantial scale. One hint in this matter which I have been able to 
unearth is the fact that the great cattle breeders and fatteners who 
had such immense wealth at this time were not the savers who held the 
savings accounts at the Banco de la Nacion, although they did account 
for the largest single share of Banco de la Nacion lending. The 
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savings balances at the Banco de la Nacion were instead balances built 
up primarily by people of very modest means, including labourers and 
domestic servants. ' This implies that people of large means were using 
some other forms of savings instruments. Government debt denominated 
in gold as well as in paper was issued locally as well as in London, 
and was traded on the Buenos Aires stock exchange, as were the mortgage 
bonds issued by the various mortgage banks, the Banco Hipotecario 
Nacional in particular. The holding of private gold hoards had been 
standard practice among the wealthy in earlier times, and gold was also 
traded on the Buenos Aires exchange; however, this practice faded out 
to a great extent after the Conversion Office began buying gold at a 
fixed rate of exchange (for domestic paper notes) in 1899. Banks which 
dealt in sterling bills of exchange, in the course of handling the 
finance of the wheat harvest and export for instance, apparently met 
some of the local demand among wealthy savers for foreign denominated 
non-monetary financial instruments, by selling these sterling bills of 
exchange on to local buyers. By this means local savings were held in 
the form of sterling bills of exchange, while the bank was extending 
loans on the basis of the funds thus raised to finance the harvest. ' 
Solving the statistical problem of identifying the currency 
denomination and form of the financial instruments in which the great 
wealth holders of this period held their financial wealth is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
During this period (1900-1930), Argentina had all three of the 
structural features identified in Chapter II as giving rise to the 
covariance reasons for making use of EFI. As we shall see, the share 
of the top three items in export earnings was above 50%, as was the 
share of customs revenues in total government tax revenues; the ratio 
of exports to total income was 30% in 1901, remained above 25% in a 
majority of the years prior to 1930, and did not fall below 22% until 
1934. The wealth distribution in the economy was such that the major 
wealth holders were the great landowners of the export sector, together 
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with the beef fatteners and the commercial interests serving the 
foreign trade sector. (See, for instance, Diaz Alejandro [1970]. ) 
Feature (2) was thus strongly present during this period, i. e. the 
great concentrations of wealth were in the hands of those whose major 
real assets were in the export sector. Moreover, these export sector 
interests had sufficient political power during this period to 
influence exchange rate policy in the manner which was described in 
Chapter III: The exchange rate was fixed in 1899, and again in 1927, 
during times when the paper peso was appreciating, while shocks which 
would have occasioned substantial losses of gold had the exchange rate 
remained fixed (as in 1914 and 1929) were met instead by the suspension 
of convertibility. The same "asymmetric" form of exchange rate policy 
(allowing the peso to depreciate, but intervening to halt appreciation) 
had characterized earlier 19th century practice. The discussions 
surrounding the 1899 decision and the choice of the exchange rate make 
the interests of the various groups very clear. The interests of this 
export sector concerning exchange rate movements have been discussed 
and analyzed at great length in the literature on Argentine economic 
history and adjustment to exchange rate changes. ' 
2 Structural Features 
Table V. 1 gives data on some of these features. None of these features 
shows any very great change prior to 1930, as may be seen, although the 
export ratio does fall slightly. On the other hand, from 1932 onwards, 
significant reductions begin to appear in both the export ratio and the 
share of government revenue derived from customs revenues. The export 
concentration figure of 57% (contribution of top three items to total 
export earnings) for 1965, given on Table 111.2, in Chapter III, is 
directly comparable with the figures given here for 1900-1913, but is 
not comparable with the figures given for intervening years because the 
categories are different. The export concentration feature thus shows 
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little change between 1900-1913 and 1965, although it does fall 
somewhat. 
It will be recalled from Chapter III that the government of an 
economy in which EFI is important will have a substantial share of its 
debt held abroad. Data for the ratio of net external debt service to 
total export earnings is given in Table V. 1, in three columns: The 
column (Sg/X) gives the figure for government external debt service 
only, (Sp/X) is the figure for the private sector, and (S/X) is the 
total. The jump in these figures between 1929 and 1930 is of course 
due to the fall in export values (in export prices) with the onset of 
the international crisis. It is clear from the magnitude of the 
government payments that any substantial rise in the price of foreign 
exchange would put severe pressure on the government budget; in Chapter 
III a specific example of this was given. The government budget was 
thus subject to pressures from two directions during times when export 
earnings were low, if the fall in export earnings brought with it a 
rise in the exchange rate: a loss in customs revenues (and in other 
revenues dependent upon current expenditure and income) would be 
accompanied by a rise in the domestic currency cost of its external 
debt service. ' The feature of positive covariance between private 
export sector incomes and the government's ability to service its debts 
was thus clearly present during this period. As will be seen below, 
the asymmetric exchange rate policy did serve to mitigate this factor, 
but certainly without erasing this covariance feature. 
The "asymmetric" exchange rate policy 
The asymmetric exchange rate policy served to defend the development of 
the domestic financial structure rather in the manner which was 
discussed in Chapter II in the section on the Type III monetary system, 
in which it is pointed out that the exercise of the lender of last 
resort function necessarily depends on the suspension of 
convertibility. On each occasion when convertibility was suspended, 
the alternative would have been to let the great banks fail, with all 
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the well-known destructive consequences. In the case of the Baring 
crisis, convertibility was not suspended early enough to prevent the 
failure of the banks, and the needs of Barings were allowed to 
supersede those of the local banks in the allocation of the fiat issue 
which had been intended as a sort of lender of last resort measure in 
the manner described in Chapter II. In August 1914, the outbreak of 
WWI threatened the economy with a gold outflow which could again have 
brought down all the banks. The suspension of convertibility, and the 
mere authorization of DFI high-powered inside money creation to support 
such lender of last resort measures as might be needed, were sufficient 
to allay fears, end panic, and maintain the banking system. I say 
"mere" authorization, because in fact the authorization was not used at 
this time, no DFI note issue occurring until after the arrival of the 
bigger crisis in 1929/30 (nor was there any fiat issue during this 
period). The suspension of convertibility at the end of 1929 served 
the same purpose of defending the banking system from collapse. 
There was another source of benefit to the economy as a whole from 
the maintenance of this asymmetric exchange rate policy, which worked 
as follows: The government made use of the exchange gains achieved on 
the stock of gold which was accumulated in the Conversion Office in the 
course of maintaining a fixed exchange rate during times when the 
domestic currency would otherwise have been appreciating. These 
exchange gains, which were taken later by gaining access to the gold at 
par for the purpose of servicing the government's external (gold 
denominated) debt, alleviated pressure on the government budget which 
the rise in the cost of such debt service would otherwise have imposed, 
and hence also benefitted taxpayers. This benefit of the asymmetric 
exchange rate policy was of substantial assistance in coping with the 
difficulties of the 1930s depression years, and was a major factor in 
enabling the Argentine government to continue external debt service 
during these years when many other debtors were pressed into default. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter III, budgetary pressures on the 
government caused by the crisis were severe. 
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The asymmetric exchange rate policy also contributed to the stability 
of the domestic price level which characterized this period. The 
Argentine domestic price level during the period 1900-1940 was more 
stable than were gold denominated prices, i. e., than sterling or US$ 
prices, as has been pointed out by Diaz Alejandro. 5 The stability of 
the price level during this period may be seen in Table V. 12, which 
gives an index for the domestic price level (1960=100) in the fourth 
column. The highest price levels during this period were in the 1918- 
1921 post-WWI boom; including this boom the ratio of the highest (1920) 
to the lowest (1914) price index was 1.88, while without these four 
boom years it was 1.41. The slightness of the fall in the index during 
the 1930s depression, during a period when price declines in other 
countries (e. g. the USA) were wrecking havoc, should be particularly 
noticed. The rise in the exchange rate which stemmed the fall of the 
domestic price level helped to save the economy from the spreading 
banking failures which falling prices were causing during this period 
in the USA for example. (See Kindleberger (1973) concerning the USA 
case. ) 
There were thus very sound reasons behind the practice of this 
asymmetrical exchange rate policy, and it appears to have brought 
important benefits in a number of ways to the economy as a whole. It 
should therefore not be seen as merely having been for the benefit of a 
powerful few, even though it may well have been the influence of this 
group which was the critical factor in particular policy decisions. 
The three structural characteristics identified in Chapter III were 
thus present throughout the period 1900-1930, with no significant 
changes in any of them occurring over the period. 
3 Currency denomination structure of the banking system 
Tables V. 2, V. 3, and V. 4 give data on the currency denomination 
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structure of the banking system for this period, including the mortgage 
bank, the Hipotecario Nacional. The information given in Table V. 3 is 
illustrated on Graph V. I. The two striking points which I shall use 
this data to bring out are (1) the sharp decline in the EFI share over 
the period, and (2) the importance of the role played by the two great 
official banks, the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco Hipotecario 
Nacional, in the development of DFI. The powerful potential role of 
government bank initiatives in reducing the relative predominance of 
EFI, in economies where structural characteristics would tend to lead 
the private sector to develop EFI at the expense of DFI, thus is very 
clearly exemplified in the case of Argentina during this period. 
At the outset it should be pointed out that the prohibition of gold 
export in 1914 did remove some of the practical purpose in holding gold 
deposit accounts in domestic banks; banks began holding larger working 
balances abroad in order to handle foreign payments, whereas prior to 
this prohibition shipments of gold were standard practice whenever the 
price of foreign exchange reached the gold export point. The sharp 
reduction, to almost nothing, in the EFI share of loans which shows up 
for "gold capital banks" between 1911 and 1918 is thus to be attributed 
in some measure to the gold export prohibition, as well as to the 
influence of the official banks in strengthening DFI. 
Table V. 2 shows the EFI share in total deposits and loans for the 
Banco de la Nacion separately and for all banks (including the Banco de 
la Nacion). 6 These figures are given in the first four columns. By 
the "EFI share" I refer to the percentage of the total (deposits or 
loans) which was denominated in gold ("% gold") as opposed to being 
denominated in the domestic currency, paper pesos (referred to also as 
"m/n", which stands for "moneda nacional", i. e. "national money"). The 
share of the Banco de la Nacion (B de la N) in total deposits and in 
total loans for all banks is given in columns five and six. The B de 
la N held government deposits, in both gold and m/n, and the sudden 
jump in the EFI share of B de la N deposits in 1902, which was caused 
by a sharp fall in paper denominated deposits, was largely due to a 
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sharp fall in the government's paper denominated account. 
The trend fall in the EFI share of both deposits and loans, and the 
lower EFI share for the B de la N, particularly in its loan portfolio, 
both show clearly in the table. 
Table V. 3 gives figures on the EFI share of loans by type of bank. 
The Banco de la Nacion is not included in the column "Banks with paper 
denominated capitals", although its capital was paper denominated. As 
noted above, its original "capital" consisted merely in a paper note 
issue. "Banks with gold denominated capitals" largely correspond to 
what are in other contexts referred to as "foreign banks", though not 
necessarily precisely. All except for the Banco de la Nacion are 
private sector banks. 
The tendency for banks with gold denominated capital to operate more 
largely in EFI loans is very marked. Moreover, this group of banks 
consistently showed an EFI share of loans which was greater than the 
EFI share of their deposits (data not shown here), whereas, as may be 
seen from Table V. 2, the reverse was the case for the B de la N. In 
size of total operations, the group of banks with paper denominated 
capital had total paper deposits approximately the same size as the 
gold capital group in 1900, but total gold deposits of just over a 
quarter the size of the gold capital group. By 1930 the growth of the 
paper denominated capital group had so far outstripped that of the gold 
capital group that the size of total deposits for the former group was 
nearly six times the size of total deposits for the gold capital group. 
The role of the Banco de la Nacion in developing DFI banking shows 
through clearly in Table V. 3, as in Graph V. 1, particularly in the 
currency denomination of its loans. The share of this bank in the 
total deposits and loans for all banks was very large, while the EFI 
share of its activity was extremely small. The contrast between the 
size of the EFI share in its loans with that of the other banks is very 
marked. Its contribution in developing DFI was therefore very 
substantial. 
In view of its importance in making DFI loans available to borrowers, 
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it seems of interest to know which sectors of the economy were the 
greatest beneficiaries of this domestic currency denominated credit. 
Tables V. 5, V. 6, and V. 7 address this question. 
Table V. 5 gives the sectoral distribution of B de la N loans. The 
figures given in the first column, "banks" refer to the percentage of 
the total B de la N loan portfolio which was comprised of loans to 
other banks. The figures given in the remaining three columns sum to 
100%, i. e. the total loans for which the sectoral percentage figures 
are given exclude loans to other banks. Column two, "agriculture", 
gives the combined share of B de la N loans which went to the two sub- 
groups "grain" and "livestock". It will be remembered that grain and 
livestock are the major Argentine exports; these domestic currency 
denominated loans were thus going to export sector borrowers, whose 
earnings were in gold. The sector "industry", on the other hand, whose 
loan share is given in column 3, would have been deriving its earnings 
largely from serving the domestic market, and hence receiving its 
income in paper pesos. This "industry" sector would thus have faced 
exchange risk if borrowing in gold denominated loans, in contrast with 
the "agriculture" group. 
Table V. 6 gives the sectoral distribution of investment (fixed 
capital formation), and the data from Table V. 6 are related to the B de 
la N distribution of loans in Table V. 7. The figures given are the 
ratios of the percentage of B de la N loans to the sector indicated, to 
the percentage of total investment for that sector. If the sectoral 
distribution of B de la N loans exactly matched the sectoral 
distribution of fixed capital formation, these ratios would therefore 
all be 1. The percentage of total B de la N loans going to "grains" is 
here distinguished from that going to "livestock", but no such 
distinction is given in the figures available on the sectoral 
distribution of investment. Therefore it is impossible to say whether 
or not the larger share for livestock reflects a larger investment for 
that sector as compared with "grains". 
We can see from Table V. 7 that the livestock sector (except during 
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1916-19) received a very much larger percentage of the credit extended 
by the B de la N than the percentage which that sector contributed to 
fixed capital formation, and that the combined agriculture sector 
received a very much larger share of credit relative to its share in 
fixed capital formation than did the "industry" sector. Until 1933, 
indeed, the share of B de la N credit which went to industry was very 
much lower than the contribution of industry to fixed capital 
formation. The political and economic power, already noted, of the 
great landowners and cattle fatteners was presumably an important 
influence in the determination of this sectoral pattern of credit 
distribution. 
Lest the Banco de la Nacion be criticized for not doing more to 
develop domestic industry, two factors should be borne firmly in mind: 
The most important of these two factors is that during this period 
Argentine educated opinion was very thoroughly committed to a belief in 
free trade, and to a belief in the international pattern of national 
specialization which free trade implies. The notion that every country 
should develop domestic industry, which conflicts with the 
international pattern of specialization brought about through free 
trade, was opposed vigorously by nearly all (there were a few notable 
exceptions) educated Argentine opinion of the period. The great wealth 
of the economy was seen to be in the land, and in developing the 
specialization in agriculture and livestock which was the result of a 
free trade policy. The distribution of Banco de la Nacion credit thus 
received the support of the liberal aspirations and idealism of the 
period. 
The second factor to bear in mind is simply that the Banco de la 
Nacion was not the only bank, and information on the sectoral 
distribution of the loan portfolios of other banks is not available. 
it may be that if we did have information on the sectoral distribution 
of the loan portfolios of other banks we would see that the sectoral 
distribution of the Banco de la Nacion loans was simply filling 
particular needs which were not being met by other banks. The fact 
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that information is costly does lead banks to tend to specialize in 
certain types of loans and loans to certain sectors. 
For the reasons just explained, therefore, no judgements are 
warranted on the basis of this data concerning any government 
"favouring" of the livestock sector at the expense of industry through 
the mechanism of the distribution of B de la N credit allocation. 7 
Table V. 5 also shows us another aspect of the role of the Banco de la 
Nacion in developing DFI, that of supporting the rest of the banking 
system in a quasi lender of last resort role. I refer to it as a 
"quasi" lender of last resort role because, except under the special 
authorization (which was not used) during WWI, this bank had no power 
to increase the note issue except through the use of its own gold 
reserves. It did hold a very large stock of gold reserves, and did 
exercise some countercyclical (i. e. stabilizing) influence on the money 
supply by the use of these resources. ° The volume of lending to other 
banks which was done by the Banco de la Nacion is shown in Table V. 5 
(first column) as a percentage of total B de la N loans. The role of 
the B de la N in overcoming a potentially dangerous crisis in 1914 by 
exercising this quasi lender of last resort function may be seen in 
this table. As noted above, the B de la N had been authorized to sell 
some of this bank debt on to the Conversion Office in exchange for 
increases in the note issue, had the resources of the bank been 
insufficient to meet other banks needs for rediscounting; in the event 
its own resources proved sufficient to meet these needs, undoubtedly 
because the granting of the authorization dispelled fears of a banking 
collapse. 
The large share of B de la N loans which went to other banks from 
1925-35 (following the introduction in 1925 of a new law enabling the 
bank to extend these loans) show that the bank was serving the function 
of a bankers' bank to an important extent. This aspect of the bank's 
role has also been discussed in the economic history literature, and is 
one of the reasons the bank has been described as a sort of quasi 
central bank. The sharp rise in these loans to other banks after 1930 
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of course reflects the influence of the international crisis on the 
domestic economy, and the role of the Banco de la Nacion in providing 
support to the rest of the banking system in this crisis. The loans to 
other banks drop sharply between 1935 and 1936 because in 1935 the 
Central Bank was founded, and the Central Bank took over from the Banco 
de la Nacion in the matter of rediscounting for other banks. 
Both in developing its own DFI portfolio and in its support of the rest 
of the banking system, therefore, the Banco de la Nacion played a very 
major role in developing domestic financial intermediation, both in the 
geographical DFI sense and in the currency denomination sense. 
Table V. 4 gives data on the currency composition of the loan portfolio 
of the great mortgage bank, the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. It was 
this bank which received the support of a paper note issue in the 
"Baring" crisis, as mentioned in Chapter III in the discussion of the 
lender of last resort function under the Type III monetary system. The 
Banco Hipotecario Nacional (BHN), like the Banco de la Nacion, was a 
bank with official status. Goldsmith gives the 1913 share of mortgage 
banks' assets in the assets of all financial institutions in Argentina 
as 19%. ' The 1925 banking census conducted in Argentina gives the 
share of BHN in loans of all banking establishments (i. e. including 
deposit banks) as 24.61%. The figure given in that source for the 
total value of BHN loans is 1,226,685,000m/n, which is not so very much 
less than the figure given in the same source for total B de la N 
loans, which is 1,385,654,000m/n. The Banco Hipotecario Nacional, like 
the Banco de la Nacion, was thus very large relative to the total 
financial sector. 
Table V. 4 shows that the operations of the BHN were conducted almost 
entirely in domestic currency after 1900. There had only ever been a 
single issue of gold denominated mortgage bonds, in fact, issued prior 
to the Baring crisis, and this issue plagued the bank with losses for 
years. Gradually the outstanding bonds were converted into paper 
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denominated issues. The contribution of this official bank to the 
development of domestic paper currency denominated financial 
intermediation is shown by Table V. 4 to have been very strong. 
The contribution of the BHN in developing DFI was of particular 
importance because it was financing investment in the domestic 
infrastructure of buildings, etc. as opposed to financing investment in 
the traded goods sector. The practical identification of traded and 
non-traded goods is problematic, but private housing must certainly 
rank among the least tradable of items; investment in private housing 
must thus be considered investment in the non-traded goods sector. 
Recent criticism of countries which spent the proceeds of foreign loans 
on investment in the domestic infrastructure of buildings, etc., 
highlight the importance of DFI in financing such forms of investment. 
Similarly, much criticism has been levied in the economic history 
literature at Germany for spending (during the 1920s) the proceeds of 
foreign loans on such projects instead of on building up the export 
sector. (See for instance Kindleberger [1973]. ) The development of a 
decent quality of domestic infrastructure of buildings, homes in 
particular, depends perhaps more heavily than any other form of 
investment, upon the development of DFI. 
In Chapter IV it was argued that investment in infrastructure in the 
non-traded goods sector would particularly suffer from weakness in the 
development of DFI. In that context this was attributed to low 
relative prices of nontraded goods and weaker support of monetary 
services to that sector caused by the pressure of incremental demand 
for imported money on the balance of payments. In Chapter III 
attention was drawn to the fact that if banks extended credit for 
purposes of financing investment in the non-traded goods sector, 
incremental demand for imported money would be generated by such 
investment without the investment leading to any increase in its 
supply. Where the (desired) imported share in the money supply is 
large, therefore, the creation of domestic credit for the financing of 
investment in the non-traded goods sector can not be very substantial 
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(relative to credit extended to the traded goods sector) without 
running into balance of payments difficulties. Infrastructure which 
directly serves the export sector can successfully be financed by such 
means, or by external borrowing (or geographical EFI). However, the 
financing on a substantial scale of investment in infrastructure in 
non-traded sectors, including investment in civic buildings and 
domestic housing particularly, requires DFI if dangerous carrying of 
exchange risk is to be avoided. 
Investment in buildings, both civic and private, was undertaken 
during this period in Argentina on a vast scale, particularly in Buenos 
Aires; the many great buildings and homes of high quality and 
craftsmanship which characterize Buenos Aires largely date from this 
period (including the 10-20 years before 1900), and absorbed vast 
quantities of capital. Much of this investment was financed through 
the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. The mortgage bonds sold by the BHN 
were purchased by foreign investors in large quantities, so the funds 
thus raised were by no means only domestic savings, but the 
denomination of these bonds in domestic currency enabled foreign funds 
to be used for these purposes, since the foreign buyers bore the 
exchange risk of their investments. 
The contribution of the BHN to the development of DFI was thus on a 
large scale, and made a particularly important contribution to the 
financing of investment in the non-traded sector of buildings and 
private housing. 
We have seen that the features identified in Chapter III as giving rise 
to incentives for using currency type EFI were all present throughout 
this period. The data presented here on the currency denomination of 
the banking system have shown us that currency type EFI was being used 
by the deposit banks during this period, but that the EFI share faded 
into insignificance during the period. The fading out of the use of 
EFI was attributed, to an important extent, to the role of the two 
great official banks, the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco Hipotecario 
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Nacional, in developing DFI. Following the lines of argument developed 
in Chapter III, my view is that the development of DFI financial 
activity was changing the character of the domestic currency, so that 
financial instruments denominated in paper were gaining broader use and 
acceptance, and the other banks were therefore able to follow the lead 
of the two official banks in extending DFI activity. The contribution 
to the stabilization of the value of the paper peso which was made by 
the change to the Type II monetary system was a major factor in the 
success of this development of DFI activity. To this we now turn. 
4 Structure of the money supply prior to 1930 
The Argentine monetary system during this period was a mixture of the 
types distinguished in Chapter II. After 1893 it was a Type II system 
as concerns the issue of paper notes, since new notes were issued (by 
the conversion Office) only in exchange for gold after this date until 
the 1914 rediscount law was finally put into operation in response to 
the 1929/30 crisis. There was however already in circulation a fiat 
issue which pre-dated the introduction of the Type II system; the 
monetary system was therefore a mixture of the Type III and Type II 
systems. In 1899, as noted above, the appreciation of the paper 
currency was halted by the means of opening the Conversion Office for 
the issue of new notes against the purchase of gold at a fixed rated of 
exchange. Since new notes were only issued against gold, the gold 
coverage, or "proportion" was rising over the period as the note issue 
increased. Data on the gold stocks and note issue are given in Table 
V. 8, as also are data on commercial bank deposits and the total money 
supply; data on the "proportion" is given in the second column of Table 
V. 9, labelled "Go/H". Data on Go and Gb in these tables are net 
figures, which is the reason the figures are sometimes negative. 
In view of the magnitude of the loans to other banks extended by the 
Banco de la Nacion from 1925, it might be appropriate to identify the 
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Argentine monetary system from that time as moving in the direction of 
a Type IV system. That is, the character of the inside money being 
created by the Banco de la Nacion may have been acquiring something 
which was at least beginning to approach a high-powered status. 
However, the burden of problematic debt which the bank had to take on 
in the early 1930s was such as must have undermined the confidence 
required to maintain that status. Whether the Banco de la Nacion was 
developing along the lines which the Bank of England had done earlier, 
and whether it might have continued to do so had the international 
crisis not taken things in another direction, is a question perhaps 
worth considering, in that it might yield some instructive insights 
which would be useful in coping with some other situation. As it was, 
the crisis did take things in a different direction. 
The direction which concerns us here is the direction in which (G/F)* 
was developing. Had the DFI financial development continued in the 
trends we have observed, and had the Banco de la Nacion continued to 
develop its role as bankers' bank, as well as maintaining a profitable 
commercial bank portfolio, we would expect (G/F)* to have fallen. 
Since there were no restrictions on capital movements, nor on the issue 
of paper notes in exchange for gold, nor on commercial banks' reserve 
ratios, etc., during this period, and the exchange rate was quite 
stable, we can sensibly treat the behaviour of the actual ratio (G/F) 
as giving some indication of the behaviour of (G/F)*. 
The stability of the exchange rate during this period, in sharp 
contrast to the post WWII period, may be seen in table V. 12. Minor 
fluctuations in the exchange rate occurred, particularly during and 
immediately following WWI. As noted above, the authorities reopened 
the Conversion office for the purchase of gold at a fixed rate of 
exchange (the pre-WWI par) in 1927 to halt the appreciation of the peso 
which was then taking place. 
Table V. 9 (first column) shows us that (G/F) was rising from 1900- 
1915, and falling (with some fluctuations) in the period 1915-1929. In 
1915 it was 40.4%, and by 1929 it had fallen to 21.97%. This table 
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also shows us that the fall in (G/F) was largely due to a fall in the 
average reserve/deposit ratios of commercial banks (shown in the third 
column, (Hb+Gb)/D), from 40% in 1916 to 12.34% in 1929. There was also 
some fall in the public's cash/deposit ratio (Hp/D), shown in column 
six of the same table. A third factor contributing to the fall in 
(G/F), at least until 1927, was a decline in the gold share of 
commercial banks' reserves (Gb) in favour of paper reserves (Hb). The 
proportion, Go/H, however, was for the most part continuing to rise for 
the reason explained above. 
The rise in (G/F) between 1900 and 1915 may be partly illusory, 
because figures on private holdings of gold (Gp) are not included. 
Private holding of gold had been important prior to the fixing of the 
exchange rate in 1899, and may have been fading out gradually over the 
next decade or so. This change would appear in the data given here as 
a rise in (G/F). On the other hand, the fall in (G/F) after 1915 
should not be attributed to this factor operating in reverse, because 
there is no suggestion in the literature that this was occurring. 
There was, however, another factor, which I mentioned above: the 
prohibition of gold export imposed in 1914 resulted in an increase in 
the balances held abroad by the deposit banks. (See Tornquist [1930]. ) 
Tables V. 8 and V. 9 show some fall in banks holding of Gold (Gb), and in 
their ratios of gold to deposits (Gb/D), which may have been partly 
offsetting increases in the balances held abroad. In other words, if 
the balances held abroad were included in the figures for Gb, the fall 
in the (G/F ratio after 1915 might turn out to be less than it appears 
to be in Table V. 9. 
What can we conclude from this about the behaviour of (G/F)*? In 
constructing the measure for what is referred to as "BOP pressure" in 
Table 11, I have simply taken the average actual (G/F) ratio for the 
period 1900-29, and called that (G/F)*. I do not believe that the rise 
in the actual ratio (G/F) between 1900 and 1915 represented a rise in 
(G/F)*; I would take the view that some of the actual rise was 
illusory, and that the maintenance of the Type II system (such that all 
Chapter V 
263 
new notes were issued against gold) had brought the actual (G/F) above 
(G/F)* by 1915. On the other hand, I take the view that (G/F) * was 
tending to fall during this period, at any rate after 1914. One reason 
for taking this view is that the fall in the actual ratio, (G/F), is 
attributable largely to a rise in the domestic money multiplier, i. e. 
to a fall in g, as may be seen in Tables V. 8 and V. 9. The fall in g 
(rise in the domestic money multiplier) in turn is largely attributable 
to a fall in the average reserve/deposit ratio of banks. That these 
ratios were falling steadily over this period suggests to me that 
confidence in the banking system was rising; this in turn suggests 
that the ratio (G/F) was perceived as "adequate" by wealth-holders. 
i. e. that it was not less than (G/F)*. 
This view receives some further support from the tenor of discussion 
in local literature of the period. During the early 1920s, for 
instance, although the paper peso was trading at a discount associated 
with post-WWI declines in the world prices of major Argentine 
agricultural export items, the local literature makes clear that the 
peso was expected to return to par. It also gives a clear impression 
that gold stocks were perceived to be at very satisfactory levels. 
The fall in the average reserve/deposit ratio of the banks should 
certainly be attributed primarily to the adoption of the Type II system 
(i. e. the restriction of note issue exclusively to the issue of notes 
against gold and foreign exchange), together with the various 
contributions made by the two great official banks which have been 
discussed above. The larger share of paper notes in banks' reserves 
should also be attributed primarily to the adoption of the Type II 
system, although the decline in the share of gold denominated deposits 
is another factor. However, the decline in the gold share of deposits 
is certainly itself largely to be attributed to the stabilization of 
the value of the domestic currency with the introduction of the Type II 
system. The decline in the public's cash/deposit ratio in turn also 
reflects the stabilization of the value of the currency, as well as the 
general increase in confidence in the stability of the banking system. 
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The important role played by the Banco de la Nacion in contributing to 
the stability and confidence of the banking system has been pointed out 
above. 
These observations do lend some support to the view that economies 
suffering from severe dollarization and monetary instability would 
benefit from the introduction of a Type II system, provided the change 
to a Type II system is accompanied by the kind of official support for 
DFI development which was provided in the Argentine case by the Banco 
de la Nacion and the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. The great importance 
of this qualification is that the way is thereby opened for a gradual 
transition to a Type IV system, in the manner which seems to have been 
occurring in Argentina, and which did occur in 19th century Britain. 
Without the provision for this development, the economy could become 
stuck in the manner described in Chapter IV, with the legal 
restrictions on the structure of the monetary base causing the 
monetization and development of the non-traded goods sectors to be 
adversely affected. In Argentina, in fact, there did continue to be 
illegal issues of paper money in the provinces (not included in the 
data given here), in response to the kinds of efficiency gains through 
increased monetization which were discussed in Chapter IV. Legal 
restrictions on the monetary base which may be introduced in the 
interests of monetary stability become damaging to the productive 
functioning of the economy when they prevent such financial market 
response to available efficiency gains. Therefore the provision for a 
gradual transition to a Type IV system in response to market forces 
(whether through an official bank or through some sort of free note 
issue banking system), such as appears to have been occurring through 
the development of the Banco de la Nacion, is of immense importance. 
It should also be noted that in the Argentine case average bank 
reserve/deposit ratios had been very high indeed, and there were 
therefore substantial gains attainable in reducing the cost of 
maintaining the circulating medium by achieving reductions in these 
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reserve/deposit ratios. In other circumstances, if reserve/deposit 
ratios (and public's cash/deposit ratios) are not particularly high, 
the introduction of the Type II system would not have this source of 
gains to offer. 
5 The behaviour of (G/F) and (G/F)* after 1930 
In Chapter IV the implications for an economy of a fall in the traded 
share of national output unaccompanied by a fall in (G/F)* were 
analyzed. It was argued that the pursuit of import substitution 
industrialization policies associated with substantial restrictions on 
international trade and capital flows, such as were pursued by 
Argentina after 1930, could bring an economy into this position. The 
purpose of this section is to test the applicability of these arguments 
to the Argentine case. 
It will be shown that the statistical material presented here does 
offer support for this approach to explaining some of the trends and 
intractable problems which have characterized post-WWII Argentina. 
It was argued in Chapter IV that the introduction of exchange 
controls and restrictions on trade and capital flows which occurred in 
response to the 1929/30 crisis would have tended to cause a rise in 
(G/F)*, by increasing the private demand for hoards of foreign money 
and other foreign financial assets (while at the same time forcing 
these demands into secret and illegal channels). It was further argued 
that these policies led to the development of a production structure 
which was incompatible with (G/F)*, in that the policy manipulation of 
relative prices caused a reduction in the traded share of national 
output, which in turn caused incremental demand for imported money to 
put impossible pressures on the available supplies of foreign exchange. 
The utilization of the productive capacity of the economy to any 
tolerable levels therefore has required the extension of domestic 
credit which has persistently pushed the actual ratio (G/F) below 
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(G/F)*, such that recurring balance of payments crises and currency 
devaluations necessarily occur. These pressures cause the economy to 
be characterized by severe fluctuations in the relative prices of 
traded and non-traded goods, as part of these cycles. 
No attempt will be made here to examine the cyclical pattern of such 
crises in the Argentine case; as noted in Chapter IV this has been done 
in depth by Guido di Tella [1983). These cyclical patterns and the 
instability of relative prices in Argentina have also been discussed by 
many other writers. '0 
The first point to note, from Table V. 1, is that the ratio of exports 
to national income does fall after 1930, and remains at less than half 
what it had been in the earlier period. 
The second point to note, from Table V. 9 and Graph V. 2, is that the 
actual ratio (G/F) has indeed been substantially lower than it was in 
the pre-WWII period. The fall did not occur until after the war, as 
Argentina built up substantial reserves of gold and foreign exchange 
during the war (and because of the war). The rise in (G/F) visible at 
the end of the 1970s was associated with the domestic financial 
policies which contributed to the development of the debt crisis, and 
should probably not be seen as a reversal in trend. However, the 
figures for (G/F) given here are significantly understated for much of 
the post-WWII period, because they do not include private holdings of 
dollars (Gp), and these private hoards are known to have risen to 
substantial proportions. Therefore the true picture, including Gp, 
would show a much less striking change in the actual levels of (G/F). 
Table V. 11 (third column, "b*/b") shows the behaviour of the ratio of 
(G/F) * to the actual ratio (G/F), which was constructed by taking the 
average actual (G/F) for the period 1900-1929 and treating this figure 
as (G/F)*. A substantial rise in this ratio in the post-WWII period is 
clearly visible in the table. It should be remembered, however, that 
the figures for b are unrealistically low because of the exclusion of 
Gp from the data given here. The figures given for the ratio b*/b 
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therefore appear here as higher than they would be if the true figures 
for G, including Gp, were available. The negative figures occur 
because actual net foreign exchange holdings (G) were negative in those 
years. Fluctuations in this ratio are very striking in the post-WWII 
period, and contrast sharply with the magnitude of these fluctuations 
in the earlier period. 
The ratio (b*/b) gives the ratio of G*/G, for any actual F, and hence 
shows the magnitude of the rise in the exchange rate which would be 
required to bring actual stocks of G up to equal desired stocks by this 
means. The actual behaviour of the exchange rate is shown in Table 
V. 12, where the second column gives the free (or black) market exchange 
rate. Two versions of the (various) official exchange rates are also 
given. No claim is being made for precision in predicting actual 
exchange rate changes with the ratio b*/b; however, the order of 
magnitude of these changes should at least be in the same ball park, so 
to speak, or we would have to doubt the pertinence to the economy of 
the values given for (b*/b). A ratio for b*/b of 4, for instance, 
implies that a fourfold increase in the exchange rate is required to 
equate desired stocks to actual stocks. If the exchange rate actually 
only depreciated a few percentage points over an extended period, we 
would have to conclude that we had given too high a value to b*. It 
happens that for 1958 the figure given is 4.77, and the rise in the 
official exchange rate between 1958 and 1959 (shown in column one of 
Table V. 12), from 18 to 80, was of 340%. On the other hand we see a 
figure of 46.77 for 1963, and the exchange rate doesn't even double for 
the next 3-4 years. In the larger picture, however, the spectacular 
rises in the Argentine exchange rate which have occurred over this 
period suggest that the concept of b*/b as represented in the figures 
given does have pertinence to the Argentine case. However, the 
hypothetical figure used for (G/F)* may be rather high. The average 
annual rise in the exchange rate, over the whole period 1930-1979, is 
only 22%; this would imply an average ratio over the period for b*/b 
of only 1.22, which is substantially below the hypothetical figures 
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given in Table V. 11. However, the fault may lie not so much with the 
hypothetical figure used for b*, as with the understatement of b; it 
could be that the inclusion of accurate figures for Gp in the figures 
for G would raise b so much that the average ratio of b*/b would be 
nearer the figure indicated by the average exchange rate change even 
with the figure for b* which has been used here. If we had accurate 
figures for Gp, indeed, we could use the average actual ratio, b, and 
the average exchange rate change, to infer b*. 
A measure called "BOP pressure" is offered in the second column of 
Table V. 11; which gives the hypothetical incremental demand for 
imported money, using the same estimate for b*, as a percentage of 
actual export earnings for the year. As was shown in Chapter II, 
incremental demand for imported money is b*kdY, where dY is the change 
in nominal income, and k is defined (as in Chapter II) as F/Y. Actual 
changes in nominal income were used in constructing these figures. The 
figures given in Table V. 11 for b*k*dY actually also use the value 
(shown as k* in the notes for that table) of k which was the average 
actual value for the 1900-1929 period. This was done because the 
figures for k as given in the table have excluded Gp, since figures on 
Gp are unavailable, yet the concept k as defined here requires the 
inclusion of Gp. The fall in k which appears in the table after 1956 
may be due to a rise in Gp at the expense of domestic forms of money (H 
and D), as much as to any fall in the actual k. The ratio (b*k*) dY / 
X provides a measure of the pressure of incremental demand for imported 
money on the balance of payments. 
The ratio of hypothetical incremental demand for imported money to 
actual export earnings, given in the second column of Table V. 11 ("BOP 
pressure"), is shown on Graph V. 5 together with the measure b*/b. The 
figures (and graph) show that the rise in the "BOP pressure" measure 
precedes the rise in the ratio b*/b, as would be expected from the 
arguments developed in Chapter IV. The closing of the economy was 
causing the incremental demand for imported money at this fixed, 
hypothetical, figure for (G/F)*, to require an increasing share of 
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actual export earnings. Restrictions on the exchange rate and on trade 
and capital flows were maintained for the purpose of allocating 
available supplies of foreign exchange in other directions in 
accordance with national policy priorities. By means of imposing these 
restrictions, the development of the economy was continued on the basis 
of increasing the domestic paper components of the money supply such 
that the actual ratio (G/F) was persistently kept under the required 
ratio, (G/F)*. The untenable character of this position was explained 
in Chapter IV. 
If the structure of money demand in Argentina is in the range 
suggested by the figure used here for b*, i. e. for (G/F)*, then the 
closing of the economy has indeed caused incremental demand for 
imported money to put pressure on the balance of payments which is of 
quite intolerable levels. The sharp contrast between the pre-WWII 
period and the post-WWII period shows vividly in the figures and on the 
graph. 
I would argue that the figures given here do support the claim that 
the arguments developed in Chapter IV are pertinent to post-WWII 
Argentina. Persistence in the development of a production structure 
which is incompatible with (G/F)* has resulted in increasingly 
intractable problems of exchange rate crises and underutilization of 
productive resources. 
The arguments developed in Chapter IV indicated that there should be 
the appearance of some trend decline in the relative prices of non- 
traded goods, and particularly in the return to fixed factor inputs 
(rents, in the technical sense of the term) in the non-traded goods 
sector. Table V. 10 provides data on relative prices for seven 
categories of goods for the purpose of identifying such a trend. Some 
of this data is illustrated on Graphs V. 6 and V. 7. 
The figures given in Table V. 10 are the ratio of the price index for 
each category to the price index for the general price level, with 
1960=100 in all cases, so that the ratios in Table V. 10 are 1 in 1960 
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for all categories. The index used for the category "houses" was 
constructed from figures taken from the annual reports of the Banco 
Hipotecario Nacional on the average values (per property) of properties 
sold by the bank either at auction or by private sale. Large numbers 
of properties were involved (i. e. 1000-2000 or more), so that a 
reasonable approximation of movements in property values is represented 
in these figures. 
We see from these figures that the index for "rents" falls from 15.75 
in 1934 when the available data begins, to 1 in 1960, and that it 
fluctuates considerably after that. This is rents in the literal 
sense, which, as the price of housing services, so to speak, certainly 
come into the non-traded category. Both "electricity" and "houses" 
also show this marked trend fall in relative price, and these two items 
must also come into the non-traded category, particularly in comparison 
with the other categories distinguished here. The relative price of 
houses continues to fall after 1960, as does electricity. 
The trend fall in relative prices of non-traded goods which the 
arguments developed in Chapter IV had indicated thus do clearly appear 
in these figures. 
However, it seems clear that not all returns to fixed factors in non- 
traded sectors experienced equally severe deterioration; the ability of 
particular groups to exert political pressure in favour of policies 
which influenced relative prices in their favour, thereby defending 
their returns (rents, to the extent these were fixed factors), 
certainly influenced the incidence of such deteriorations. Some 
evidence of the force of these tensions may be seen in the instability 
of the real exchange rates during the post-WWII period. 
Tables V. 12 and V. 13 give data on two versions of the real exchange 
rate, one using the official exchange rate and the other using the 
black market rate. Substantial divergences in these rates are 
observable from 1948 onwards. The real exchange rate constructed by 
using the official exchange rate (Table V. 12) does not reflect the set 
of relative prices faced by ordinary consumers; for this the black 
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market version of the real exchange rate is more accurate. This shows 
considerable fluctuation, during the whole post 1930 period, 
contrasting sharply with the relative stability of the earlier period. 
The official rate is held fairly consistently under the black market 
rate, with wide variations in the extent of the divergence. Since the 
main exports are basic foodstuffs, which dominate the price index used 
here because of their importance in the consumption basket used in its 
construction, this policy of maintaining an overvalued official 
exchange rate was also influencing the behaviour of the black market 
version of the real exchange rate, via its depressing influence on the 
price level. The fact that the main exports are food staples which 
figure so largely in the consumption baskets of workers contributes 
strong incentives for industrial interests to exert political pressure 
towards maintaining an artificially low exchange rate, combining with 
the political interests stemming from the rents of owners of fixed 
capital in the non-traded goods sector. The divergence of the official 
exchange rate from the price people are actually willing to pay for 
foreign exchange, on the other hand, tends to foster expectation of 
currency depreciation, and thereby erodes willingness to hold the 
currency, or to accept domestic currency denominated financial 
instruments, undermining (currency type, at least) DFI. 
The fluctuations in relative prices which are evident in these tables 
reflect the influence of the non-traded goods sector and labour 
interests just discussed, and their conflict with the opposing 
pressures deriving from the export sector interests and a variety of 
factors giving rise to balance of payments pressures, including the 
monetary factors we have been analyzing in this thesis. 
The timing of the declines in these relative prices can be compared 
with the rise in the hypothetical figures given in Table V. 11 for "BOP 
pressure". Table V. 11 shows us that the figures for "BOP pressure" 
begin to rise appreciably from 1944/45, whereas Table V. 10 shows that 
the relative prices of two of the three particularly non-traded items 
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have been falling continuously since 1934. The fall in the price of 
houses does not come until after 1950 however. The early beginning of 
the trend fall in rents and electricity supports the idea that the 
introduction of restrictions on international trade and capital flows 
may have pushed (G/F)* up from 1930. However, since relative price 
data is not available for an earlier period on these groups we can not 
rule out the possibility that the observed trend decline may have 
actually been present prior to the policy changes which occurred in 
1930. 
Table V. 11 gives data on two variables which are sometimes used in 
alternative approaches to explaining the post-WWII deterioration of the 
Argentine currency. One of these is the government budget deficit, and 
the other is the behaviour of the trade balance. Neither of these two 
variables deteriorate in a time pattern which would make them plausible 
explanations of the observed change from the pre-WWII monetary and 
exchange rate stability, to the post-WWII spectacular deterioration of 
the currency. 
The sixth column of Table V. 11 gives the government budget deficit as 
a percentage of total government expenditure. The figures show that 
this percentage does not rise until well after the deterioration in the 
currency has begun. It may be that the absolute size of the deficit 
would show a different pattern; however, to attempt to explain the 
historical change from monetary stability to deterioration of the 
currency, by an increase in the government budget deficit does not look 
like a promising prospect. 
Table V. 14 presents data on the government budget deficit as a share 
of total aggregate demand, which confirms the conclusion just drawn. 
The average size of the government budget deficit as a share of 
aggregate demand did not rise until after the deterioration in the 
external value of the currency was already well advanced. Table V. 14 
shows that this figure jumps to a higher level (2.03%, as compared with 
the average for 1900-1940 of 0.92%) in 1957, and thereafter shows 
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figures which are on average higher than during the pre-WWII period. 
However, by 1957, the (black market) exchange rate has already risen to 
39.62 pesos per US$, as compared to less than 3 pesos per US$ for the 
whole period 1900-1930. Therefore it is not plausible to argue that 
the deterioration of the currency was caused by the behaviour of the 
government budget deficit. It seems likely, on the other hand, that 
the deterioration in the government budget was partly caused by the 
deterioration of the currency, due to the burden of foreign currency 
liabilities and the failure of government revenues to keep pace with 
the exchange rate. 
Two versions of the figures for the trade balance are given because 
they turned out to differ so strikingly when taken from different 
sources; this serves as a reminder of the vagueness of balance of 
payments figures. The person who would venture to try to explain the 
deterioration of the currency with reference to the trade balance 
figures shown here (in either column) is more imaginative than the 
present writer. 
Neither the behaviour of the government budget deficit nor the 
behaviour of the trade balance seems to offer a plausible source of 
explanation for the striking historical change in the trend of monetary 
and exchange rate stability in the Argentine case. 
6 Conclusions 
The statistical material presented in this chapter offers support for 
the view that the theoretical analysis developed in this thesis is 
pertinent to the Argentine case. The theoretical analysis developed in 
this thesis offers a fresh approach to explaining the historical 
emergence of some of the intractable problems which have plagued the 
Argentine economy in recent years. An attractive feature of this 
explanatory approach is that it accounts for the dramatic change from 
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monetary stability to increasing monetary instability which has been 
such a striking feature of the Argentine case. 
We saw that the economy was characterized in the pre-1930 period by 
the structural features which were shown in Chapter III to cause a 
tendency for EFI to predominate over DFI, and that the initiatives of 
the two great official banks made a major contribution towards 
overcoming that tendency. We also saw that the structure of the money 
supply was changing during this period, such that the imported share 'in 
the money supply was falling. This was attributed to the stabilization 
of the value of the domestic currency by the adoption of the Type II 
system, together with the important role of the Banco de la Nacion in 
the stabilization and development of the banking system. 
The role for government which was identified in Chapters III and IV 
in economies of this type was very successfully performed by the two 
official banks, the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco Hipotecario 
Nacional. The role performed by these official banks made a major 
contribution to the successful financial and economic development which 
characterized this pre-1930 period. 
The data presented here support the application of the arguments 
developed in Chapter IV in explanation of the emergence in the Post- 
WWII period of the intractable problems of inflation and 
underutilization of productive resources. The emergence of these 
problems is attributed to the pursuit of development policies which led 
to a closing of the economy without simultaneously reducing the 
imported share in the desired structure of the money supply. 
A particularly appealing feature of this explanatory approach is that 
it yields policy conclusions which widen the available range of policy 
initiatives in confronting these problems: In the analytical framework 
developed in this thesis a government is not stuck in a trap between 
the hazards of inflationary money creation on the one hand and 
intolerable underutilization of domestic resources on the other. 
Instead it can tackle both problems simultaneously, by developing 
275 
Chapter V 
through its official banks a profitable DFI portfolio of productive 
earning assets, in the manner that the Banco de la Nacion and Banco 
Hipotecario Nacional were doing in the pre-1930 period. By these means 
the structure of incremental money demand can be gradually altered, so 
that the full utilization of the productive capacity of the economy 
will no longer lead inexorably to exchange rate and balance of payments 
crises. 
Notes 
1. Information on the identity, by occupation group, of the various forms of deposits, as well 
as of loans, is given for this period in the volume 'Banco de in Nacion en su Cinquentenario , 
Banco de la Nacion Argentina (1941), which has been cited as a data source on the various 
tables. 
2. This practice was described in a note by Laura Randall (1978), in which Ms. Randall was 
quoting an unidentf ied speaker who had witnessed the practice. 
3. See for instance the books by J. N. Williams (1920), A. G. Ford (1962), and C. Diaz Alejandro 
(1965). 
4. Williams, Ford. Diaz Alejandro, and others, have all drawn attention to the fact that in 
the Argentine case exchange rate depreciation has a deflationary effect on aggregate 
expenditure, which would cause other expenditure related government revenues to fall, as 
well as customs revenues. The deflationary effect of exchange rate depreciation is caused by 
the income distribution effect, which is particularly severe against wage earners and lower 
income groups in Argentina because the major exports are also basic foodstufs, which figure 
largely in the expenditure bundles of these groups. 
5. Diaz Alejandro, 'Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic". 1970. 
6. The missing figures in these tables occur because no source for the information could be 
found. Upon arrival at the Central Bank library in Buenos Aires, I was informed by the 
director of the library that he was doubtful whether data on the currency denomination of 
banking operations could be found, although the fact that operations had been regularly 
conducted in two denominations was well known. The director was extremely helpful and 
well-informed in guiding my search for this data, which was eventually found. However, no 
consistent source for this information could be located, in six weeks of joint search of the 
Central Bank library resources. The main source, the annual volumes of the Memoria de 
Hacienda, was somewhat variable in its coverage during this period. 
7. Such, in my view unwarranted, conclusions have been drawn from relating the sectoral 
pattern of B de la N credit extension to the share of the sector in total national income, by 
Laura Randall (1978). Relating the sectoral pattern of credit to that of investment instead of 
to that of income has made no great difference to the main conclusions however. Reading 
through the annual reports of the Banco de la Nacion gave me the distinct impression of a 
bank being (very successfully) run by its directors according to the educated views of the time; 
the quality of the writing in these reports is very high, and testes clearly to educated 
thought. The portrayal of the bank as an instrument of government policy put forward by Ms. 
Randall strikes me as rather overdrawn, in view of the tenor of these reports during this 
period. 
8. This practice has been discussed in the literature on Argentine economic history, for 
instance by A. G. Ford (1962) and Laura Randall (1978). 
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9. Goldsmith, Raymond W. (1969), page 255. 
10. See for instance Mallon and Sourrouilie, 1975. 
Chapter V 
Table V. 1: Data on Structural Features of the Argentine Economy 
277 
year X/Y M/Y Sg/X Sp/X S/X I/Y ITT export 
conc. 
1900 32.9% 26.6% 27.1% 60.8% 70.0% 
1901 30.3% 25.5% 25.9% 54.1% 62.5% 
1902 30.9% 22.4% 26.1% 54.0% 58.5% 
1903 27.1% 25.5% 25.0% 59.9% 61.9% 
1904 24.5% 36.6% 32.7% 61.0% 66.3% 
1905 29.9% 30.6% 44.7% 63.3% 66.7% 
1906 28.5% 33.5% 50.8% 65.4% 66.9% 
1907 27.9% 31.9% 61.5% 64.8% 65.8% 
1908 25.4% 26.9% 47.8% 65.6% 66.3% 
1909 24.2% 29.6% 51.3% 64.9% 61.5% 
1910 25.0% 31.8% 57.2% 66.5% 56.5% 
1911 24.6% 34.0% 55.3% 66.0% 60.5% 
1912 22.7% 30.5% 41.7% 64.6% 60.0% 
1913 22.5% 33.2% 41.8% 64.8% 59.9% 
1914 25.1% 22.9% 12.5% 21.8% 34.3% 28.9% 55.9% 96.2% 
1915 25.6% 17.3% 9.2% 16.4% 25.6% 17.3% 47.7% 95.2% 
1916 26.4% 21.4% 9.5% 19.2% 28.7% 15.7% 51.7% 94.7% 
1917 28.7% 20.3% 8.1% 16.2% 24.3% 12.9% 48.5% 94.6% 
1918 24.3% 15.7% 6.5% 12.5% 19.0% 11.0% 53.1% 94.8% 
1919 23.4% 18.7% 4.9% 12.4% 17.3% 12.4% 55.2% 95.7% 
1920 30.3% 23.4% 3.6% 9.2% 12.8% 21.5% 66.3% 96.0% 
1921 29.6% 21.7% 6.5% 12.6% 19.1% 24.3% 56.2% 95.8% 
1922 27.4% 20.3% 6.6% 12.6% 19.2% 26.4% 55.8% 95.8% 
1923 24.7% 23.9% 6.8% 14.0% 20.8% 32.8% 59.2% 95.6% 
1924 22.9% 22.9% 5.8% 12.3% 18.1% 32.7% 59.8% 96.8% 
1925 28.4% 16.7% 5.8% 12.4% 18.2% 33.1% 60.7% 95.7% 
1926 27.1% 26.6% 6.0% 16.8% 22.8% 31.1% 56.9% 95.8% 
1927 25.3% 28.2% 5.3% 13.6% 18.9% 33.4% 56.7% 96.0% 
1928 23.9% 26.3% 5.5% 13.8% 19.3% 37.3% 59.5% 96.1% 
1929 22.8% 25.6% 6.2% 16.1% 22.3% 40.8% 58.1% 96.7% 
1930 22.3% 22.2% 11.2% 21.9% 33.1% 35.9% 55.0% 95.4% 
1931 23.9% 15.5% 13.8% 18.9% 32.7% 23.6% 52.1% 95.8% 
1932 24.7% 12.5% 14.5% 20.7% 35.2% 17.1% 38.1% 96.5% 
1933 23.6% 14.0% 15.6% 22.2% 37.8% 18.3% 40.8% 94.9% 
1934 21.9% 13.7% 13.1% 16.7% 29.8% 22.4% 36.1% 94.4% 
1935 22.3% 15.1% 11.2% 16.1% 27.3% 20.5% 32.0% 95.0% 
1936 20.2% 15.4% 9.9% 15.4% 25.3% 21.2% 30.5% 95.2% 
1937 21.7% 19.5% 6.5% 12.1% 18.6% 26.7% 30.6% 95.9% 
1938 15.3% 18.5% 8.3% 18.4% 26.7% 28.5% 37.8% 93.0% 
1939 18.1% 14.6% 9.0% 18.4% 27.4% 23.4% 32.4% 92.6% 
1940 14.5% 12.5% 10.7% 15.4% 26.1% 20.5% 25.0% 90.8% 
1941 14.0% 9.1% 9.0% 17.4% 26.4% 18.6% 20.8% 85.8% 
1942 12.7% 7.5% 9.1% 19.3% 28.4% 17.2% 17.6% 82.2% 
1943 14.1% 5.2% 6.0% 12.2% 18.2% 17.1% 11.5% 75.5% 
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1944 12.6% 4.8% 5.7% 15.3% 21.0% 17.6% 8.5% 82.3% 
1945 13.0% 5.0% 3.9% 11.5% 15.4% 18.3% 9.1% 82.2% 
1946 13.8% 8.5% 2.0% 9.5% 11.5% 21.8% 14.7% 85.9% 
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year X/Y M/Y Sg/X SP/X S/X I/Y ITT export 
conc. 
1947 11.7% 15.2% 0.7% 4.4% 5.1% 29.6% 17.8% 93.5% 
1948 9.3% 14.6% 6.6% 6.6% 29.0% 13.1% 95.7% 
1949 7.0% 10.5% 1.1% 1.1% 25.2% 5.9% 95.5% 
1950 9.6% 8.9% 0.2% 0.2% 24.3% 4.6% 92.6% 
1950 13.2% 13.6% 0.2% 0.2% 16.4% 3.1% 92.6% 
1951 10.0% 14.7% 0.4% 2.8% 19.5% 4.0% 94.1% 
1952 7.8% 11.4% 0.5% 1.5% 18.3% 2.5% 92.0% 
1953 11.3% 8.8% 0.3% 1.0% 17.1% 1.3% 94.2% 
1954 11.6% 11.2% 1.4% 15.8% 1.8% 95.4% 
1955 9.8% 12.6% 2.3% 17.1% 2.2% 94.0% 
1956 10.9% 10.9% 1.8% 17.7% 17.2% 94.2% 
1957 10.9% 11.6% 1.3% 18.5% 8.9% 92.6% 
1958 10.6% 11.4% 3.1% 19.0% 9.0% 95.0% 
1959 11.9% 10.8% 4.0% 16.0% 24.8% 95.6% 
1960 11.1% 12.3% 5.3% 22.5% 21.0% 75.4% 
1961 9.6% 13.7% 10.6% 24.5% 20.8% 93.7% 
1962 13.1% 13.4% 5.9% 22.6% 94.4% 
1963 13.7% 10.7% 5.0% 19.7% 87.2% 
1964 11.6% 11.2% 7.3% 19.7% 91.1% 
1965 11.7% 10.2% 6.0% 18.9% 92.7% 
1966 12.8% 9.7% 9.5% 19.4% 61.4% 
1967 12.3% 9.3% 8.2% 19.8% 55.8% 
1968 11.6% 9.7% 10.3% 21.4% 50.2% 
1969 12.4% 11.0% 9.9% 23.6% 53.9% 
1970 12.7% 10.4% 8.0% 23.6% 53.4% 
1971 10.7% 10.8% 14.7% 24.7% 55.9% 
1972 9.7% 9.9% 17.2% 25.1% 55.1% 
1973 9.7% 9.1% 12.1% 23.8% 52.0% 
1974 9.2% 8.9% 8.5% 24.4% 48.2% 
1975 7.7% 9.5% 14.6% 24.0% 51.5% 
1976 11.0% 7.4% 12.6% 25.8% 49.6% 
1977 15.7% 8.8% 10.2% 28.8% 47.7% 
1978 17.2% 7.9% 11.1% 26.8% 46.9% 
1979 16.5% 9.9% 11.5% 28.0% 50.4% 
1980 14.8% 13.1% 14.2% 27.9% 48.9% 
Sources: ITT: 1900-1950 Diaz Alejandro (1970) p. 490; 1950-1961 Diaz 
Alejandro (1970) p. 491. All other data are from Economia 720 as 
follows: Sg/X, Sp/X, S/X, pp. 274-275; X/Y, 1900-34, constructed from 
Y on p. 242 and X on p. 249 (figures for Y are 5-year averages to 
1934); X/Y, 1935-80, p. 249; M/Y, 1900-1980, p. 227; I/Y, 1900-80, p. 242; 
Export conc., pp. 246-248. 
Notes: 1950 appears twice because of change in price index used in the 
underlying calculations, as follows: figures 1935-1950 are based on 
1950 prices; figures 1950-1980 are based on 1960 prices. 
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ITT: customs revenue as a% of government revenue; 
ITT: figures 1900-50 are as a% of tax revenues; 
ITT: figures 1950-61 are as a% of total current revenue; 
X/Y: exports as a% of GDP; M/Y: imports as % of GDP; 
I/Y: Fixed capital investment as % of GDP. 
S/X: total external debt service as % of exports; 
Sg/X: government external debt service as a% of exports; 
Sp/X: private sector external debt service as % of exports; 
Export conc.: 1900-1913: top three items as % of total exports; 
1914-1980: agricultural exports as % of total (excluding hunting, 
fishing and forestry). 
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Table V. 2: Percentage of total deposits and loans denominated in gold 
Banco de la Nacion 
Banco de la Nacion 




year % gold % gold % gold % gold deposits loans 
1892 1.50% 0.00% 
1893 5.97% 0.00% 
1894 1.30% 0.00% 
1895 2.20% 0.00% 
1896 0.00% 
1897 0.00% 
1898 3.44% 0.00% 
1899 4.05% 0.02% 
1900 2.20% 
1901 1.29% 
1902 19.79% 0.02% 
1903 3.52% 0.62% 
1904 3.37% 0.93% 
1905 2.02% 1.69% 
1906 4.04% 1.78% 
1907 2.47% 2.13% 
1908 5.93% 
1909 
1910 2.69% 1.29% 
1911 2.78% 1.05% 
1912 1.70% 1.00% 
1913 2.91% 0.90% 
1914 1.31% 0.42% 
1915 2.23% 0.54% 
17.07% 20.24% 24.62% 26.88% 
18.43% 20.04% 28.62% 28.94% 
16.34% 19.15% 23.77% 27.76% 
11.09% 16.42% 26.17% 23.46% 
9.53% 14.78% 25.51% 22.46% 
9.60% 13.95% 25.57% 27.97% 
7.72% 13.75% 21.54% 25.66% 
0.78% 
7.40% 8.31% 28.11% 30.15% 
6.94% 7.05% 29.96% 28.92% 
5.82% 5.87% 29.34% 28.25% 
5.37% 4.81% 29.99% 27.78% 
4.45% 4.31% 32.30% 28.24% 
5.60% 4.23% 33.42% 32.17% 
5.11% 2.66% 44.50% 45.22% 
2.53% 1.75% 43.68% 40.57% 
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1916 0.31% 2.01% 1.64% 41.92% 38.18% 
1917 0.70% 0.04% 1.78% 0.93% 37.16% 42.13% 
1918 0.34% 0.00% 0.90% 0.48% 35.76% 51.84% 
1919 0.15% 0.00% 1.07% 0.75% 35.69% 50.33% 
1920 0.39% 0.00% 0.69% 0.75% 33.33% 46.38% 
1921 0.25% 0.00% 0.68% 0.60% 32.95% 42.23% 
1922 0.32% 0.00% 0.63% 0.51% 34.93% 45.73% 
1923 0.35% 0.00% 0.35% 0.48% 41.10% 50.45% 
1924 0.36% 0.00% 0.27% 0.55% 40.86% 48.20% 
1925 0.20% 0.00% 0.22% 0.33% 40.48% 45.33% 
1926 0.22% 0.00% 0.21% 0.30% 40.01% 46.41% 
1927 0.11% 0.00% 0.15% 0.06% 40.45% 46.68% 
1928 0.06% 0.00% 
1929 0.06% 0.00% 
1930 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 37.75% 45.33% 
1931 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 
Sources: (i) Banco de la Nacion loans and deposits: Memoria de Hacienda, 
various years; series compiled from annual balance sheets of 
Banco de la Nacion. 
(ii) All banks total loans and deposits: 
1900-1906: Memoria de Hacienda 1906 pp. CLII-CLXV 
1908-1919: econ 690 pp. 220-221 
1920-1927: Memoria de Hacienda 1927 pp. 138-139 
1930-1931: Memoria de Hacienda 1930-31 
Notes: Banco de la Nacion % total all banks: Banco de la Nacion 
deposits and loans as a percentage of total deposits and loans 
for all banks. 
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(Selected Years) 
Banks with Banks with 
Banco de la 
gold denominated paper denominated 
Nacion Argentina 
year capitals capitals 
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1900 31.60% 7.72% 2.20% 
1901 32.16% 12.08% 1.29% 
1902 33.27% 6.81% 0.02% 
1903 26.12% 5.15% 0.62% 
1904 21.61% 6.62% 0.93% 
1905 20.62% 6.74% 1.69% 
1906 21.92% 6.97% 1.78% 
1909 14.69% 2.08% 1.25% 
1910 13.04% 1.74% 1.29% 
1911 12.71% 2.54% 1.05% 
1918 1.74% 0.23% 
1919 0.97% 0.66% 
1927 0.05% 0.16% 
1930 0.05% 0.01% 
1931 0.00% 0.00% 
Sources: 
1900-1906 Memoria de Hacienda 1906 
1909-11 Memoria de Hacienda 1909,1910,1911 
1918 Bancos 523 pp. 84-85 
1919 Econ 690 pp. 220-221 
1927 Bancos 525 (table 1) 








Table V. 4: Gold denominated loans as percentage of total BHN loans 
BHN is the National Mortgage Bank, Banco Hipotecario Nacional 
Gold loans as 






























Source: series compiled from BHN annual balance sheets in Memoria de 
Hacienda and in BHN Annual Reports 
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Table V. 5: Percentage of total loans extended to each sector 
year banks agriculture industry 
1905 0.00% 33.96% 7.03% 59.01% 
1906 0.00% 36.24% 7.23% 56.53% 
1907 0.00% 35.80% 6.58% 57.63% 
1908 0.00% 34.19% 6.99% 58.83% 
1909 0.00% 33.32% 7.41% 59.27% 
1910 0.00% 32.23% 6.66% 61.11% 
1911 0.00% 31.33% 6.24% 62.43% 
1912 0.00% 32.79% 6.38% 60.84% 
1913 0.00% 31.18% 6.39% 62.43% 
1914 11.84% 35.76% 9.08% 55.15% 
1915 9.77% 41.45% 7.04% 51.51% 
1916 7.15% 35.22% 5.69% 59.09% 
1917 3.87% 32.50% 4.32% 63.17% 
1918 0.74% 31.40% 4.10% 64.50% 
1919 0.00% 32.99% 3.34% 63.68% 
1920 0.00% 35.30% 3.63% 61.06% 
1921 0.00% 36.91% 4.43% 58.66% 
1922 0.00% 33.01% 4.11% 62.88% 
1923 0.00% 29.42% 4.93% 65.65% 
1924 0.00% 25.88% 4.63% 69.49% 
1925 31.60% 27.36% 10.68% 61.95% 
1926 31.20% 26.85% 10.30% 62.85% 
1927 29.23% 30.27% 10.85% 58.88% 
1928 35.86% 31.19% 12.32% 56.49% 
1929 34.69% 29.34% 12.15% 58.51% 
1930 39.00% 36.02% 12.31% 51.67% 
1931 45.10% 32.99% 11.97% 55.03% 
1932 60.82% 32.91% 13.03% 54.07% 
1933 69.60% 30.95% 17.90% 51.15% 
1934 63.95% 47.53% 13.95% 38.51% 
1935 55.98% 24.96% 13.36% 61.68% 
1936 3.66% 18.84% 16.65% 64.51% 
1937 2.19% 19.72% 19.30% 60.98% 
1938 1.19% 27.01% 16.44% 56.55% 
1939 0.53% 48.19% 11.40% 40.42% 
1940 1.06% 35.60% 14.05% 50.35% 
Source: 
Banco de la Nacion Argentina (1941) pp. 257-258 
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Note: 
Figure for banks is percentage of total loans given. Other figures 
use total loans excluding loans to other banks. 




Table V. 6: Sectoral Share as % of Total Gross Fixed Capital Investment 
year agriculture industry other 
1900 7.00% 19.80% 73.20% 
1901 8.40% 16.40% 75.20% 
1902 15.30% 16.70% 68.00% 
1903 15.10% 17.80% 67.10% 
1904 13.20% 20.50% 66.30% 
1905 9.90% 13.40% 76.70% 
1906 12.00% 13.20% 74.80% 
1907 9.80% 12.20% 78.00% 
1908 10.60% 13.30% 76.10% 
1909 7.90% 12.20% 79.90% 
1910 9.20% 12.20% 78.60% 
1911 7.30% 13.60% 79.10% 
1912 8.40% 19.70% 71.90% 
1913 10.40% 17.10% 72.50% 
1914 21.60% 15.00% 63.40% 
1915 27.00% 15.00% 58.00% 
1916 30.60% 12.90% 56.50% 
1917 31.60% 15.20% 53.20% 
1918 35.00% 13.90% 51.10% 
1919 29.60% 17.30% 53.10% 
1920 22.20% 17.30% 60.50% 
1921 18.10% 17.00% 64.90% 
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1922 15.50% 14.10% 70.40% 
1923 14.50% 14.70% 70.80% 
1924 16.60% 15.00% 68.40% 
1925 18.60% 16.50% 64.90% 
1926 17.90% 17.20% 64.90% 
1927 15.90% 15.30% 68.80% 
1928 15.00% 16.10% 68.90% 
1929 15.40% 15.50% 69.10% 
1930 13.00% 15.50% 71.50% 
1931 12.50% 16.60% 70.90% 
1932 15.50% 15.20% 69.30% 
1933 13.70% 15.70% 70.60% 
1934 12.30% 14.00% 73.70% 
1935 15.10% 17.60% 67.30% 
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Source: Econ 720 p. 235 
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Table V. 7: Ratios of Banco de la Nacion's (B de la N) loan portfolio 



































































Source: All series constructed from data 
de la Nacion Argentina (1941) p. 257-8. 
Notes: 
B de la NB de la 



































































V. 6 and Banco 
Column 1: Ratio of the % of total Banco de la Nacion (B de la N) loans 
to grain sector, to the share of agriculture in total 
investment. 
Column 2: Ratio of the % of total B de la N loans to livestock sector, 
to the share of agriculture in total investment. Agriculture is 
here divided into grain and livestock. Figures in Table V. 5 are 
for grain and livestock jointly. Separate figures for grain and 
livestock share in investment are not available. 
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Column 3: Ratio of the % of total B de la N loans to industry, to the 
share of industry in total investment. 
Column 4: Ratio of the % of total B de la N loans to other sectors, to 
the share of other sectors in total investment. 
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Table V. 8: Argentine Monetary Data 
All figures in millions m/n; 
Figures in (parentheses) denote negative numbers 
year 
Gold and Foreign Exchange 
Go Gb Hb Hp 
(Official) (Private) (bank) (public) 
1900 n. a. 79.5 126 168 
1901 n. a. 77.2 132 163 
1902 0.0 97.6 131 165 
1903 8.7 84.0 176 204 
1904 114.3 102.2 151 255 
1905 204.6 88.5 182 315 
1906 233.2 72.6 202 324 
1907 238.6 90.9 220 311 
1908 287.7 108.0 230 351 
1909 391.6 152.4 319 365 
1910 422.2 153.2 333 382 
1911 429.1 134.6 351 371 
1912 505.9 156.1 378 421 
1913 529.4 122.4 400 422 
1914 509.4 103.6 361 441 
1915 693.8 54.4 554 433 
1916 719.2 69.7 569 443 
1917 719.3 121.2 542 470 
1918 860.4 117.2 658 498 
1919 883.1 138.7 605 571 
1920 1,068.3 97.9 851 511 
1921 1,068.5 78.0 892 470 
1922 1,068.5 75.5 847 515 
1923 1,068.3 50.5 691 670 
1924 1,025.5 39.2 626 693 
1925 1,025.5 53.3 655 664 
1926 1,025.5 53.4 651 668 
1927 1,084.1 185.7 663 715 
1928 1,111.5 343.2 535 871 
1929 952.6 93.6 388 859 
1930 966.5 21.8 451 810 
1931 592.2 7.2 513 732 
1932 583.2 4.7 645 694 
1933 560.3 4.7 520 694 
1934 560.2 2.6 411 760 
1935 1,353.7 0.4 358 820 
1936 1,527.7 0.0 388 914 
1937 1,422.0 0.0 369 990 




1939 1,396.0 0.0 391 1,101 
1940 1,440.3 20.0 319 1,128 













































































































1976 11,400,000.0 (9,100.0) 15,200,000 
1977 110,100,000.0 (53,500.0) 
107,300,000 
1978 308,600,000.0 (156,800.0) 
333,200,000 










































Exchange rates are: (i) 1900-34: 1 gold peso = 2.27 m/n; V. L. 
Phelps (1938) p. 263; Gb 1900-06: Bancos 525 p. 27; Gb 1907-35: Bancos 
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831 p. 54; Go 1936-39: Bancos 3437 p. 201; Go 1940-79: Bancos 720 
pp. 298-302; Gb 1940-79: Bancos 720 pp. 307-312; Hb, Hp, D 1900-1927: 
Bancos 525 Table 26; Hb, Hp, D 1928-35: Bancos 831 pp. 6,62; Hb, Hp 
1936-39: Bancos 3437 p. 201; D 1936-39: Bancos 1349 p. 164; Hb, Hp, 
1940-1979: Bancos 720 pp. 303-306; D 1940-70: Bancos 720pp. 313-316. 
Notes: Go: Official holdings of gold and foreign exchange. Held 
by Conversion Office 1900-35; transferred to the new Central Bank in 



















































































































































1946 11,174 14,755 
1947 12,791 17,563 





year (Deposits) (F = Hp+D) 
1949 20,615 29,682 
1950 23,378 35,290 
1951 26,210 41,573 
1952 28,291 46,549 
1953 35,740 57,806 
1954 42,610 69,354 
1955 49,458 81,284 
1956 64,483 100,626 
1957 71,893 113,706 
1958 102,262 162,540 
1959 132,834 217,248 
1960 176,649 282,010 
1961 199,376 321,060 
1962 203,986 339,365 
1963 283,100 450,200 
1964 415,900 643,700 
1965 539,000 835,600 
1966 692,400 1,089,300 
1967 980,800 1,489,500 
1968 1,317,400 1,908,900 
1969 1,503,900 2,162,800 
1970 1,855,000 2,616,700 
1971 2,526,800 3,520,200 
1972 3,984,800 5,300,500 
1973 7,779,100 10,419,700 
1974 12,600,900 16,913,400 
1975 33,500,000 45,900,000 
1976 153,900,000 194,900,000 
1977 538,000,000 645,300,000 
1978 1,449,400,000 1,782,600,000 
1979 4,320,100,000 5,107,100,000 
Notes: Gb is gold and foreign exchange held by private sector banks 
(commercial banks). Data for Gb for 1936-39 were not available but are 
believed negligible. Hb is cash (note issue) held by banks. Hp is cash 
held by public. D is total commercial bank deposits. Prior to 1935 
figures for deposits include savings and fixed term deposits. Figures 
after 1935 are for current account deposits only. F is total money 
supply, defined as Hp + D. 
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year G/F Go/H (Hb+Gb) /D Gb/D Gb/Hb 
1900 14.01% n. a. 51.49% 19.91% 63.10% 42.11% 
1901 13.76% n. a. 52.56% 19.39% 58.48% 40.95% 
1902 16.77% 0.00% 54.82% 23.41% 74.50% 39.57% 
1903 13.09% 2.28% 51.59% 16.66% 47.73$ 40.48% 
1904 25.76% 28.15% 43.27% 17.46% 67.68% 43.59% 
1905 28.33% 41.18% 37.57% 12.30% 48.63% 43.75% 
1906 28.34% 44.33% 36.38% 9.62% 35.94% 42.91% 
1907 30.12% 44.94% 39.70% 11.61% 41.32% 39.72% 
1908 32.30% 49.51% 38.67% 12.36% 46.96% 40.16% 
1909 35.75% 57.25% 40.75% 13.17% 47.77% 31.55% 
1910 33.57% 59.05% 36.50% 11.50% 46.01% 28.68% 
1911 32.31% 59.44% 35.34% 9.80% 38.35% 27.00% 
1912 34.83% 63.32% 36.09% 10.55% 41.30% 28.45% 
1913 35.56% 64.40% 37.03% 8.68% 30.60% 29.91% 
1914 37.61% 63.52% 39.08% 8.72% 28.70% 37.09% 
1915 40.40% 70.29% 42.87% 3.83% 9.82% 30.51% 
1916 38.69% 71.07% 40.02% 4.37% 12.25% 27.76% 
1917 35.60% 71.07% 35.07% 6.41% 22.36% 24.85% 
1918 30.91% 74.43% 29.09% 4.40% 17.81% 18.69% 
1919 30.01% 75.09% 26.24% 4.90% 22.93% 20.15% 
1920 30.66% 78.43% 28.82% 2.97% 11.50% 15.52% 
1921 31.44% 78.45% 30.53% 2.46% 8.74% 14.79% 
1922 30.00% 78.45% 27.97% 2.29% 8.91% 15.62% 
1923 29.94% 78.49% 24.18% 1.65% 7.31% 21.85% 
1924 26.54% 77.75% 20.04% 1.18% 6.26% 20.88% 
1925 26.98% 77.75% 21.24% 1.60% 8.14% 19.92% 
1926 26.79% 77.75% 20.97% 1.59% 8.20% 19.89% 
1927 29.81% 78.67% 23.94% 5.24% 28.01% 20.17% 
1928 30.16% 79.06% 22.22% 8.68% 64.15% 22.03% 
1929 21.97% 76.39% 12.34% 2.40% 24.12% 22.01% 
1930 20.74% 76.65% 11.95% 0.55% 4.83% 20.48% 
1931 14.11% 47.57% 14.79% 0.20% 1.40% 20.81% 
1932 13.93% 43.56% 18.43% 0.13% 0.73% 19.69% 
1933 14.26% 46.16% 16.06% 0.14% 0.90% 21.24% 
1934 13.44% 47.84% 12.07% 0.08% 0.63% 22.18% 
1935 32.42% 114.92% 10.68% 0.01% 0.11% 24.43% 
1936 33.02% 117.33% 10.45% 0.00% 0.00% 24.62% 
1937 27.20% 104.64% 8.71% 0.00% 0.00% 23.36% 
1938 25.00% 97.74% 8.14% 0.00% 0.00% 23.43% 
1939 26.23% 93.57% 9.26% 0.00% 0.00% 26.08% 
1940 27.12% 99.58% 7.96% 0.47% 6.27% 26.49% 
1941 27.78% 109.20% 4.93% -1.91% -27.92% 27.30% 
1942 30.46% 117.86% 5.73% -1.54% -21.17% 26.81% 
1943 41.22% 156.64% 5.98% -0.61% -9.20% 27.30% 
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1944 44.64% 167.36% 5.60% -0.69% -11.00% 28.36% 
1945 50.48% 177.10% 5.70% -0.71% -11.04% 31.46% 
1946 37.27% 137.05% 3.50% -1.32% -27.36% 32.05% 
1947 21.44% 67.51% 5.84% 0.94% 19.11% 37.31% 
1948 10.38% 31.31% 6.21% 0.35% 5.93% 39.16% 
1949 7.73% 19.46% 7.26% 1.44% 24.75% 43.98% 
1950 9.02% 20.18% 8.14% 2.11% 34.93% 50.95% 
1951 5.99% 7.15% 13.66% 4.67% 51.93% 58.62% 
1952 1.87% 2.39% 11.97% 1.28% 11.98% 64.54% 
1953 5.24% 10.18% 13.36% 0.93% 7.51% 61.74% 
1954 4.15% 8.44% 11.88% 0.49% 4.32% 62.77% 
1955 2.81% 0.88% 15.37% 3.94% 34.53% 64.35% 
1956 4.38% 2.58% 15.46% 5.12% 49.54% 56.05% 
1957 3.70% 1.83% 16.59% 4.57% 38.06% 58.16% 
1958 -0.42% -6.77% 14.89% 4.06% 37.49% 58.95% 
1959 6.10% 7.35% 15.97% 4.46% 38.69% 63.55% 
1960 11.51% 18.61% 17.53% 4.94% 39.18% 59.64% 
1961 5.72% 9.84% 11.27% 2.32% 25.89% 61.03% 
1962 3.65% 6.72% 9.61% 1.03% 12.01% 66.37% 
1963 2.55% 5.29% 10.81% 0.39% 3.73% 59.03% 
1964 0.62% 2.50% 10.07% -0.67% -6.26% 54.77% 
1965 1.89% 7.54% 7.50% -1.93% -20.47% 55.03% 
1966 1.38% 7.09% 6.38% -2.53% -28.36% 57.32% 
1967 7.60% 22.64% 8.76% -2.82% -24.38% 51.87% 
1968 5.82% 20.67% 6.51% -2.76% -29.81% 44.90% 
1969 1.92% 11.53% 4.83% -3.21% -39.95% 43.81% 
1970 4.96% 20.44% 5.14% -3.08% -37.51% 41.06% 
1971 -1.30% 0.61% 3.66% -2.09% -36.36% 39.31% 
1972 3.28% 15.06% 4.79% -1.58% -24.74% 33.02% 
1973 7.64% 26.52% 6.89% -0.81% -10.52% 33.94% 
1974 4.95% 15.55% 7.89% 0.10% 1.34% 34.22% 
1975 0.87% 2.47% 11.34% -0.01% -0.05% 37.01% 
1976 5.84% 20.28% 9.87% -0.01% -0.06% 26.64% 
1977 17.05% 72.05% 8.45% -0.01% -0.12% 19.94% 
1978 17.30% 71.39% 6.83% -0.01% -0.16% 22.99% 
1979 19.35% 96.82% 5.41% -0.01% -0.27% 18.22% 
All figures are constructed from data in Table V. 8 
H= Hb + Hp 
Note: G/F is here (Go+Gb)/F since Gp figures are unavailable 
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Ratio of the price index for each category to the index for the 
aggregate price level. (Base 1960) 
year food clothing general house- rent 
Elec- Houses 


















1934 0.75 0.87 0.85 1.31 15.75 5.92 
7.72 
1935 0.79 0.82 0.80 1.31 14.86 5.59 
5.88 
1936 0.84 0.76 0.74 1.31 13.70 5.15 
4.63 
1937 0.84 0.77 0.72 1.29 13.95 4.34 
4.40 
1938 0.80 0.82 0.72 1.29 15.11 3.88 
4.76 
1939 0.80 0.84 0.71 1.29 15.26 3.82 
5.01 
1940 0.79 0.91 0.70 1.33 14.96 3.73 
5.66 
1941 0.80 0.92 0.68 1.29 14.57 3.64 
5.58 
1942 0.83 0.90 0.64 1.25 13.79 3.61 
6.46 
1943 0.83 0.89 0.74 1.36 12.98 3.84 
6.10 




1945 0.83 0.85 0.83 1.33 12.75 3.58 
6.11 
1946 0.85 0.91 0.85 1.17 10.84 2.88 
5.64 
1947 0.86 0.99 0.81 1.17 9.54 2.53 
5.74 
1948 0.87 1.05 0.80 1.13 8.44 2.48 
5.85 
1949 0.86 1.13 0.86 1.09 6.54 2.27 
5.39 
1950 0.88 1.10 0.93 1.06 5.59 1.81 
6.42 
1951 0.88 1.18 0.98 0.98 4.09 1.35 
4.13 
1952 0.92 1.15 0.95 0.99 2.95 1.25 
2.25 
1953 0.91 1.19 0.94 1.00 2.83 1.34 
2.96 
1954 0.87 1.28 0.99 0.97 2.73 1.30 
3.37 
1955 0.86 1.30 1.02 0.96 2.43 1.19 
2.28 
1956 0.86 1.25 1.04 1.21 2.14 1.07 
1.75 
1957 0.92 1.13 1.03 1.23 1.72 0.98 
1.70 
1958 0.96 1.05 1.03 1.22 1.31 1.02 
1.59 
1959 1.05 0.87 0.94 1.50 0.61 1.46 
0.64 
1960 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 
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year food clothing general house- rent 
Elec- Houses 
expenses hold tricity 
1961 0.97 1.08 1.05 0.92 0.91 
0.77 
1962 0.98 1.05 1.08 0.77 0.94 
0.61 
1963 0.97 1.04 1.13 0.64 1.02 
0.38 
1964 1.01 1.02 1.07 0.55 0.83 
0.40 
1965 1.00 1.02 1.10 0.45 0.94 
0.61 
1966 0.95 1.03 1.15 1.09 0.99 
1967 0.95 1.03 1.20 0.93 0.96 
1968 0.95 1.02 1.25 0.88 1.06 
1969 0.94 1.04 1.28 0.90 0.98 
1970 0.96 1.00 1.27 0.87 0.87 
1971 1.01 0.88 1.19 1.01 0.81 
1972 1.04 0.86 1.16 0.86 0.55 
1973 1.01 0.85 1.15 1.72 0.48 
1974 0.93 1.05 1.22 1.54 0.42 
1975 0.95 1.08 1.22 1.04 0.18 
1976 0.97 1.04 1.20 0.67 0.21 
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Notes: The figures in columns 1-6 were calculated by the author from 
various issues of the publication "Cost of Living in the Federal 
Capital [Buenos Aires]", Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Census. 
Column 7 ("Houses"): figures constructed from average sale prices for 
properties sold by the National Mortgage Bank (BHN). Underlying data 
taken from Annual Reports of the BHN, various years. 
302 
Chapter V 
Table V. 11: "BOP Pressure", Liquidity (k), and Other Data 
k "BOP pressure" 



























































































































-27.04% 2.49% 26.44% 
-38.28% -18.38% 25.46% 
-34.17% 10.88% 16.77% 
-47.58% 4.41% 13.41% 
8.76% 19.98% 40.40% 
32.53% 47.54% 42.43% 
18.93% 36.10% 37.91% 
29.34% 30.88% 41.41% 
35.33% 37.54% 29.32% 
20.13% 36.41% 13.91% 
22.85% 10.45% -4.72% 
26.62% -11.74% 22.93% 
25.87% -2.02% 30.50% 
3.10% -12.61% 2.17% 
-0.09% 18.09% 0.87% 
41.28% -1.01% -1.49% 
1.96% -3.83% 5.49% 
-11.31% 15.13% 25.90% 
-10.24% 20.65% -0.62% 
-12.25% 9.64% 24.94% 
0.28% -20.34% 36.22% 
35.21% 19.37% 12.81% 
49.48% 35.09% 3.29% 
40.76% 19.98% 2.50% 
37.46% 22.81% 0.02% 
32.20% 25.11% -3.12% 
23.93% 32.55% -2.09% 
10.10% 32.58% 4.37% 
-21.06% -4.36% 18.00% 
19.20% 14.94% -2.43% 
14.02% -4.97% 19.82% 
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1941 0.46 6.38% 1.05 35.00% 12.83% 16.13% 
1942 0.50 6.19% 0.95 41.04% 28.79% 11.55% 
1943 0.57 0.31% 0.71 63.10% 57.03% 17.89% 
1944 0.62 9.59% 0.65 61.82% 57.33% 17.94% 
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k "BOP pressure" government 
year (k=F/Y) (b*k*)dY/X b*/b (X-M)/X (X-M)/X 
deficit % 
1945 0.60 12.88% 0.58 61.53% 53.80% 14.70% 
1946 0.62 19.37% 0.78 38.51% 41.30% 9.26% 
1947 0.59 21.65% 1.36 -30.09% 2.83% -8.82% 
1948 0.67 21.21% 2.80 -56.56% -11.69% -2.95% 
1949 0.67 33.30% 3.76 -44.04% -24.82% -1.12% 
1950 0.60 30.53% 3.22 7.27% 11.17% -1.20% 
1950 0.59 23.15% 4.85 -2.91% 11.17% -0.73% 
1951 0.49 35.89% 15.54 -46.29% -56.29% -0.46% 
1952 0.42 37.73% 5.54 -46.70% -90.37% -0.28% 
1953 0.47 9.48% 7.00 22.02% 21.17% -0.14% 
1954 0.53 7.80% 10.36 3.55% 4.64% 9.88% 
1955 0.51 21.07% 6.63 -29.04% -26.28% 9.90% 
1956 0.55 14.68% 7.85 1.07% -15.68% 1.89% 
1957 0.47 27.37% -69.84 -5.97% -34.43% 27.07% 
1958 0.48 32.56% 4.77 -7.26% -24.02% 30.70% 
1959 0.32 51.33% 2.52 9.04% 1.70% 13.42% 
1960 0.30 29.73% 5.08 -11.04% -15.76% 21.40% 
1961 0.28 22.84% 7.97 -43.39% -51.47% 38.47% 
1962 0.24 18.06% 11.38 -1.99% -11.55% 39.21% 
1963 0.26 16.55% 46.77 22.07% 28.18% 49.55% 
1964 0.28 27.02% 15.37 3.80% 23.62% 30.98% 
1965 0.26 29.92% 21.11 12.93% 19.69% 31.80% 
1966 0.25 23.51% 3.82 24.14% 19.16% 
1967 0.26 24.43% 4.99 24.41% 13.18% 
1968 0.28 18.30% 15.11 16.66% 4.88% 
1969 0.27 14.10% 5.86 11.59% 4.30% 
1970 0.27 15.83% -22.29 17.88% 13.39% 
1971 0.26 33.37% 8.87 -1.30% 16.46% 
1972 0.24 48.71% 3.80 -1.91% 32.93% 
1973 0.27 51.74% 5.88 6.28% 28.61% 
1974 0.34 31.27% 33.50 3.17% 45.88% 
1975 0.33 102.43% 4.97 -24.04% 44.82% 
1976 0.26 90.48% 1.70 32.46% 
1977 1.68 44.07% 
1978 1.50 54.04% 
1979 39.87% 
1980 11.75% 
b*k* = 0.12194542 b* = 0.29066310 k* = 0.41954215 
Sources: 
Y (=GDP): constructed from data in Econ 720 pp. 212-213 
X: constructed from data in Econ 720 p. 249 




k: constructed from data for F and Y (see note below) 
b*, k*: taken to be the average values of b and k respectively for the 
period 1900-1929 
dY: is the change in Y between the given year and the previous year. 
Column 4: constructed from data for X/Y and M/Y in Table V. 1 
Column 5: 1900-1953 Diaz Alejandro (1970) pp. 461,475-476 
1954-1979 Econ 720 p. 264 
Column 6: government defecit as percentage of total government 
expenditure taken from Econ 720 p. 283 
Notes: 
k is defined as: k= F/Y; b is defined as: b= G/F 
Data for X and Y were given in 1950 prices for 1900-1950, and in 1960 
prices for 1950-1979. This also explains the duplication of data for 
1950. Current nominal figures constructed using price index data from 
the same source as Table V. 10. 
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Table V. 12: Exchange Rates and the Aggregate Price Index 




official black official Price level 
rate market rate 1960=100 exch. 
rate 1960=100 1960=1 
1900 2.3451 2.3451 2.83 
1901 2.3451 2.3451 2.83 
1902 2.3472 2.3472 2.83 
1903 2.3493 2.3493 2.84 
1904 2.3472 2.3472 2.83 
1905 2.3493 2.3493 2.84 
1906 2.3432 2.3432 2.83 
1907 2.4049 2.4049 2.90 
1908 2.3472 2.3472 2.83 
1909 2.3472 2.3472 2.83 
1910 2.3533 2.3533 2.84 
1911 2.3576 2.3576 2.85 
1912 2.3514 2.3514 2.84 
1913 2.3842 2.3842 2.88 
1914 2.4388 2.4388 2.95 2.118 1.39 
1915 2.3933 2.3933 2.89 2.283 1.27 
1916 2.362 2.362 2.85 2.451 1.16 
1917 2.2814 2.2814 2.76 2.869 0.96 
1918 2.2466 2.2466 2.71 3.62 0.75 
1919 2.305 2.305 2.78 3.4 0.82 
1920 2.5505 2.5505 3.08 3.983 0.77 
1921 3.1411 3.1411 3.79 3.539 1.07 
1922 2.7768 2.7768 3.35 2.979 1.13 
1923 2.9052 2.9052 3.51 2.924 1.20 
1924 2.915 2.915 3.52 2.979 1.18 
1925 2.488 2.488 3.00 2.897 1.04 
1926 2.4675 2.4675 2.98 2.814 1.06 
1927 2.3619 2.3619 2.85 2.785 1.02 
1928 2.3583 2.3583 2.85 2.759 1.03 
1929 2.3906 2.3906 2.89 2.785 1.04 
1930 2.7384 2.7384 3.31 2.814 1.18 
1931 3.455 3.455 4.17 2.422 1.72 
1932 3.8864 3.8864 4.69 2.173 2.16 
1933 3.2332 3.2332 3.90 2.451 1.59 
1934 3.9527 3.9527 4.77 2.173 2.20 
1935 3.81 3.81 4.60 2.303 2.00 
1936 3.6 3.6 4.35 2.498 1.74 
1937 3.33 3.33 4.02 2.564 1.57 
1938 3.92 3.92 4.73 2.547 1.86 
1939 4.33 4.33 5.23 2.587 2.02 
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1940 4.37 4.37 5.28 2.645 2.00 
1941 4.24 4.24 5.12 2.715 1.89 
1942 4.23 4.23 5.11 2.869 1.78 


















































































































official Price level 
rate 1960=100 exch. 
1960=100 1960=1 
4.86 2.892 1.68 
4.87 3.463 1.41 
4.94 4.075 1.21 
5.47 4.627 1.18 
5.11 5.233 0.98 
5.86 6.86 0.85 
7.92 8.612 0.92 
9.06 11.771 0.77 
9.06 16.328 0.55 
9.06 16.978 0.53 
9.06 17.622 0.51 
12.22 19.792 0.62 
21.74 22.446 0.97 
21.74 27.995 0.78 
21.74 36.836 0.59 
97.38 78.717 1.24 
100.00 100 1.00 
100.40 113.7 0.88 
140.07 143.5 0.98 
167.40 180.7 0.93 
170.29 220.7 0.77 
207.27 283.8 0.73 
252.84 374.3 0.68 
402.78 483.7 0.83 
422.71 562.1 0.75 
422.71 604.7 0.70 
457.93 686.9 0.67 
603.86 925.3 0.65 
603.86 1466.2 0.41 
603.86 2350.5 0.26 
603.86 2919.6 0.21 
2579.71 8256.5 0.31 
16948.07 44916.6 0.38 
Sources: 
Official exchange rate (pesos m/n per us$): 
1948-1970: Mallon and Sourrouille (1975) p. 23 
1971-1976: di Tella (1983) p. 222-3 (commercial rate) 
Black market exchange rate (pesos m/n per us$): 
Econ 720 p. 279 
Price level: "Cost of Living in the Federal Capital, Direction National 




Exchange rate figures 1900-47 are black market rate in both columns 
Column 5: constructed from columns 3 and 4; real exchange rate index = 
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The subject of this thesis has been certain monetary and financial 
implications of the currency area structure of the international 
economy. Analysis of these monetary and financial implications of 
currency area structure has involved the use of certain concepts, such 
as that of "currency type EFI", which have been formulated and defined 
for this purpose. An analytical framework has also been developed, for 
the purpose of analyzing the determination, and implications, of the 
structure of the money supply of a currency area, as between its 
domestic and imported components. The analysis developed in the thesis 
has then been applied in some statistical detail to the specific case 
of Argentina. 
A central tenet of the thesis has been that there are cross-country 
differences in the relative shares of the imported and domestic 
components of the money supply which are compatible with monetary and 
exchange rate stability. The analysis developed in the thesis has led 
to the conclusion that currency areas in which the use of external 
financial intermediation (EFI) tends to be of quantitative importance, 
relative to the use of domestic financial intermediation (DFI), will 
require a relatively larger imported component of the money supply. 
The relative shares of EFI and DFI, in turn, are subject to influence, 
in both directions, by government policy. The influence of this factor 
on the desired (or "required") structure of the money supply therefore 
provides a source of government policy influence on the required 
structure of the money supply. We saw that government influence in 
strengthening DFI could succeed in reducing the required share of the 
imported component of the money supply; we also saw that policy 
measures which had been devised for other purposes could result in a 
weakening of DFI relative to EFI, causing the required share of the 
imported component of the money supply to rise. 
The structure of the money supply, as between its imported and its 
domestic components, turned out to have some important implications for 
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the behaviour of an economy. We saw that the structure of the money 
supply would influence relative prices between traded and non-traded 
goods, and that it would influence the extent to which an economy 
suffered from a "balance of payments constraint" on income growth. We 
saw also that when the imported share of the money supply was 
relatively large, the non-traded goods sector could suffer severe 
problems of under-utilized resources because of liquidity pressures; in 
extreme cases the development of monetized markets in non-traded goods 
sectors could be stifled by these pressures, with serious efficiency 
losses resulting from this under-monetization. 
The importance of the influence of the structure of the money supply 
on the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods, and on the 
"balance of payments constraint", stems from the fact that incremental 
money demand, associated with income growth, is large relative to 
demand for individual categories of goods and services. Incremental 
demand for the imported component of the money supply can therefore be 
large relative to total exports and imports, and relative to total 
supplies of foreign exchange. The share of total export earnings which 
could be required simply to meet incremental demand for imported money, 
as income was growing, was given quantitative analysis for the 
Argentine case; the conclusion was drawn that incremental demand for 
imported money has been a major factor in the balance of payments 
pressures experienced by that economy in the post-WWII period. 
The analytical framework developed in this thesis offers a new 
approach to the analysis of a wide range of problems and policy issues. 
For instance, it offers a means of analyzing the idea that "soft" 
currency countries, such as impoverished LDCs or the countries of 
Eastern Europe, should adopt an imported ("hard currency") monetary 
base. The application of the analysis to this policy issue was given 
considerable attention in the thesis. The analytical framework also 
offers a new approach to the explanation of certain historical 
phenomena, such as the emergence of cross-country differences in the 
relative prices and productivity in non-traded goods sectors, and in 
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the intensity of balance of payments pressures. We saw that this 
analysis offered a means of explaining the emergence of some very 
intractable problems in Argentina in the post-WWII period. An 
attractive feature of the analysis applied to the Argentine case was 
that it offered a means of explaining the striking contrast between the 
monetary and exchange rate stability in Argentina in the pre-1930 
period and the post-war deterioration of Argentine monetary 
performance. Application of the analytical framework to the Argentine 
case was given quantitative study. 
We began the analysis, in Chapter II, by looking at the influence of 
certain characteristics of the currency area structure of the 
international economy on patterns of international financial 
intermediation. The analysis made use of the terms "external financial 
intermediation" (EFI) and "domestic financial intermediation" (DFI), 
within which the distinction was drawn between the "currency type" EFI 
and DFI, and the "geographical type" EFI and DFI. The concept of the 
"two money strategy" was also formulated and defined for use in the 
analysis, and the intended meaning of the phrase "the 'currency area 
structure of the international economy" was explained. 
Three structural features were then identified which would tend to 
give rise to the development, within a currency area characterized by 
these features, of EFI at the expense of DFI. The three structural 
features in question have been characteristic of many of the world's 
smaller countries, particularly among the group commonly referred to as 
"LDCs"; these three structural features were also present in the 
Argentine economy in the pre-1930 period. Goldsmith's cross-country 
data on financial structure was used in an attempt to assess the 
influence of these structural features on cross-country differences in 
the historical development of financial structure. 
The conclusion drawn in Chapter II was that the geographical 
distribution of these structural features among the world's currency 
areas has been a factor of importance in determining some of the major 
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cross-country differences in the pattern of financial development. The 
"LDC type" of financial structure as identified by Goldsmith was seen 
to be present in countries which, for the most part, were also 
characterised by the three structural features analyzed in Chapter II; 
on the other hand, these structural features were in most cases not 
present in countries for which the Goldsmith data showed the "DC type" 
of financial structure. 
The influence of policy differences in patterns of financial 
development was not denied. However, it was pointed out that as 
concerns the broad patterns of cross-country differences in the 
international economy as a whole, one would expect the geographical 
distribution of structural characteristics to dominate the geographical 
distribution of policy wisdom or error. It was argued that the cross 
country data presented in the chapter show this to be the case. 
An implication of the analysis was that governments of economies 
characterized by the three structural features in question, would need 
to take the influence of these features into account when formulating 
policy measures designed to foster domestic financial development. It 
has been argued in this thesis that there is an important role for 
official financial institutions in economies of this type, in fostering 
the development of DFI, which is not needed in the same way in other 
types of economies. 
In Chapter III the analysis of cross-country differences in the 
structure of the money supply was developed. The analysis centred 
around the distinction between imported money and domestic forms of 
money, and made extensive use of the concept of "inside" money which 
was developed by Gurley and Shaw. 
Four types of monetary system were identified analytically by the 
various types of money used in each. An algebraic framework was 
developed, and used for the purpose of analyzing these various types of 
monetary system. The algebraic framework was then used to identify 
various factors which might contribute to the determination of cross- 
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country differences in the share of the imported component of the 
monetary base which is compatible with monetary and exchange rate 
stability. This was done by using the algebraic formulation of the 
structure of the money supply to draw together various concepts of what 
constitutes "adequacy" of foreign exchange reserves. The analytical 
framework was then used to develop the argument that a smaller share of 
imported money can be compatible with monetary and exchange rate 
stability when DFI is stronger relative to EFI. 
The central conclusion of the analysis developed in Chapter III was 
that the ordinary notion of monetary policy independence is dangerous 
as well as unrealistic. Attempts to maintain a level of the money 
stock which reduce the imported component of the monetary base below 
the level I have referred to as (G/F) * will result in a worsening of 
both unemployment and inflationary tendencies. Persistence in such a 
policy was seen to result in a rise in (G/F)*, and a rise in the 
imported share of incremental money demand associated with income 
growth. The pressure of a "balance of payments constraint" on income 
growth would be worsened by the increase in incremental demand for the 
imported money. Attempts to alleviate unemployment by this sort of 
expansionary monetary policy were therefore seen as not only self- 
defeating, but also tending to build up increasingly intractable 
problems of unemployment and inflationary tendencies. 
This conclusion does not mean that governments are inexorably stuck 
in a trap between the hazards of excessive monetary expansion on the 
one hand, and intolerable unemployment on the other. On the contrary, 
it was shown that it is possible for governments to tackle both 
problems simultaneously, by operating on (G/F)*, to reduce it, by means 
of improving the quality of the central bank's DFI asset portfolio. 
Detailed analysis of the sources of profit in financial 
intermediation was provided for the purpose of showing the existence of 
this possibility for government policy initiatives. It was shown that 
there were reasons why a government bank could find DFI financial 
intermediation activity profitable when private sector banks would not 
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find it so. The conclusion was drawn that the productive forms of 
government expenditure which are essential to the efficient and 
profitable functioning of private markets can be profitably financed 
through a state or central bank, so that there is no need to allow 
essential infrastructure maintenance to deteriorate for lack of 
finance. 
Cross-country data were examined in an attempt to see whether 
financial structure could be identified as a factor determining the 
success with which economies were able to maintain low (G/F) ratios 
without suffering deterioration in the external value of their 
currency. In general this was seen to be the case. Countries which 
were identified by the Goldsmith data as having the LDC type of 
financial structure were less successful in maintaining the external 
value of their currency with a low (G/F) ratio than were countries with 
the developed country type of financial structure. The cross-country 
data gave some support to the idea that the structure of incremental 
money demand is related to the development of the financial structure. 
This idea was also supported by the historical data offered on the 
structure of the money supplies of France and England and Wales. 
In Chapter IV the analysis developed in the preceding chapters was used 
to address three specific questions. These questions served to bring 
out the answers offered in the thesis to the general question of what 
are the implications for an economy of using an imported money supply. 
The analysis developed in Chapter IV led me to reject the idea that 
the introduction of a Type II (currency board type) monetary system 
would be a successful approach to alleviating the problems of 
impoverished sectors of soft currency countries, by helping to attract 
foreign banks and capital. It was shown that the maintenance of this 
type of monetary system could result in serious problems of under- 
monetization and efficiency losses in the non-traded goods sector. It 
was argued that the introduction of a Type II system should at least be 
accompanied by substantial policy initiatives in the development of 
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DFI, and by provision for a transition to a Type IV system through the 
development of a strong central bank DFI portfolio. 
The lines of argument developed in this chapter provided a new 
explanation for some of the characteristic features of differences in 
the development of markets in traded and non-traded goods sectors in 
economies commonly referred to as "less developed". We saw that the 
"marginalization" of large sectors of the population and regions, which 
has been a distressing feature in many of these economies, can be 
explained partly in terms of the structure of the money supply. It was 
shown that the tendency for non-traded sector prices to be relatively 
low in "less developed" countries, as compared with developed 
countries, can also be explained in terms of the structure of the money 
supply. 
The analysis provided in this thesis can be applied to a wide range of 
historical problems and current policy issues, as has been shown in the 
range of issues discussed. The central message of the thesis is that 
the currency area structure of the international economy has important 
implications for patterns of international financial intermediation, 
for cross-country differences in the structure of money demand, and 
for the international distribution of "hard" and "soft" currencies. 
The analysis developed in the thesis offers a new way of looking at 
some very familiar and intractable problems, and thereby opens up a 
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